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ABSTRACT
The character of state interaction matters. This dissertation quantifies this
interaction from 1960-2001 and then forecasts it from 2010-2050. I contribute to the field
of International Relations by improving traditional measures of Realism and Liberalism,
quantifying new perspectives sensitive to cultural interaction, and statistically evaluating
these indices relative to the occurrence of conflict. It is the first step in an academic
research agenda that desires to expand the scope of possibility regarding the modeling of
International Relations theory for the purpose of theory evaluation and policy analysis.
This dissertation spans two fields of study that do not typically overlap:
International Relations and Integrated Assessment Modeling. I begin by laying a broad
foundation to bridge this chasm. I do this by first exploring knowledge constraints
associated with forecasting. This leads to an overview of my conceptual and empirical
tool for calibrating my final model: the historic occurrence of international conflict. Next,
I introduce conceptual and applied systems theory, which leads to an overview of the
International Futures (IFs) model.
I then explore Liberalism and Realism as they have been traditionally
operationalized at the macro-level. A newly quantified variable—referred to as the
Cultures of Interaction Index— is introduced that builds on Liberal notions and tries to
explain some aspect of intersubjective norms and values operating in a dyad. I perform
ii

statistical analysis on these indices and show that using IR theories in conjunction
explains more of the historic occurrence of conflict—and thus the character of state
interaction—than using any theoretical tradition in isolation. I then endogenize
Liberalism and Realism in IFs and use the cultural measure as an exogenous constant. I
am interested in whether the stock of culture in a dyad and growth in Liberal notions of
interdependence can off-set negative pressures arising from Realism.
Most dyads improve their character of interaction to 2050, but some become more
conflictual, including China – US and China – India. The analysis is extended by looking
at long-term structural shifts in the global system: depleted fossil fuel reserves, stressed
fresh water availability and tension from domestic instability. I conclude by offering a
series of next steps that builds upon this work and recommendations for policy planners
concerned with the future of interstate relations.
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1. Introduction and Overview
The character of state interaction matters. Cooperative engagement among dyads
can foster human development, economic growth and peace. Non-cooperative or
conflictual dyads can become mired in vicious cycles potentially leading to armed
conflict. The 20th century witnessed the consequences of the most destructive output of
poor state interaction: large-scale war killing millions of people and destroying trillions
in capital.
International Relations (See Box 1, below) provides plausible explanations—
many empirically verified—for why state dyads respond differently to internal and
external conditions. IR has been historically dominated by rationalist debates between
two theoretical approaches: Liberalism and Realism.1 Liberals, on the one hand, argue
that high levels of interdependence lead to more pacific, mutually beneficial long-term

1

Throughout this project I capitalize Liberal and Realist to emphasize that I am highlighting an ideal-type
representation of these substantive theoretical positions within IR. Neither position is a monolith, but their
operationalization at a macro level treats them similarly.
Additionally it is important to emphasize at this early stage that the primary goal of this project is the
quantification and forecast of theory. Thus, it neglects theoretical work done at the margin of each main
theoretical position. For example, I am not interested in the multiple variations of balance of power theory,
or democratic peace theory. Instead, I am interested in the fact that material power is important for Realists
and interdependence is important for Liberals and how these have been traditionally operationalized.

1

relations. Realists, on the other hand, point to the importance of international anarchy
which creates uncertainty about state survival and requires that states focus on the
accumulation of relative material power (defined in various ways). A third approach has
been developed over the last two-plus decades. This approach is characterized by nonrationalist accounts of state behavior. These new theories largely use constructivist
methods that emphasize the
Box 1: Typology of Theory:

role of language, ideals, norms,
and culture, which are
understood to be created and
evaluated through intersubjective meaning-making.
These alternative accounts have
gained traction in providing
explanation for state behavior,
but they have not supplanted
the broad, explanatory power
provided by previous Liberal
and Realist theories about state

International Relations (IR) is a sub-field (I will
refer to it as a field in this dissertation) within the
discipline of Political Science whose subject is
the behavior of states. Realism and Liberalism are
both substantive approaches to doing the work of
IR that make similar ontological, epistemological
and methodological assumptions and choices
about their subject of inquiry and come to
generalized conclusions about state behavior. I
refer to Realism and Liberalism as standard
bearer accounts as well for the reasons listed
above. Constructivism is not a substantive field,
but a method of inquiry that privileges the
exploration of intersubjective meaning as a driver
of state behavior. It is not a substantive
approach—like Realism and Liberalism—
because it comes to no generalized conclusions
about the behavior of states in the international
system.

behavior in the international system.
Theories are sets of principles and assumptions used to create hypotheses within
academic fields. Within IR, theories provide analysts with frameworks for evaluating
how changes in the environment are likely to impact state behavior. Each theory—
whether a substantive approach (like Liberalism or Realism) or a method of inquiry (like
2

Constructivism)—offers information that can help humans more accurately understand
state interaction and behavior. The quantification of theory can extend the utility of an
abstract theory by forcing making theoretical assumptions to be explicit, testing theories
against other quantified variables and producing objective measures that can be formally
modeled for the purpose of planning for the promotion of human development.
Since state behavior matters and IR provides tools for assessing this behavior, a
forward-thinking policy analyst should be interested in forecasted, quantified IR theories.
Large structural shifts loom on the long-term horizon: transitions in national material
capabilities, changes in international organization penetration, reductions in fossil fuel
resources, changing availability of fresh water resources, and destabilizing impacts from
state fragility. How these trends impact dyadic state behavior may be important enough to
warrant the establishment of institutions and resources that reasonably can mitigate
plausible negative scenarios.
There is currently no model to forecast the character of bilateral state
interaction—explained in more depth below and introduced in Box 2—that is quantified,
modeled as being integrated to other key global systems, and that deploys a long-term
horizon. This dissertation remedies this deficiency by quantifying IR theory (from 1960
to 2001) and endogenously forecasting it within the International Futures (IFs) integrated
assessment tool from 2010 to 2050. This first chapter lays the foundation for this toolbuilding exercise by introducing this project in general terms. Forecasting is not a well
understood activity within IR, and IR theory is not well understood within the forecasting
community. Because I rely heavily on both fields, this chasm in familiarity compels me
to take multiple steps back to shape expectations about my scope.
3

The first block laid in this dissertation foundation identifies the kinds of things
that we can and cannot reasonably say about the future. This is the focus of the first half
of Chapter 2. The future is fundamentally unknowable, but we plan as if we have some
insight on what lies around the next bend in history. I refer to this as the “problem of the
future”, characterized by our
Box 2: Character of State Interaction
We know when two states have better or worse
characters of interaction. States that have enduring
international rivalries (like India and Pakistan) have
relations that are characterized by conflict. Most
members of the European Union have relations that
are characterized by cooperation. Quantifying this
historically is difficult and requires a dependent
variable that represents the character of state
interaction. For this project the onset of conflict is
used as this calibration tool as it represents a
character of bilateral interaction that is fully
deteriorated.

fundamental need to prepare
for a future that we
fundamentally cannot know.
To plan effectively we need
to seriously consider what
kinds of things we can know
about the future. Variables
that we can be modeled over
long time horizons are those

with well understood stocks and flows. It is possible to forecast both continuity and
change in these cases.
Up to this point, the dependent variable of this analysis was referred to obliquely
as the “character” of dyadic interaction in the international system. We are able to intuit
that one dyad has a better character of interaction than another. For example, Belgium
and the Netherlands cordially interact; Iran and the US have unpleasant relations.
However, to create a quantitative forecast, intuition is not sufficient. Instead, we need an
operationalized dependent variable that can help to tell us when our model accurately
explains the character of a dyadic interaction. Again, see Box 2. The occurrence of
4

armed conflict that leads to battle deaths between sovereign states serves as the
operationalized dependent variable in this project. I use this as my calibration tool both
conceptually and empirically in order to create indices that represent the character of state
interaction across time. The occurrence of armed conflict between two states
unambiguously identifies the full deterioration of the character of dyadic interaction.. It
represents one extreme of a quantified index that gets at something that is difficult to
otherwise operationalize. The second half of Chapter 2 provides an overview of this
variable by exploring how international conflict has been empirically and theoretically
treated in IR.
At the end of Chapter 2 readers will have a good understanding about the kinds of
things that we can reasonably say in forecasts and how this is related to the
operationalized dependent variable used in this project. However, getting from this
understanding to a long-term integrated forecast is no simple task. Chapter 3 lays the next
block in this dissertation’s foundation by providing readers with an overview of literature
and methods related to theoretical and applied approaches to working with complex
systems.Long-term integrated assessment forecasts rely on the interaction of variables
both across and within a wide range of key global systems. These approaches leverage
both conceptual and applied systems theory. Chapter 3 introduces conceptual systems
thinking, focusing on system interaction, characteristics and delineation. This theory
forms the basis for making practical modeling decisions, referred to as applied systems
thinking. Applied systems approaches—often using systems dynamics methods—form
the backbone of our forecast tool. Chapter 3 ends by generally introducing the IFs model

5

structure, developed primarily by Barry B. Hughes over the past three decades and now
housed in the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures.
Chapter 4 turns from issues of forecasting to our understanding of state behavior
in the international system. Here I evaluate the key and generalized arguments within the
field of IR (See Box 1). I focus on Realism, Liberalism and their critics and place special
emphasis on how these measures have been traditionally operationalized. Both
substantive fields in IR are broad in scope, and my account in Chapter 4 is not meant to
fully capture the breadth of either field. Instead, here I am interested in laying out
approaches to understanding state behavior and what kinds of variables have historically
been leveraged to quantify these theories.
I attempt to extend this analysis. I
do this by “pulling threads” from critical

Box 3: Distinguishing CoI Index
from Liberal Index:

perspectives of rationalist accounts in
Countries can have high CoI Index
scores but low Liberal scores, and vice
versa (Chapter 5). Historically,
countries with high CoI Index scores
and low levels of Kantian Liberalism
existed throughout the Middle East and
North Africa and in the former Soviet
Bloc during the Cold War. Countries
with low CoI Index scores and high
levels of Liberalism exist currently in
dyads that are small and physically
distant, like Mongolia and Luxembourg.
There has been a convergence between
the CoI Index and Liberalism across
time.

general, and Liberalism and Realism in
particular. I argue in Chapter 4 that both
standard bearers of IR have been criticized
for being excessively parsimonious, poorly
treating complex networks of relationships
and not giving full shrift to the importance
of interdependently created norms and
values. I am interested in explaining
cultural understanding between states using

Katzenstein’s definition of norms: “collective expectations for the proper behavior of
6

actors within a given identity” (1996, 5). I used these criticisms to build a quantified
measure that explains some of the characteristics highlighted by these critical
perspectives. This third measure in my dissertation is referred to as the “Cultures of
Interaction Index” (CoI Index) and it is created using a dyad-first operationalization itself
constructed from five sub-indices that captures complex networks and tries to draw out
an understanding of culturally driven interactions between states at a dyadic basis (See
Box 3).
Quantifying theory—the job of Chapter 5—is useful but also deeply problematic.
It is useful because, when a theorist sits down and translates an analytical framework into
a quantitative index, she is forced to evaluate extant data (or create her own) and make
clear-cut assumptions about how her concept can be transferred into numbers. This
reduces hand waving and promotes transparency for the purpose of comparison and
evaluation. There are infinite ways to operationalize either Realism or Liberalism. My
approach to solving this potentially debilitating issue is to evaluate my quantification
standards using the following criteria. First, has this approach to operationalization been
used by others (in at least general terms) in academic literature? Second, can this
operationalized index be formalized and modeled within an integrated assessment tool
like IFs? Third, is there a straightforward way that I can build upon previous
operationalization while retaining the second criteria? I make theoretical and applied
contributions to the field by producing new data and quantifying both accounts using
methods that are novel. Quantifying theory is problematic because it can be overly
restrictive, and reduce the nuance and character of questions asked by a substantive
approach or method.
7

After building the two standard-bearer accounts in IR, I turn to the alternative
approach outlined in Chapter 4, the CoI Index. Here my goal is not to create a measure
that can currently be forecast within the IFs system—it is hard enough to forecast
Liberalism and Realism, let alone to construct a new approach out of whole-cloth and
forecast it as well. Instead, my goal here is to create a historic data series that can be used
as a tool for statistical analysis and as an initializing value in my forecast exercise. The
CoI Index largely builds upon previous operationalization of Liberalism and Realism, and
should be seen as a quantified compliment
to those approaches instead of a refutation.

Box 4: Can we Forecast Culture?

As this measure cannot be forecast, it is the

Chapter 2 argues that forecasted
variables need well understood stocks
and flows. Culture can act as a stock
across time—we can measure it
based on a public opinion poll of
values, or by using other proximate
measures. However, understanding
its flow is much more difficult, and it
appears to be discrete: whether Saudi
Arabia and Iran move from a
conflictual culture to a cooperative
one is contingent on drivers of
behavior well outside the scope of
this analysis. Thus, the CoI Index
remains an exogenous component of
this forecasting project.

core of my uncertainty going forward (See
Box 4).
The final section of Chapter 5
evaluates a claim that has been tacit
throughout this introduction: IR produces a
series of tools that are more useful when
used in an integrated analysis than when
taken as separate explanations for behavior
in the international system. I evaluate this

by taking my three indices—the Realist, Liberal and CoI—and creating a series of
logistic regression models that are fit to the historic occurrence of conflict (measured in
various ways). Here I find that an approach that simply adds up the three indices
produces a stronger fit to the historic data than any of the approaches in isolation. This
8

both validates my contribution in adding the CoI Index to this analysis as well as my later
use of the Integrated IR Index (the addition of Realism, Liberalism and CoI Index scores)
to produce analysis on the future of state behavior.
With my historic analysis completed, I turn to the Base Case behavior of IFs in
Chapter 6 (See Box 5). I operationalize my analysis by using the same Liberal and Realist
measures that I created and analyzed in Chapter 5. I
Box 5: What is the Base Case
of IFs?
The Base Case is a scenario
produced within the IFs model
that continues policy choices,
technological advances,
economic decisions, and natural
system behavior similarly to its
behavior since the end of the
Cold War. This scenario does
not include radical change and
generally forecasts improving
human development.

initialize each dyad’s score with the 2001 CoI Index
score (the most recent historic data available) and
keep this flat across my time horizon (2050). The
Realism and Liberal indices vary and form the core
of my analysis.2 I find that, on the whole, the
character of dyadic interactions is improving, though
serious problems persist. I then explore some of
these most dangerous dyads—including China – US
and China – India. I end this chapter by going on a

global tour of regional powers and the forecast Integrated IR Index. This analytical
exercise highlights the scale of applicability of the tool created in this project, which only
begins to scratch the surface of possible utility.

2

Each dyad’s Integrated IR score forecast is initialized using 2010 values for Liberalism, Realism and the
CoI Index. The CoI index remains constant across the time horizon. Both Liberalism and Realism change
across time and the CoI index remains the large scenario oriented uncertainty (in other words, if a dyad
experiences a deterioration across time we can talk about how much an increase in the CoI Index would
need to compensate for this deterioration).
The inability to forecast the CoI Index is another reason why standard Liberalism is not operationalized
initially on a dyadic basis. Forecasting dyadic relations—such as trade—from the ground up is beyond
current capabilities in a large-scale, long-term model.
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Base Case behavior considers the impact of Liberalism, Realism and an initial
condition that attempts to explain the culture of interaction between a pair of states.
Because these forecast variables are themselves comprised of sub-measures, and each of
these sub-measures is deeply endogenized within the IFs system, they already consider
impacts from structural shifts in the international system. However, the treatment of
structural shifts within IFs does not directly connect to changes in the character of
bilateral interaction. In other words, the structural shifts—such as running out of fossil
fuels—will impact economic variables and thus relative power, but they will not directly
drive state behavior in the model that I created.
I extend the analysis of Chapter 6 by evaluating the potential impact on the
character of state interaction of three structural transitions on the global horizon in
Chapter 7. First, as many countries with low levels of fossil fuel reserves begin to run
out, a relatively larger amount of production will shift to countries with extensive
reserves. This has the potential to impact dyadic relations between these countries
andGreat Powers trying to keep global markets churning. Second, the increasing pressure
put on freshwater systems from agricultural production and population growth for dyads
that share a river basin may have dramatic impacts on vulnerable dyads. Third, I measure
the disruptive power of state instability in politically relevant dyads using an indexapproach to analyzing vulnerability to domestic conflict.
This analysis identifies new hot-spots not identified in Chapter 6 that should be
relevant to policy planners and analysts. An example of this output is shown below in a
word cloud. The countries in this visualization are those who have quantified overall
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indices3 that deteriorate over time, indicating that improvements in interdependence
(Liberalism) are outstripped by deteriorations in other drivers. The size of the country
name in the visualization below correlates to the number of deteriorated dyadic
relationships forecast over the next four decades. As a point of reference, Iraq and
Mauritania are forecast to have 10 dyadic relations that reduce in character.

Word Cloud of Dyads with Deteriorated Total Scores between 2010 and 2050

I draw the following conclusions from this dissertation. They are likely relevant to
forward thinking policy analysts:



Gains in Classical Liberal drivers—trade, democracy and embeddedness in
international political systems—are forecast to improve state relations across the
great majority of dyads

3

The fully quantified index, explored in Chapter 7, contains the following: fully endogenized Realist,
Liberal, Fossil Fuel, State Fragility and Water indices and an exogenous CoI value that stays flat across the
forecast horizon pegged to 2001 values.
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Pressures from relative material power are forecast to have destabilizing impacts
on Great Powers relations in spite of gains made by Liberalism: China – India,
China – US and India – US



Stabilizing interventions brought about by state fragility are forecast to be less
common, though some states remain concerns over the next four decades:
Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad and Myanmar



Fossil fuel production is forecast to become increasingly concentrated (mostly in
OPEC countries) and will continue to remain a key for Great Power planning
even as the world moves towards greater renewable energy production



Water resources are forecast to become more constrained in key river basins
(North-East Africa, Middle East, Central Asia), leading to the possibility of
deteriorated relations among states in these regions



The following states experience a confluence of pressures that do not outstrip
gains from Liberalism, and should be of general concern: Iraq, Mauritania,
China, Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan



Central Asia remains a serious concern for deteriorated interstate relations driven
by low levels of growth in Liberalism coupled with the rapid rise of Turkmenistan
(and their increased importance as a gas exporter), pressure from water stress and
slow improvement in state fragility

This dissertation is one stage in a broader project designed to model IR and forecast
the character of state relations. It is a tool building exercise, and more tools need to be
developed to finally accomplish this ambitious task. I have created new data and
12

structures that will form the basis of projects going forward that attempt to further
evaluate how states have interacted in the global system. Future work should address
broader networks of alliances internationally, take more care to treat regional power
distribution to identify politically relevant dyads, and conceptually hone quantified
indicators that can more effectively identify culturally relevant interactions between pairs
of states.
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2. The Future and Conflict
“We shall see strange things before we die. Dare we guess at what they will be?”
-Abramo Fimo Kenneth Organski4
"This volume is about war—that single collectively organized human effort which has taken more human lives than
any other"
-Manus Midlarsky5
"History usually makes a mockery of our hopes and our expectations"
-Robert Jervis6

Introduction
Humans are stuck in the present but constantly moving through time. Because we
(generally) desire to make a better life for ourselves and community, the constant ticktick-tick of existence compels plan us to for what lurks around the corner. However, what
lies ahead is fundamentally unknowable. We are stuck with the problem of the future: we
are compelled to plan for it (and take action based on those plans) but we are unable to
know what it holds (and thus unable to know if the decision we are taking is the right
one).
4

(Organski 1958, 433)

5

(Midlarsky 1975, xvii)

6

(Jervis 1991, 39)
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Our understanding of the past and present informs our understanding of the
future, though all three time-spaces are fraught with epistemological complexity and
uncertainty. The past is filtered through the subjectivities of the many who tell its stories
and the traces of evidence that remain in the present. The present is complicated by the
number of interacting variables and complexities occurring at any given point and the
limitation of being one subjectivity occupying only a very limited terrain. The future is
shrouded in a veil of uncertainty.
We are tied to a need to understanding the future, and the first section of this
chapter sets a framework for thinking about what we can and cannot know. We act as if
we know things about the future in the same way that we act as if we know the past. We
have no absolute reason to believe that either fully corresponds to “reality”. We are
forced to make decisions about what is salient, more plausible and to learn from our
mistakes along the way.7
Putting forward an epistemology of the future8 sets the path for understanding the
kinds of things that we can say about conflict over a 40 year time horizon. This is the
goal of the second half of this chapter. This project cannot forecast when two countries
will go to war over the next 40 years; that is beyond all human knowledge. However,
informed by IR scholarship, we can analyze and assess the relative pressures acting on a
dyadic relationship in the international system. Chapter 3 builds on this by presenting a

7

This approach to decision making is partially argued for by Sharon Welch (2000).

8

This section of Chapter 2 does not more broadly engage in debates about epistemology. Instead, the
purpose of this chapter is to bring people up to speed on the kinds of variables that we can forecast over
long time horizons.

15

theoretical and applied systems framework for understanding these questions, along with
an introduction of the specific modeling technique.
Humans have a long history of trying to explain war. This has led to studies,
theories, and findings on the subject. These previous works are useful, and form a block
in the foundation of this project. However, as long-term forecasting is constrained by
methods, technologies and epistemology, expectations about the scope and scale of what
can be said reasonably about the future of war needs to be established.

Epistemology of the Future
We know absolutely nothing about the future because it has not occurred. The
events of the next decade, day or minute are not knowable in any absolute sense. That
said, there is reasonable evidence to
Box 6: What do we want to forecast?
assume that many currently observed
phenomena will continue tomorrow,
and for some time. In fact, we live our
lives as if there is much continuity
between the past, present and future.
This section introduces
characteristics related to the type of

This chapter will argue that the variables
that we are most interested in forecasting
are those where we can reasonably
measure both continuity and change.
Forecasting things like a sunrise is
uninteresting because we only understand
continuity and not change in its behavior.
Forecasting population is interesting
because we understand both continuity in
the trend as well as change.

variable that we are interested in forecasting over long time horizons (See Box 6). First, it
must be a continuous trend, or at least a trend that can be understood in continuous terms.
Second, the variable must have well understood stocks and flows that can be quantified.
Stocks are the foundation of forecasting: they are accumulations of things that remain
relatively consistent across time periods, such as population or capital. Flows take away
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or add to stocks in any given period of time. Finally, the system in which the dependent
variable is situated must be understood well enough to be able to forecast both continuity
and change. We cannot forecast discrete events. However, we can use conceptually well
understood continuous trends to measure the probability of the occurrence of a discrete
event, related to our understanding of its historic occurrence. We also are not interested in
forecasting trends where the underlying stocks and flows are not understood. In these
variables—things like the force of gravity or the sunrise—we can understand continuity,
but have no ability to measure change. All of this is outlined in more detail below.
The past tells us that there are things that we have been able to successfully know
about the future and other things that have evaded human foresight. It is important to
distinguish between different types of dependent variables and what we can know about
their behavior. To begin this exploratory process, I present a taxonomy that distinguishes
the degree to which variables have been accurately forecasted on one axis and our
understanding of causality9 related to their forecast on the other axis. The variables
identified in Figure 2 should be understood as descriptive categories. This section should
be seen as a compliment to Chapter 3 which fleshes out the concepts discussed here in a
systems framework.

9

The treatment of causality in this section ignores the obvious problems associated with the term. Causal
relationships are difficult to understand—especially in the study of war—and our understandings of
causality should be tempered with great humility.
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Figure 1: Epistemology of the Future

Starting in the bottom left of Figure 2, humans are unable to forecast the specific
movement of particles that results from being bombarded by atoms—Brownian Motion—
and we have no understanding of the causal mechanisms that drive its behavior (in fact,
the longitudinal trend of Brownian Motion is a synonym for randomness). On the other
end of this cross-cutting axis we have World Population which we have forecast both
continuity and change with high levels of accuracy and whose causal mechanisms we
understand clearly. The alternative cross-cutting axis describes a different set of
dependent variables. Gravity is in the bottom right of Figure 2, the force of attraction
between objects with mass. We have been very accurate in our historical forecast of
Gravity (so accurate that many would not even claim it to be a forecast), however we do
not understand its deeper causal mechanisms. Many physical “constants” or “laws” fall
into this category. The top left category—an Earthquake—is a category where we
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understand the causal mechanisms that behave on the relationship, but have little ability
to forecast it accurately.
Figure 2 draws attention to the distinction between forecasting continuity and
forecasting change. In the top right we have a good understanding of forecasting both
continuity and change in these dependent variables: we understand when population
systems grow, when they peak and when they decline. On the bottom right we have the
ability to forecast continuity, but not change. There is no mechanism—either theoretical
or applied—for understanding if and how the forces of gravity will change from one year
to the next. We rely on the assumption that, because they haven’t changed, they won’t
change.
The difference between continuous trends and discrete events is also identified in
Figure 2. First, continuous trends are those that can be measured (at least perceived) and
have a clear trajectory across time. These events—like the average change in temperature
across seasons in a given year—have cyclical behavior that produces patterns. Discrete
events are defined as those that occur independently of driving variables,10 such as the
occurrence of a violent conflict between parties, the occurrence of a natural disaster or an
unexpected interpersonal gesture. An Earthquake and the drivers of Brownian Motion are
two events that appear to be discrete when they occur. The force of Gravity and World
Population appear to be continuous trends.
The difference between a continuous trend and a discrete event hinges on two
concepts: the treatment of time and our measurement of causal mechanisms. The
10

There are actually no discrete events in the world, as this would require a fully closed system with no
drivers. Events appear to be discrete at times when we do not understand the causal logic. When discrete
events are referred to in this project it should be understood to be referring to apparently discrete events.
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treatment of time is one way to distinguish the top right and top left of the diagram,
above, though it is also relevant for our understanding of the bottom two dependent
variables. Most dependent variables are discrete at extremely long time horizons. Take
global population as an example. If the time horizon is the last 200 year, or so, the trend
appears to be continuous. This is not the case if the trend is taken over a much longer
time horizon. Figure 3 shows global human population with a multiple billion year time
horizon. At this level of distance, human population appears to be a discrete event. In
terms of our diagram above, it would fall into the upper left category, as we have a good
understanding of the causal mechanisms that are at play for the advent and growth of
human civilization (evolution from more primitive organizes, organization into families
and societies, the advent of farming, cities, etc.) but would have a nearly impossible time
forecasting when this event would have occurred over the course of known history.

Billions of People

World Population Over Time
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Figure 2: Global Population - Long Time Horizon

If our time horizon is extremely short, even an earthquake can appear to be a
continuous event. If our perception of time was shortened to Planck Time (the time
required for light to travel 1.616199×10−35 meters in a vacuum) an earthquake would
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gradually increase in strength, plateau and decline. It would appear to be a continuous
event. However, because our filter is the human mind, generally accepted perceptions of
time should be the reference point used to assess whether we have the ability to forecast
dependent variables, and an Earthquake and Global Population stand at opposite ends of
this spectrum.
The second distinction between discrete and continuous events relies on our
ability to understand and operationalize conceptual variables. We have a good
understanding of what causes earthquakes. Shifts in tectonic plates along well established
fault lines produce massive amounts of friction and vibrations that shift the earth’s crust.
However, we are both limited in our deeper understanding of the drivers of earthquakes
and our ability to operationalize key variables. The exact reason that plates shifts is not
fully known, and could be due to changes in electromagnetic fields, pressures deep within
the earth or long-standing movements that have been building pressure for thousands of
years. Additionally, our ability to measure the exact amount of pressure between plates,
the composition of the earth in areas most vulnerable, and the broader impacts from
shifting plates on the other side of the world is impossible to operationalize. In other
words, we do not have a global model of tectonic plates and geography that is sufficiently
complex to capture the necessary effects to deal with accurate prediction of an
earthquake.
We can understand and forecast global population levels with much more
accuracy than we can the occurrence of an earthquake because we both understand the
causality in population systems and are also able to operationalize key variables
effectively. Population growth and change is contingent on well understood driving
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mechanisms. At its most basic on a global level it is directly driven by two variables:
fertility and mortality rates. Fertility rates are driven by income, contraception use, infant
mortality and female education. Mortality rates are driven by levels of income,
technology and the prevalence of certain types of diseases.
This moves us to an important component of variables that we can forecast well
and that we understand causally: stocks and flows. These concepts are treated in more
detail in Chapter 3, but I introduce them now. To forecast continuity and change in a
variable with accuracy—especially over a long time horizon—it is important to have a
continuous dependent variable with well understood stocks and flows. In population
systems, the stock from year to year is the overall number of people who are alive.
Globally, there are two flows: births and deaths. First, as explained above, being able to
operationalize these measurements is crucial. Second, the systems most easily forecasted
are those with relationships where the stock remains fairly consistent for the time horizon
in question and the flows do not change dramatically. See Figure 4 that traces the stock of
global stock of population over time compared with the overall flow.
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Figure 3: Population Stock verses Population Growth Rate

While I have used population systems as my example of variables that are
accurately forecast and well understood conceptually, I could substitute the overall size
of the economy as well. Global economic output (as measured by GDP and which is not a
stock, but a flow) is similar to global population in that it is a continuous trend for a
human oriented time horizons whose underlying components are well understood.
Broken down, economies are made of three things: the overall stock of capital, the stock
of labor and the stock of technology. We have clear measures of each of these three
stocks, we understand why they grow and shrink year to year (the strength of the flows)
and this allows us to talk about the long-term propensity for growth in an economy.
Economies are, however, different from population systems, in that their year-toyear growth projections are less smooth. Figure 5 shows the growth in global GDP over
time as compared to the annual growth rate in global GDP. The growth rate over time
experiences movement around a central trajectory (shifting from a moving average of
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nearly 4% down to a moving average closer to 3%), but these shifts are difficult to
forecast over a long time horizon. GDP growth rates are typically forecast over a shorter
time horizon (both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund forecast countrylevel GDP growth rates over three year time horizons).
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Figure 4: GDP verses GDP Growth Rate

The annual growth rate (the rate of change in the overall flow of GDP year to
year) is forecast over a short time horizon effectively because it is driven by variables
that we understand well but that change rapidly. For example, supply, demand and price
are all components of short-term growth and these are all mediated through billions of
individual subjectivities, which are less well understood (thus, things like “consumer
confidence” and “market sentiment” become drivers of growth in short term models, but
not long-term models). Government policy decisions—effectively discrete events that we
understand causally (located in the top-left of Figure 2)—also have strong impacts on
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growth rates. The frequency and intensity of storms—something that certainly evades a
long-term time horizon forecast—also impact GDP growth rates.
The focus of this project is international conflict, which is a discrete event similar
to the occurrence of an earthquake. Like earthquake forecasts, forecasts of international
conflict rely on measuring variables that are associated with the discrete event and that
also have characteristics that are conducive to accurate long-term forecasts (well
understood stocks and flows, continuous trend, etc). They thus become forecasts of the
probability, or likelihood of the discrete event happening.
Probability is a measure of certainty related to the occurrence of a discrete event
in a time-period. These measures can take various forms but two are particularly relevant
to this project:


the output of a model fit to the previous occurrence of the discrete event



a conceptual index of variables associated with the discrete event

Both of these approaches are discussed in greater detail later in this dissertation.
This chapter takes this conceptualization of what we can say about the future and
applies it to our understanding of international relations. The occurrence of war appears
to be a discrete event whose causal mechanisms we fairly well understand. We have a
hard time operationalizing some of these measures with long time horizons. I will use this
framework to identify the specific dependent variable measured in this project. This then
leads to Chapter 3 which provides a systems theory conceptual and practical framework
to talk about how we model and how we produce long-term forecasts of continuous
trends with well understood and operationalized causal mechanisms.
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Treating War: Calibration Device
I am interested in quantifying the character of state interaction in the international
system. Do states interact in ways that are agreeable or disobliging? A quantitative
measure of this must be calibrated to some dependent variable that is not a part of the
original index creation process (thus avoiding multicollinearity). This section introduces
the operationalized variable that I use for this calibration: the occurrence of international
war.
We intuitively know when states have better or worse relations. We know, for
example, that the US has a better relationship with the UK than the US does with Cuba.
In an ideal world this information would be easily quantified and validated for a large
number of dyads. An operationalized measure like this could then form the backbone of
the forecast analysis pursued in this project. However, information of this kind does not
exist. Because of this I am forced to select an alternative measure that gets at some
component of the character of dyadic interaction in the international system.
International war involves organized violence between states and results in the
slaughter of humans. It generally occurs when the relationship between a dyad has
fundamentally deteriorated, resulting in physical violence being the accepted vehicle for
solving political disagreements. Dyads with cooperative patterns of interaction do not
typically go to war, and examples are scarce across time relative to the total number of
dyad-years.
This is the first reason that war is a fundamental part of this dissertation. I use it as
a measure of dyadic relations that have clearly deteriorated. The “worst” scores in my
Integrated IR Index should show the occurrence of conflict, while the “best” scores
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should correlate with non-conflict. War is also fundamentally important for this analysis
because it is an operationalized series that is not used as a component of Realist, Liberal
or CoI Indices. We cannot use levels of bilateral trade as a dependent variable to point to
which dyads have better interaction because it is a sub-measure used in the creation of
my indices. Similarly we can’t use embassies, treaties, IGOs or levels of democracy. As
such, we need an “outside” variable to play the role of calibrator.
The second reason that war plays a key role in this analysis is that I am most
concerned with which dyads are most likely to experience a future deterioration in the
character of their interaction across time. I am less concerned with dyads that are likely to
improve the character of their interaction, though the identification of this is a useful
output of this project. My most obvious normative concern in this project is the
avoidance of armed violence between states, and improving our ability to identify where
conflict is likely on the horizon. This value is the second reason that an exploration of
armed conflict is an important component to this analysis.
As the operationalization of war plays such an important role in this analysis, I
feel compelled to treat the literature around it seriously. I use the remainder of Chapter
2—building upon the analysis done earlier—to argue for the specific kind of dependent
variable that we want to use to determine whether states have better or worse relations.
War occurs when distinct political groups engage in armed violence in an attempt
to resolve a disagreement. The above definition works conceptually, but is difficult to
operationalize. For the purposes of measuring war’s occurrence, scholars and
practitioners use definitions that emphasize battlefield fatalities. The threshold for
conflict varies by the index in question (for Uppsala, it is 25 battle deaths over the life of
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the conflict, for Marshall, it is 500, and for the COW group, it is 1,000 (Gleditsch et al.
2002; M. Marshall 2003; Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Singer and Small 1994)).
These events are grouped by the kind of units engaged in violence: either
domestic (civil war, for example) or international (between two sovereign states). The
historic distribution of international conflict is different from the distribution of domestic
conflict. Some examples from different data sets below help illustrate this. Overall, the
stories told by the different operationalizations of conflict are the following:


international conflict is a relatively rare event



domestic conflict occurs more frequently than international conflict



domestic conflict occurrences/magnitudes peaked at the end of the Cold War and
have declined to levels seen closer to the middle of the 20th century

The first is the data on war compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Group (UCDG) in
Sweden and displayed in Figure 6 (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Gleditsch et al. 2002;
Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005). The number
of conflicts has grown from a low point in the early 1950s of around 15 on an annual
basis to a peak of over 50 during the turmoil at the end of the Cold War. After this peak,
the overall number of conflicts decreased to less than 40 conflicts annually for most of
the first decade of the 21st century.
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Figure 5: The UCDP Data (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom, Högbladh, and
Wallensteen 2006; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005)

Figure 6 also highlights the relative frequency of interstate conflicts to all other
types of conflict since the end of WWII. There has also been great growth in intrastate
conflicts over time, rising from less than 10 per year to almost 50. Interstate conflicts
have been a relatively small portion of the overall conflict mix over time representing at
most 5 incidences of conflict in a given year, and as few as zero.
The data in Figure 7 track a similar trend, and are compiled by Marshall at the
Center for Systemic Peace (M. Marshall and Cole 2009; M. Marshall 2003). This graph
measures the overall magnitude of conflict, and not the numbers of conflicts, as were
being measured by the UCDG group above. In spite of the different dependent variables
the two graphs show a similar trend: overall, conflict starts out at a relatively low level at
the end of World War II, climbs to the end of the Cold War, and then eventually falls
again, but not yet to the level experienced directly after 1945. The Center for Systemic
Peace group and the UCDG group both show similar distributions in the breakdown
between domestic and international conflict. “Societal Conflict”—domestic war—starts
out at a very low level after WWII, grows quickly and consistently, and then falls sharply
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after the end of the Cold War. International conflict remains relatively low throughout the
entire period.

Figure 6: Center for Systemic Peace Historic Conflict Data: Total Magnitude of Conflicts (M. Marshall and
Cole 2009)

Figure 8 explores the Correlates of War Data (Singer and Small 1994; Singer
1972; Singer 1978; Sarkees and Schafer 2000) and was re-produced from data published
by Sarkees, Wayman and Singer (2003). These numbers explore a longer time horizon
than either the UCDG or Center for Systemic Peace data. It again compares international
and domestic conflict, though this time does so in terms of the number of conflict onsets
by decade. The occurrence of international conflicts peaked at the end of the 19th
century, with 20 per decade. This distribution has since waned through the 20th century.
Civil wars, on the other hand, show a different distribution entirely. The number of onsets
fluctuated throughout the 19th century, and takes off after WWII.
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Figure 7: COW Data: Civil and International War (Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and Singer 2003)

Domestic conflicts have occurred more frequently than international conflicts.
This has led to an increase in focus on these types of conflict in the academic and policy
oriented literature, specifically since the end of the Cold War. This focus has been largely
warranted, though scholars and practitioners should not neglect the occurrence of
international disagreements as a key issue moving forward. As Chapter 1 indicated, while
large-scale international conflict is on the decline and the relative frequency of smallscale international disagreement is also in retreat, the absolute number of Militarized
Interstate Disputes continues to grow.
While the world has learned lessons from the destruction of previous large-scale
conflicts, militarized disagreement between states continues. These disagreements often
lead to confrontation that falls short of the traditional measure of 1,000 battle deaths.
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) are used to operationalize these lower-threshold
conflicts. This measure is defined as:
“Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or
use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state.
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Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual
combat short of war” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 163)

The line graph below takes MIDs and measures them two ways: first, their
absolute value across time and second as a percentage of the total states in the
international system (Russett, Singer, and Small 1968; Singer 1980). This figure tells two
stories about the development of international disagreement. The blue line measures the
percentage of total possible dyads that are involved in a Militarized Interstate Dispute in
any given year (using a 5 year moving average). Throughout the 19th century, around 1
percent of total possible dyads were involved in conflict. This measure spikes during
World War I and World War II up to over 3.5 percent. It falls quickly at the end of World
War II and continues to decline to the end of the time horizon. As of 2000 less than 0.5
percent of total possible dyads experienced international conflict. The probability of a
state in the latter half of the 20th century engaging in a Militarized Interstate Dispute was
lower than at any other point since the beginning of the 19th century. This is a positive
development.
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Figure 8: Militarized Interstate Dispute - 5 Year Moving Average, Measured Two Ways (Ghosn, Palmer, and
Bremer 2004, 3; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996)

The red line tells a different story by measuring the absolute number of MIDs. It
demonstrates relatively low levels of overall conflict in the 19th century with spikes
during World War I and World War II, a similar story to the measure of percentage of
dyads with conflict. However, the two accounts diverge in second half of the 20th century.
Here decolonialism and the end of the Cold War birthed new states and new conflicts.
These new countries offset the absolute jump in MIDs, making the increase in conflict
difficult to see in the relative measure.
A state at the beginning of the 21st century could, on the one hand, consider itself
lucky: the probability of involvement in a MID was lower than at any point in the
previous two decades (not to mention there being an impressively small chance of
involvement in a massively destructive war). On the other hand, a state might engage the
international system warily: the absolute number of small international conflicts was on
the incline. States continue to disagree, finding reasons to quibble, which can lead to
small-scale military disputes. Even if dyadic tension does not rise to the level of violence,
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disagreements can weaken previously strong relationships and produce issues for foreign
policy and diplomatic engagement.
This section of Chapter 2 explores the literature on international conflict. It builds
a foundation that is linked back to the discussion at the beginning of this chapter. I argue
that, if we are interested in modeling and forecasting international conflict, we need to
hone in on a dependent variable that is conceptually well defined with a continuous
historic trend and well understood stocks and flows.
This project forecasts vulnerability to international conflict in the same way that a
seismologist forecasts an earthquake. Instead of trying to predict the occurrence of a
discrete event, I measure continuous and conceptually well understood trends that are
linked to the occurrence of international conflict and that are informed by IR theory. This
allows me to create indices that measure the relative likelihood of international conflict
occurring between two pairs of states. I begin by tracing fundamental concepts in the
study of international conflict.

Fundamental Concept: Levels of Analysis
The “Levels of Analysis” debate informs theories that identify the causes of
international conflict. This is important for this dissertation because I am drawing on
theory that operates at the systemic level11 but I eventually operationalize things entirely
at the dyad level. I introduce this concept here to inform the kinds of things that we can
say about the future of international conflict. Explanations for the causes of war take
place at three levels: humans, the state and the international system (Waltz 1959).

11

Structural Realism clearly is a system theory in IR, Wendt’s Cultures of Anarchy is clearly at the system
level and Cosmopolitanism is at the system level as well, among others.
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Individual system theories—the most granular level of analysis—highlight drivers
of international conflict that take place at the level of human decision maker. These
explanations for the conditions for war deal with human nature, psychology, perception
and personality. Much of the structure of this outline of human causes from war draws on
Cashman (1993).
Human nature has been considered to be a driver of international conflict for
some time. Authors like Hobbes, Spinoza and Freud all identified aggression and hostility
as core components of human nature and behavior. These, it was thought, were the
fundamental drivers of conflict between people. Extrapolated, these also became the core
drivers of war. These are the necessary conditions for war.
Another group of theorists eschewed the rigid essentialism of discussions of
human nature and instead focused on aspects of human emotion, personality and
perceptions. Some, like Adorno, identified specific traits that made someone more likely
to make dogmatic decisions, and thus predisposed some to be inflexible in problem
solving, potentially leading to choices made that emphasized violence. Etheridge, for
example, categorized personalities in the Johnson administration as being either
introverted or extroverted. Those who were extroverted tended to prioritize inclusive
policies towards the USSR compared to the more introverted (1978).
Misperception has also been explored by a variety of authors as a driver of
international conflict (Jervis 1976; Levy 1983). By perceiving reality to be different than
it is, leaders may make decisions that promote conflict by 1) believing that opponents are
more belligerent than they are; 2) misunderstanding an adversary's level of material
power; 3) believing that war is an inevitability; 4) expecting war to be short and not
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costly; 5) not understanding third party states' goals and desires; or 6) not understanding
the other's worldview (Cashman 1993).
A third kind of explanation for drivers of war bridges individual systems and state
systems. This group of theories focuses on how state decision making can be made by a
kind of group-think mentality that drives misperceptions, thus leading to conflict. Janis,
for example, argues that there was pervasive groupthink in the Kennedy administration,
thus leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion (1982). Another kind of bridge between the
psychic system and state systems is game theory, stimulus response theory and
rationality. These approaches anthropomorphize the state into a rational actor who is
(typically) interested in maximizing security.
In international conflict, states do not go to war by themselves; they always need
a partner (though this partner may be unwilling). Thus, the second level of analysis—
state systems—focuses on how domestic pressures and bi-lateral pressures can lead to
war or peace. At this level of analysis, the most germane drivers of international conflict
are relative to one state's position to another. Geographic continuity has been shown to be
the main driver of international conflict, for example (Bennett and Stam 2004). Territorial
disputes are one of the main drivers of international conflicts, and have been shown to be
one of the main causes of conflicts over time (Jensen 1982). Many states have gone to
war with a neighbor when this neighbor has shown high levels of instability and is itself
weak. Blainey argues that, from 1815 to 1939, a full 15% of conflicts have occurred
directly after a neighboring country has been engaged in civil conflict (1973). Others
have argued that states have used intentional conflict as a way of mitigating negative
implications of domestic instability (Rosecrance 1963). This "diversionary theory of
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conflict" has been shown to be a driver of US involvement in military activities during an
election year (Ostrom and Job 1986). Maoz has found that there is a link between
domestic revolutionary movements and international conflict. When states emerge from
their own revolutions, they tend to be more heavily involved in international conflict
(Maoz 1989).
Additionally, states can be differently constrained by their own government
systems. States that are more pluralistic in their decision making, it is argued, have a
harder time amassing troops for conflict. On the other hand, states that are autocratic may
have a less difficult time urging young people to go into battle, as there is a monopoly on
decision making. This explanation for war is dealt with in the section below, outlining the
international system.
The international system does not go to war, but it is an important theoretical
level of analysis related to the drivers of international conflict. Instead, of going to war,
the international system is the context in which wars occur. The international system
level is also a fundamental component of understanding the difference between Realist
and Liberal accounts of conflict.
Realists argue that international conflict will always be with human beings—no
matter how altruistic our intentions are—because the international system is not
structured hierarchically. Stemming from Hobbes, these authors argue that hierarchically
organized systems allow for the promotion of peace and stability because there is an
authority that can establish peace through force. Since the international system is not
itself structured hierarchically, states are forced to fend for themselves. These conditions
create a self-help system and lead to distrust and violence.
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On the other side of the coin, Liberals argue that the international system contains
pieces of interdependence and norms that exist beyond the direct control of states.
International agreements, though they are not made binding by an international hegemon,
still change the cost of state-based decisions. When states agree to economic, political or
other international treaties and agreements, they increase their interdependence with other
states, thus bringing about a context where some decisions can be made on a level
ideational plane.
Causes and Correlates of War
Suganami argues that there are three types of questions about the cause of war
(1996). The first are questions concerned with the necessary conditions for war. The
second are interested in the kinds of conditions that tend to be present when wars occur.
The third are questions concerned with how a particular war came about at a particular
point in time.
These questions highlight broad differences in our understanding of war. The first
question focuses on the kinds of things that have to exist for war to take place, a kind of
question interesting for philosophers. The third question concerns specific wars, the kind
of thing germane to regional experts. This project is invested in building a model that
highlights answers to the second question. This approach shapes the following
conceptualizing of a model of international conflict.
The "kinds of conditions" that are frequently present when international conflicts
occur are the causes or correlates of war. Specifically leveraging the work of the
Correlates of War project (Singer 1972), this dissertation privileges an understanding of
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correlation over causation, or, in Suganami's words, an understanding of the "kinds of
conditions" that are frequently present when war occurs (1996).
So, what then are the conditions that tend to be present when wars occur? Recent
work by Bennett and Stam has quantitatively assessed the relative strength of different
drivers of international conflict on the history of war (2004). It has found that, in the
diagram below, the variables on the left decrease the likelihood of international conflict
while the variables on the right increase the pressure for international conflict. They are
organized by the relative strength of these variables impact, from stronger effect (on the
top) to weaker (on the bottom).

Figure 9: Probabilistic Drivers of War (Bennett and Stam 2004)

Drawing on lessons from the first section of this chapter, many of the variables in
the diagram above can be useful for long term forecasting. In other words, they are
variables where we can reasonably model both continuity and change across time. These
types of variables mush have well understood stocks and flows. For example, any
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measure of material power—and thus drivers of both Power Transition theory and
Balance of Power theory—rests on an understanding of military spending and growth in
overall GDP. The deeper stocks of those measures are capital, labor and technology. It is
impossible to forecast continuity and change over long-term time horizons for other
variables in this list.
Take, for example, membership in NATO. Whether NATO is a relevant alliance
grouping in 20 years is a difficult to ascertain because modeling change in that driving
variable requires understanding the deeper drivers of membership and how these are
likely to change. We simply do not have adequate information (either conceptually or
quantitatively) to forecast continuity and change within this variable, and it thus becomes
inadequate for thinking about the long-term behavior of states.
Bennett and Stam are just the latest in a long line of researchers who have
quantitatively explored the conditions that are frequently present for the occurrence of
war. These include Wright (1964), Singer (1972; 1978; 1994), Singer and Small (1994;
1966), Ray (1995; 1993), Diehl (1988; 1983; 1985) etc. While quantitative models are
useful, the study of war suffers from a variety of problems that make them incomplete.
First, wars happen very infrequently. This makes their statistical evaluation very difficult.
For example, there are approximately 16,000 pairs of countries in any given year.
However, the number of conflict pairs engaged in war is very small, somewhere in the
range of 0-10 per year. Thus, approximately only 0.03% of all country pairs are involved
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in conflict in even the most violent of years.12 This presents problems for statistical
analysis.

War and the Future
Long-term forecasts of the occurrence of war can be conceptualized using the gasand-rag metaphor. The rag represents a pair of countries. The amount of gas on the rag
indicates the vulnerability that these countries have to conflict. This is the continuous
trend with well understood stocks and flows that are measured in this project.
If a dyad has high levels of gas on their rag then they are more vulnerable to a spark
causing a fire. Sparks are the wild-card events that take place at levels-of-analysis that are
overly granular for this project (such as leadership decisions, the specific occurrence of
mass movements, etc). We cannot forecast sparks, but we can measure continuity and
change in the amount of gas on the rag over long time horizons.
The gas on the rag—the output of the project—is the likelihood that a pair of
states will experience conflict in a given year. Likelihood—or probability—is a measure
of our confidence in the outcome of an event and can be measured in various ways.
Others—see the discussion of Bennett and Stam above (2004)—have created quantitative
models with the historic occurrence of conflict that accurately fit a statistically significant
probability to the occurrence of conflict. I do not replicate this work. Instead, I am
interested in the likelihood of conflict as measured through a conceptual index.
Conceptual indices are useful for analyzing international or domestic conflict. The
historic occurrence of conflict is a very rare (as a percentage of possible occurrences) and

12

This is conflict defined by 1,000 battle field deaths, since 1960.
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is driven by variables that significantly differ across cases. The characteristics of
quantitative date related to international conflict can pollute results produced by
probabilistic measures because the data do not conform to normal sampling, among other
problems. Thus, an index measure of conflict can be a useful addition to pure statistically
driven models. The distinction between using probabilistic and index models already
exists in the field of measuring domestic fragility to conflict.
But measuring the amount of gas on the rag for any given dyad is contentious. IR
theory tells us that there are competing accounts of the drivers of vulnerability to conflict,
with Liberals and Realists standing largely in opposition. This project takes this division
and works it into a framework for analysis. I operationalize these two IR theories and add
a third built on standard criticisms of both Liberalism and Realism. I use these three
operationalized IR theories to build an index of the dyad-year threat of international
conflict between each pair of states in the international system.
This chapter has set one block in the foundation of the dissertation by presenting a
framework for understanding what we can say about the future as well as introducing our
understanding of international relations theory vis-à-vis war. Bringing these two threads
together points to what I am modeling and analyzing. The dependent variable measured
in this dissertation is the dyadic vulnerability to conflict operationalized through an index
built from IR theory and forecast from 2010 to 2050 and it is a proxy for the character of
state interaction (discussed in Chapter 1). I cut into this problem using state dyads as the
level of analysis informed by the system level of analysis but rejecting the human system
level of analysis.
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3. Systems Theory and Modeling: From Concept to Integrated
Application
“Every living organism is essentially an open system”
-Ludwig von Bertalanffy13
“The ability to predict outcomes in open systems is beyond all science”
-Colin Wight14

Introduction
Chapter 2 outlined a foundation for thinking critically about epistemological
considerations associated with the long-term forecast of pressures associated with
international conflict as a proxy for the character of dyadic interaction. There I concluded
by highlighting what we can reasonably forecast over long time horizons: vulnerability
towards international conflict using variables taken from IR theory with continuous
trends, stocks, and flows. I used Chapter 2 to identify the dependent variable, but the
method leveraged to produce results remains unspecified.
All theories are models and all models are representations of reality. Models are
used in all aspects of life, both academic and applied. Models take an infinitely complex

13

(Bertalanffy 1968, 39)

14

(Wight 2006, 52)
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space (an open system) and prune it down into something that humans can work with (an
apparently closed system).15
Different accounts of the causes of war rely on models. A Liberal model may look
like this: increasing levels of bilateral trade and democracy will lead to regions where the
threat of international conflict decreases. A Realist model may alternatively go something
like this: global anarchy forces countries to focus on changes in relative material power,
which can upset pacific relations and increase the pressure for war.
Formalizing a model requires following clearly defined steps. First, all of the
crucial variables used in the model need to be outlined, typically in a schematic. Next, the
key relationships between these variables need to be identified. Along with identifying
the important relationships, it is crucial to establish the direction of the relationship: for
example, does increased democracy increase or decrease the pressure for international
conflict? If our model is sufficiently complex, we need to take into consideration how
different modules within the broader model interact with one another. With a multilayered quantitative model, putting numbers to all of the variables is not sufficient: one
has to also be concerned with how the model behaves in different situations.
Understanding systems is helpful for building both of these models for the
following reasons. First, when dealing with models that involve a large number of
variables, systems thinking can act as a tool for organization. Second, when creating
models where there is interaction between different sub-systems, systems thinking can
help identify the expected behavior of interaction. Third, when dealing with large

15

Open Systems are defined as the units that constantly interact with other units in a broader environment.
Closed systems are defined as a select group of units interacting separate from an outside environment.
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numbers of variables and complexity, a system approach helps to account for all activity
within the model. Fourth, system approaches can create a framework in which models
can be conveyed transparently.
Just as the first chapter set the foundation for thinking about forecasting,
modeling and the long-range future of international conflict, this chapter sets the stage for
the rest of the project by exploring the implications of system thinking on a model of
international conflict. This chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it outlines previous
attempts to use systems thinking and the theoretical foundations of the field. Next, it
presents applied systems thinking, a requisite of actually formalizing our quantitative
model. Finally, it uses these first two steps to build a modelling framework that can be
used to plug in the theoretical approaches of IR for the purpose of long-range forecasting
in a quantitative model by introducing the International Futures system.

Approaches to Thinking Systematically about Systems: Three Questions
"The systems theorist's orientation is to describe and predict complex elements and relationships in the real world...it
has been easier to specify than to achieve"
-Arlyn J Melcher16

Saying that the work of science involves the use of systems is redundant. All
science does systems, just like all science does models. While a focus on system thinking
may at first appear non-descriptive, this is not the case. While all science uses systems, it
does so in a wide variety of ways with varying degrees of commitment.
Generally, systems are "sets of elements standing in interaction" (Bertalanffy
1968, 38). However, when we typically talk about systems, we are referring to something
with more distinct characteristics. Systems always have a boundary, and one main
16

(Melcher 1975, 3)
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consideration is the demarcation of that boundary. Systems are also comprised of units,
which constitute the character of the system. The relationship of different units in a
system is the system structure. One key question in the field of system thinking is the
relationship between system unit and structure. Each system is embedded within other
systems, either partially or fully.
Theories about system thinking have existed since the post WWII era. These
approaches—most notably General Systems Theory (GST)—attempted to bring a more
rigorous methodological approach to the treatment of systems to all areas of science. GST
eventually became hypertrophic (Weltman 1973), overly focusing on the concept, and
less focused on added value and practical application.
This section explores the three kinds of questions about systems referred to
earlier: 1.) What are systems made of? 2.) What are typical system behaviors? 3.) How
are systems delineated? This theoretical treatment of systems will then bridge to a more
practical treatment of systems, eventually resulting in the full conceptualization of our
forecast model.
System Components and their Interaction
Simple systems contain a boundary and elements within that boundary that have
at least one conjoining characteristic. Complex systems increase the number of units
within the boundary, compare interactions across boundaries, explore the correspondence
across systems or inspect a system as it changes through time. This section begins with a
simple understanding of systems, and builds in complexity, working through relevant
arguments and literatures germane to the topic.
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Waltz argued that the systems were composed of structures and interacting units
(Keohane 1986, 70). This simple elucidation is reminiscent of von Bertalanffy's
parsimonious definition of systems as "sets of elements standing in interaction"
(Bertalanffy 1968, 38). Waltz stated that the definition of structure was separate from the
characteristics of units. The key to understanding structure is to ignore unit interaction
and instead focus on unit position. This “property of the system” is then built upon to
argue that there are two main forms of political unit positioning: hierarchical and
anarchical, with the former operating at a domestic level and the later at an international
level.
Waltz’s understanding of system constitution is helpful, though misleading. It is
true that, in the most abstract, systems are composed of units. The position that these
units take vis-à-vis one another represents the structure of a system at any given point in
time, another of Waltz’s points. However, the approach is misleading because it does not
focus on the kind of unit or the type of unit interaction, but rather their relative position to
one another. Unit type and interaction matter because they change the quality and
character of the system structure.
This simple approach to understanding systems brings about two system
components that have come to represent foundational theoretical decisions that must be
taken at the occurrence of any system analysis: how much of a system is units and how
much of a system is structure? Unit-emphasizing theory is typically referred to as agentbased analysis, or reductionist analysis. Structure-emphasizing theory is typically referred
to as holism. Reductionists critique holists because they lack agency. Holists critique
reductionists because they underemphasize (or entirely negate) structure. However, each
47

theory can build up or down to take both agent and structure into account. This section
will explore the agent-structure debate in full, but not yet.
Agent-based accounts that use a strong system method largely developed out of
the cybernetic tradition (Wiener 1948). Cybernetics is an interdisciplinary approach to
understanding the composition and character of systems building specifically out of
mathematics and engineering, though used in other fields. The approach was applied in
nature, and eventually built out to studies of artificial intelligence and agent-based
modeling.
The agent-based modeling trend is most clearly seen within the school of thought
that has come to be called Complexity Theory, and is most notably rooted within the
Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico, USA. "Complexity theory involves the study of many
actors and their interactions...a primary tool of complexity theory is computer simulation"
(Axelrod 1997, 3). As argued by Phelan, Complexity Theory is neither General System
Theory nor a series of postmodern "...metaphors or analogies based on resemblance
thinking" (2001, 132). Instead, it is a, "...search for generative rules," that do not to seize
the, "...radical holism of systems theory" (Phelan 2001, 130–1). The scientists engaged in
these pursuits identify complex effects that stem from simple causes and try to map the
regularities observed. The components of complex systems involve agents, strategy,
measures of success, copying, population, type, variation, interaction patterns, artifacts,
which all add up to the term "system" (Axelrod 1999, 4–6). The goal is not to try to
overcome complexity, but to harness complexity (Axelrod 1999).
It is harder to pin down one group as a representation of the holist side of this
debate. Some—like Luhmann—strip any standard understanding of agents out of his
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theory, instead arguing that the world is comprised of four main kinds of systems:
mechanical, biological, social and psychic (1995, 2). The standard understanding of
"agent"—as in a human acting within a system—becomes a combination of a psychic
system (consciousness, psychology) coupled with an organic system (the body, brain).
These systems then interact in social, organic and mechanical systems. Thus, if agency is
understood to be action within a system, as per Archer (1982), for example, then there is
still agency, as "human systems" still exist. However, this "agency" is not the same kind
of agency explored within, for example, Complexity Theory.
Systems analyses highlighted here neither build-up a theory (e.g. agent-based
modeling) nor build-down a theory (e.g. a fully structural model). These theories involve
and explore the interaction of different system components. This middle-ground is most
notably seen in the Agent-Structure debate.
This debate has spanned academic disciplines and time and is obviously germane
to a discussion on the composition of systems. This debate, “…concerns how to develop
an adequate theoretical account which deals simultaneously with men constituting society
and the social formation of human agents” (Archer 1982, 455). Taken out of an
anthropomorphic context, the disagreement was about trying to reconcile how units both
shape and represent structure, and how structure is fully comprised of units, yet shapes
units.
The discourse began fruitfully, but without a mechanism to move beyond pedantic
claims about the cause of system change stemming either from agents or structures, it
appeared still-born. Empirically, both agents and structures bring about important change
in any system. A theory that took this into account needed to be developed.
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In IR, Wendt's well known article brought this issue out into the open (1987). In this
piece, he argues for the use of Giddens' “structurationist” approach (1984; 1979). In the
words of Archer:
“Giddens’ approach hinges on overcoming three dichotomies and it is these
dualisms which he strips away from a variety of sources, then recombining their
residues” (1982, 456).
First, Giddens views human action as being deeply embedded within actions in
society, transcending the dichotomy between voluntarism and determinism. Second, he
promotes the subject’s knowledgeability in her creation of society, while also keeping in
mind that the subject is aware that they employ societal processes in this process, thus
transcending the subject/object dualism. Third, Giddens rejects theories that separate
static and dynamic treatments of time, thus transcending the synchrony/diachrony
dualism. Structuration is mainly concerned with, “…amalgamating the two sides of each
divide” (Archer 1982, 457).
This approach to solving the agent-structure problem was criticized by Doty, who
argued that it did not go far enough and that agents were eventually underemphaisized
and structures overemphasized (1997). Wight, another prolific writer about the agentstructure problem (2006), responded to Doty, arguing that she was searching for final
solutions to an issue where none existed (1999).
Archer pushed this debate further afield by arguing for a “morphogenetic”
approach that was distinct from the “structurationist” approach by promoting a final end:
the reification of overall structure (1982; 1995).
“’Morphogenesis’ is also a process, referring to the complex interchanges that
produce change in a system’s given form, structure or state…, but it has an end-
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product, structural elaboration, which is quite different from Giddens’s social
system as merely a Visible pattern” (Archer 1982, 458).
The “morphogenetic” takes the attempted dynamism of the “structurationist”
approach and gives it a telos. The “structurationist” approach understood the
structure/agent interaction to be complex, and evolving over time. However, it did not
identify a clear and concise way in that this interaction could move through time without
appearing muddled. In other words, the “structurationist” approach understood
complexity to end with complexity, and not to lead to something concrete.
Archer reconciled this by providing a clear time frame through which
agent/structure, or in the language of Archer, action/structure, interact. In T1, structure
exists independent of action. In T2, structure and Action interact. By T3, this has caused
structure to become elaborated, which can be understood as the autopoietic moment
within the system movement. By T4, structure again sits, elaborated, and independent of
action (Archer 1982, 468).
In terms of system operation, many have argued that social systems are driven by
agents, that these individuals are the "action" in Archer's construct. Luhmann, however,
argues that it is not just individual action that is what drives system operation but rather
communication. This is how social systems are able to reproduce themselves.
Communication occurs through three ways: information, utterance and understanding
(Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005, 28). This communication must be understood writ
large; it is the combination of all things that transfer information from one unit in the
system to another. These communications produce specific understandings which then
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must be accepted or rejected by another unit in the system. Communication is similar to
Bourdieu's habitus (1977).
Interaction across systems is different than interaction within systems. Luhmann
is again helpful in this regard. Communication that occurs within a system is relatively
smooth, as everyone is essentially speaking the same language. However, across systems
communication is difficult.
“The living system is inaccessible to the psychic system; it must itch, hurt, or in some
other way attract attention in order to stir another level of system formation—the
consciousness of the psychic system into operation” (Luhmann 1995, 40).

System Characteristics
All system analysts identify system characteristics. This language has a certain
kind of utility but has also contributed to hyperbole. It is important enough that I include
an analysis of it here, but this project does not focus on generalizable system
characteristics. I rather am interested in the specific kinds of characteristics that emerge
from systems at any given point of time and dependent on their structure.
Some of the important nomenclature associated with General System Theory are,
"...boundary, feedback, entropy, homeostasis, growth and decay and threshold,"
(Milburn, Negandhi, and Robey 1975, 11) along with, "...negentropy, equilibrium, and
steady state..." (Wenninger 1975, 23). Complexity theory accounts for change in the
world with the deployment of eight key concepts: fitness, coevolution, emergence, agentbased systems, self-organization, punctuated equilibrium, and fitness landscapes
(Richards 2000; Lewin 1992; Kauffman 2000; Kauffman 1995; Kauffman 1993; Berardi
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2009; Axelrod 1999; Axelrod 1997; Clemens 2002, 3). Each of these concepts deserves
elaboration.
Table 1: Systems Characteristics: General Systems Theory verses Complexity Theory

Boundary
Feedback

Entropy
Negentropy
Homeostasis
Growth

Decay

Threshold
Fitness

Coevolution
Emergence
Agent-Based
Systems
SelfOrganization
Punctuated

System Characteristics: Definitions and Terms
General Systems Theory
The line of demarcation that separates one system from another.
Unit dynamic interacts with another unit in a system over time.
Feedback occurs when, for example, increases in fertility
increase the population, when then further increases total
fertility.
The loss of energy in any organic or mechanistic system as per
the second law of thermodynamics.
The energy that a system expends to reduce entropy.
How well a system can manipulate constitutive units to remain
stable.
Increasing the amount of units in a system or the complexity of
the relationship between units (through, for example, changing
unit type)
Decreasing the amount of units in a system or the complexity of
the relationship between units (through, for example, changing
unit type)
A place that is a boundary where a system goes from one state
to another. Previous growth or decay rates change and new rates
apply.
The ability of a system to withstand change in its environment.
Complexity Theory
The observed tendency where one system in close physical
proximity to another system change in similar ways. The
change in one system impacts other systems.
Lower level complexity resulting in higher level complexity.
Systems that are created by the actions of agents, who create
system characteristics that are associated with Complexity
Theory.
The units of a system independently and autonomously create
and stabilize the system in question.
System changes happen when a threshold is passed, and do not
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Equilibrium
Autopoiesis

progress linearly.
The ability of a system to reproduce itself.

The list above gives a taste of how different theories have tried to cut into
complexity. Some themes appear. First, there is understandable overlap between different
theories at different points in time: the General System Theory concept of homeostasis is
relatively similar to the Complexity Theory concept of fitness; the General System
Theory concept of threshold is also similar to the Complexity Theory concept of
punctuated equilibrium. Differences are also noticeable. Complexity Theory is does not
embrace the radical holism of General Systems Theory, and this leads to an agentoriented emphasis (Phelan 2001). Characteristics of systems involve agent-based
interaction and self-organization which results in emergent properties. General System
Theory does not address ground-up emergence.
What is the utility of identifying a series of characteristics that seem to stretch
across disciplines and time? First, it gives us something to look for: if we approach a
new kind of complex system, we can see if we identify the characteristics and traits in the
above list. Second, if we identify one of these characteristics in a system, we can use this
as a point of reference to other systems. Third, some of these concepts are foundational
and useful: complex systems involve feedback, have boundaries, sometimes grow and
sometimes decay.
This focus on system characteristics may have been part of the reason that
General System Theory did not survive as an academic discipline, and why, in my
opinion, Complexity Theory is headed for a similar fate if it tries to be all things to all
fields. It is odd to imagine that a list of system characteristics will be applicable across
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systems in a wide range of fields. What these approaches end up being reduced to is a set
of labels that are arbitrarily slapped on characteristics in situations in which we already
have perfect useful words.
A piece by Clemens is a good example (2002). In this, Clemens explores the issue
of ethnic conflict in east Europe by applying concepts of Complexity Theory. He
identifies four groupings of countries, and claims that one group in particular has
developed with more stability for two reasons that stem from Complexity Theory: it has
more fitness and it coevolved with Europe. Coevolution is a product of proximity, and
social science has multiple ways of talking about things that are closer to each other
impacting each other. The term coevolution adds nothing, and one word that would be a
suitable substitute is proximity. The term fitness—and Clemens uses democratic
institutions and open markets as a proxy for this—is argued to be a synonym for stability.
If fitness means stable, why not use the word stable?
Complexity Theory has much to offer through the promotion of agent-based
models, which provide novelty and potential understanding for how large groups of units
interact and produce interesting results. The work of the Santa Fe Institute is a beacon for
this kind of productive work. However, as a grab-bag of labels that can be slapped on
system characteristics to sound sophisticated, it risks becoming irrelevant.
Trying to identify system characteristics that are applicable across academic disciplines
may be a waste of time. Certainly, some system characteristics are quite useful—like
growth and decay—but they are clearly not the sole purview of systems theory, nor are
all systems always behaving in any of these ways. Systems theory should instead provide
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a framework for understanding and analyzing trends instead of attempting to create a
model that all science can be wedged into.
System Delineation
Separating one system from its environment can be complicated. System
delineation can happen in at least three ways: separating systems based on a measure of
importance or influence, dividing systems hierarchically based on a metric of abstraction,
such as into core/periphery or organizing systems based on the functions that they
perform (Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005, 36).
World Systems Theory and Hegemonic Stability/Transition Theory are two
approaches to system delineation that divide states in terms of their relative influence.
World Systems Theory—most notably proponed by Wallerstein—argues that the
international system can be divided into core and periphery (and, in the case of some
theoretical progeny, the semi-periphery) (1979). All important resources flow from the
periphery to the core. These system components are distinguished not by function, but by
influence.
Hegemonic Stability/Transition theory argues that there are qualitatively different
kinds of states within the international system. When one state holds a preponderance of
global power, it becomes the hegemon and is able to bring about stability within the
broader system. This kind of system separation argues that different kinds of seemingly
like systems can be distinguished based on their importance or influence.
International relations theory—especially Realist iterations—separates state
systems based on their relative positions to one another, and not by their function or their
influence. In other words, they separate systems based on what kind of system they are.
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States are a certain kind of system that differs from an international system that differs
from a psychic system. This is the ontological distinction highlighted by Buzan (1995,
203).
Waltz accomplished this by identifying the causes of war as emanating either
from the system, state or individual (1959). The logic underlying this demarcation
requires that one see different kinds of aggregations of units as representing different
systems. For example, the international system is an organization of units that was
particularly anarchic, and thus distinct from the hierarchy of states. Individuals were
systems organized in altogether different ways, and in many ways (especially in accounts
that reject classical Realism) fall mostly out of the analysis.
The system delineation identified by Waltz created a debate within IR theory on
the different ways in which levels (read: systems) should be separated. As all state
systems occupy a similar position vis-à-vis their (shared) environment, they are all
treated similarly. This may underemphasize important sub-state characteristics that are
germane for the IR theory (Singer 1961). Additionally, by lumping all "units" in the
"international system" into one general category, much of the difference between unit
interaction is missed. This, it is argued, can be overcome by focusing on how different
states in the international system interact (Buzan 1995). Luhmann also separates systems
based on their type. He divides the world into four systems: organic, mechanistic,
psychic and social (Luhmann 1995).
The third method for delineating systems is based on what the system does. This
approach—labeled by sociologists as "functional differentiation"—focuses on the kinds
of tasks that are charged to different systems. Easton defines political systems as being,
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“...oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society” (Easton 1965, 50).
Gilpin, drawing on Kindleberger, identifies the economic system and the political system
by what they do: "...economics takes as its province the creation and distribution of
wealth; politics is the realm of power"(Gilpin 1975, 22).
Though Luhmann breaks down general systems into four types—identified
above—he is most interested in social systems. These kinds of system are separated from
other kinds of systems because their method for reproduction involves communication.
Within social systems writ large there exist myriad sub-systems, each of which is
functionally differentiated.
Social systems are also broken down by type: society, interaction and
organization (Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005). Society encompasses all
communication. Functionally differentiated social systems distinguish one from another
by their “binary coding” (Seidl, Becker, and Luhmann 2005, 36). For example, the legal
system is distinguished by communication that is understood as referring to the
legal/illegal binary; economic systems the payment/non-payment binary, art the
beautiful/ugly binary, etc.
The over-lap between different systems then depends on the kind of
communication that happens at different points through time. For example, in buying a
house, the legal system will transact the title based on understandings of legality; the
economic system will be reified through the transaction of payment, etc. As systems are
functionally differentiated, multiple systems can temporarily exist at the same time.
The point of system delineation—along with the point of systems theory in general—is to
take complexity, break it down into manageable chunks, but to lose as little as we
58

imagine possible. If we can take our level of analysis—the globe—and break it down into
large systems whose logic can apply broadly—across culture, space and hopefully time—
then we are able to say something potentially useful about the whole.
Moving to an Applied Systems Approach
Applied system theory deploys core concepts that help to unpack the complexity
of theoretical systems thinking for their eventual formalization and modeling. This is the
bridge between the discussion in Chapter 2 and our eventual model output. These applied
models start being built at around the same time as the introduction of General System
Theory. They are closely associated with the development of computing power. With the
ability to calculate much larger series of data than was possible before, researchers could
formalize problems and tackle differently than previously. Some of the more notable
system thinkers are Jay Forrester and Donella Meadows (Jay Wright Forrester 1971;
Meadows, Randers, and Meadows 1992).
A foundational concept to understand in the study of system dynamics is the
difference between stocks and flows, concepts that should be familiar to readers of
Chapter 2. Building on that analysis, systems dynamics modeling help us to formalize
assumptions in order to formally represent the kinds of variables that we can forecast
over long time horizons. One basic example of a formalized systems dynamic model is
demonstrated below. National stocks of population are understood as being directly
driven by three independent variables. First, there is the flow of new people being added
to the population. Second, there is the flow of people being removed from the population
through death. Third, there is either an inflow or an outflow of people who migrate or
emigrate. This is a simple demographic model.
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Figure 10: Simple Demographic System

These simple models can become complicated as feedback loops are added and
time is taken into consideration. The model below highlights two of the three drivers of
population growth, with their respective feedback loops. Thus, as more babies are born,
the population grows. Higher population rates ceteris paribus then lead to higher births in
the future. On the other side of the equation, when people die, they remove from the total
population. As the size of the population shrinks, again, ceteris paribus, the amount of
people who die will shrink as well.

Figure 11: Dynamic Demographic System

This highlights some of the complexity involved in presenting issues in this
simple format. In a general sense, yes, the above relationships do hold. However, when

60

time is considered, along with dynamic trends—such as the education level impacting
when and how many children families have—the picture becomes quicly complicated.
There is much happening in this simple diagram, and many variables that are not
yet represented to fully represent a demographic system. The three variables are both
independent and dependent variables. Depending on levels of births and deaths,
population levels will eventually equilibrate at a measurable stock. There is much that is
missing, and a full understanding of population growth would require an analysis of the
deeper drivers of the proximate drivers of population, along with an understanding of
how these different systems interact with one another.
This further and deeper understanding of demographic drivers is one of the things
that an integrated assessment model like IFs attempts to accomplish. For example, look at
this slightly more complicated causal diagram, showing the interaction of three systems,
and building upon the previous analysis of the demographic system. If we start in the
upper right, we see the positive feedback loop that we identified in the previous image
between babies born (in this case, we're using the more technical term, the Total Fertility
Rate, which is a measure of the total amount of children that one women will have in
their lifetime) and total population. As more babies are born, the population increases,
leading to more babies being born.
Now, let's look at the impact of one system on another system. In this instance,
the size of the population has a direct impact on a variable in the economic system: the
size of the labor force. For this example, let's assume that the economy needs more labor,
though this would not obviously be the case in all countries. Higher labor then leads to
higher levels of overall output (within the economy, the stocks are labor and capital, and
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the flow is output, typically measured as GDP). Higher levels of economic output have
impacts on other systems as well. In this instance, we highlight their impact on the
Education system, where higher economic output can help fund higher enrollment rates.
Higher enrollment rates lead to more education, which eventually leads to a decrease in
fertility rates and an increase in productivity.
With the arrows indicating the direction of the relationship between each of the
variables in question, we can see that, as we drawn it, this system is a negative feedback
loop. If time was taken out of the equation and the relationship between each of our
parameters was identified, the total population after a number of model iterations would
decrease. This is the decay feature discussed by General System Theory theorists.

Figure 12: Dynamic Interaction of Multiple Systems
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In the figure above, each sub-system is a different System Type. The Economic
and Education sub-systems are both social systems that rely on the interactions of human
agents working within Functionally Differentiated tasks. The Demographic System, on
the other hand, is a natural system—though heavily influenced by social systems—that
measure the amount of people who enter or leave a population.
Time Lags are a component of system analysis that helps to parse complex
systems into more manageable chunks. In the example above, time was not taken into
consideration, and the impact of population on fertility rates was assumed to happen
immediately. This is obviously not the case. When fertility rates increase, more babies
have been born. For this to increase levels of the population, at least 14 years and more
likely 20 years have to pass. Taking time as an independent variable is crucial for the
modeling of complex systems.
The Marginal Need of one variable as a component in the computation of another
variable also was only tacitly referred to in the example above. In that example, I said
that we should assume that the economy needs more labor, thus making the positive
linkage between labor and GDP correct. However, the Marginal Need of GDP for either
labor or capital will determine whether an increase in labor or capital will have a larger
input on economic output. If an economic Structure—the relationships and kinds of units
that comprise an economy—is already heavily endowed with capital, it will likely need
more labor; an economic system that already has excesses of labor will likely need more
productive power.
This leads to another point about trade-offs that can be inferred from the diagram
above: because of limited resources, there is often—if not always—a Trade-Off in
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decision making. Enrollment rates were directly tied to economic output within the
education sub-system. This connection is typically made through public investment in
education, which then helps to attract students through improved quality and access to
education. This government investment—like all investments in global systems—takes
place amid various other choices. For example, governments must choose to invest in
either education or the military, among other sectors that require funding.
Identifying that these kinds of choices exist within the analysis of complex
systems brings us back to the agent-structure debate. To what degree do agents shape
structures, and how do structures in turn shape agents? This is a fundamental aspect of
understanding complexity in large systems, and further reveals the ability of humans to
talk about these systems in the future.
It is difficult or impossible to forecast the impact of an individual on structure—
the next Mugabe, Bush or Thatcher—because these impacts are discrete events. It is
possible for individuals to change structure and future events, and this may obviously
have long-term impacts. There are two responses to this: because these kinds of impacts
cannot be mapped with current levels of technology—not to mention reasonably foreseen
future levels of technology—people who use integrated assessment models do not use
them. Second, it is also argued that the changes brought about by individual personalities
and leaders are not as impacting on overall structure as some may seem to believe: the
Second Iraq War, for example, while making large changes in a very short time, did less
to alter long-term patterns of development within crucial systems like economics,
demographics and energy. Much of structure is beyond the reach of single individuals.
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That said the reach of large groups of people can more substantively shift the
structure of a system. Actor behavior responds to a wide range of predictable independent
variables. If the price of energy becomes dearer, individuals use less, and the price is
driven down. If actors have higher levels of education, they make different decisions
about fertility, for example.
Take the structure of savings and consumption in the United States as an example
of the interaction between agents and structures in a system. In the 1990s and 2000s,
agents in the US responded to an abundance of cheap credit by reducing savings and
increasing consumption. Thus, the economic structure—promoted by low interest rates
and limited regulation—shaped agent behavior. Agent behavior—responding to signals
from the economic structure—spent widely and saved little. This behavior promoted
financial speculative bubbles in various sectors, most notably within real estate. When the
bubble reached a limit, the global economic system was altered. This interaction, well
documented by Archer, is a fundamental aspect of the study of large systems in complex
environments. Integrated assessment models do not necessarily track bubbles (though
they can be useful in identifying them) but they can model large-scale behavior of agents
on system structure.

Using Systems Theory as a Foundation for Integrated Analysis
As argued in Chapter 2, variables where we can reasonably measure both
continuity and change are those most typically forecast over long time horizons. These
variables tend to be continuous with well understood stocks and flows. The beginning of
Chapter 3 presented a framework for thinking about how to construct models that took
into consideration widely accepted system behavior, both within and across boundaries.
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This final section of Chapter 3 brings these threads together and presents an integrated
approach to long-term modeling.
Integrated analysis is an approach to viewing the world that can be applied to
empirical or theoretical considerations. It rests on the assumption that everything is
connected to everything else. Integrated analysis is less interested in proving theories
“wrong” and more interested in identifying under what conditions theories demonstrate
utility and integrate these theories into tools (both empirical and theoretical) for analysis.
The remainder of this chapter explores how integrated approaches can be used to produce
quantitative models.
Integrated assessment models are a particular class of models that take into
consideration key variables from a wide range of systems. This approach does not
forecast trends in isolation, but endogenized the calculation of the widest range of
variables and systems possible. The International Futures model—the cornerstone of this
dissertation project—endogenizes the largest number of variables from across the widest
range of system of any quantitative model in the world.
The section that follows highlights standard forecasting techniques (qualitative
and quantitative, though focusing mostly on the quantitative). It underscores the
importance of the explicit structuring of stocks and flows in a relationship to produce
forecasts that can measure both continuity and change in dependent variables. This
eventually builds to a broader discussion of the importance of integrated assessment
modeling, the characteristics of IFs and then will point the way to how an integrated
approach can also be useful in bringing together different strands of IR thought.
How We Forecast: a Stylized Introduction
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Good forecasts of variables that measure both continuity and change require the
following: a clear dependent variable, and a well defined time horizon, a combination of
qualitative and quantitative approaches and the ability to factor in variables from a wide
range of key systems, a characteristic of integrated approaches to modeling. For this
example, I demonstrate this approach to forecasting using the population of Japan as an
example. I contrast it with other formal modeling approaches.
Qualitative approaches—relying on mental models—are the backbone of the
construction of quantitative models. Mental models form the basis of our assumptions
about the world. A mental model about the change in Japan's population may go
something like this: population is driven by fertility, mortality and migration. Japan's
migration is very low, its fertility is low, and its mortality is low. One additional driver of
future population size is the shape of the distribution in the population. Japan has a lot of
old people, few young people and few people are having children. This will lead to a
decrease in Japan's overall population sometime in the relatively near future.
A quantitative approach could start by simply extrapolating the historic trend.
Extrapolation requires fitting a line to the curve by running a regression with time as the
independent variable. In the example below the historic data is represented in the green
line and it stops in 2005. The blue line is the extrapolation, with an r squared of 0.92,
which is very high. It looks like we have a pretty good model and that the population of
Japan will be somewhere around 130 million by 2030.
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J apan Population - Log Extrapolation (LOGARITHMIC TREND)
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Figure 13: Japan Population - Log Extrapolation

We should not be overly convinced by the results from this method. It is entirely
a-theoretical. To improve on this forecast we need to combine both theory and
quantitative methods. To reinforce a point made earlier: this method doesn’t embrace the
structural character of population systems and thus can only forecast continuity in a trend
and not change. I am interested in variables where we can forecast both continuity and
change over long time horizons.
First we formalize the assumptions in our mental models. In quantifying this
population model, I need to understand the mathematical relationships between all key
variables. For example, what is the current fertility rate of Japan, and how do we expect it
to change? What changes fertility rates? What is the current mortality rate? What
changes mortality? What is the current population structure, and how does this affect
future fertility? Once all of these assumptions are established within our quantitative
model, it becomes possible to create forecasts.
In order to make this model quantitative, we explore the relevant trends
statistically. This provides us with relationships between our key variables across time,
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and relative to all countries where there is data. After we have made our model—in this
case, a demographic model of Japan—we now want to explore the implications from
variables in other relevant systems. Demographic changes are driven by changes in
education levels, income and the current structure of the population. For a good, longterm forecast, we want to take all of these potentially impacting systems into account.
Let's compare our earlier extrapolation of the history of Japan's population with our
dynamic forecast of their population. Below, the difference between our a-theoretical
extrapolation and a dynamic model is a different in population in 2030 of around 15
million people.
Japan Population - History and Forecast
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Figure 14: Japan Population History and Forecast

After we have our quantitative forecast, it is important to return to a qualitative
assessment. Quantitative forecasts cannot stand on their own free from theory and
subjectivity. Quantitative forecasts are born of qualitative assessment and their results are
then analyzed using qualitative techniques. For our forecast of the population of Japan,
we may wonder if our quantitative model is producing the results that we would expect.
Are we showing the population decline that we expect?
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One additional qualitative assessment tool to shape forecasts is the creation of
different stories called scenarios. Scenarios area tools that forecasters should use to frame
the uncertainty of any quantitative analysis. The base case is what you would consider to
be the most likely unfolding of the trend that you are modeling. However, if you just
present a base case, the results of your model will have done nothing to frame the range
of uncertainty inherent in any forecast. For example, going back to our forecast of the
population of Japan, how certain are we that mortality trends continue? What if there is
an increase in migration?
Each of these questions can be explored by changing some variable within our
quantitative model. If old people suddenly begin to live longer, we can extend our
population structure and have the oldest die off at a slower rate. If migration increases,
we can add to that variable on an annual basis, increasing the size of the population.
Quantitative and qualitative models must be used in conjunction to make good forecasts.
Qualitative methods provide creativity and flexibility to the analysis; they allow
forecasters to imagine a wide range of possibilities that likely fall outside of the structure
of quantitative models. Quantitative methods' strength lies in their transparency of
assumptions and their ability to account of a large number of variables simultaneously.
How We Forecast: a Technical Introduction of Method and International Futures
Forecasts can be made using a range of technical methods. Meadows and
Robinson (2002, 26–86) argue that there are four main types of models: systems
dynamics, econometrics, input-output and optimization. I add to this a fifth type: agent
based models. Meadows and Robinson argue that most applied models are actually
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“composite” in that they glean from a variety of approaches and methods. Integrated
approaches tend to also be of this final, hybrid type.
Systems dynamics models were described above. They emphasize identifying
system boundaries, stocks and flows and formalizing the relationships between these
parameters and variables (Jay W Forrester 1987; Jay Wright Forrester 1971; Richardson
and Pugh,III 1981; Sterman 2001). Then second approach identified by Meadows and
Robinson (2002) is econometrics, which takes statistical relationships and represents
them in formal mathematical equations to represent a system or systems in interaction.
This method is most widely used—as its name would indicate—within the field of
economics, and examples (Kennedy 1998; Maddala 2001). The third approach outlined
by Meadows and Robinson is input-output models the first of which was famously
constructed by François Quesnay in the mid 18th century (2005). These methods account
for interactions between sectors of an economy (Batey and Rose 1990; Leontief 1986).
These accounting approaches eventually were constructed more broadly represent society
and account for stocks and flows among key actors in an economy (households, firms and
businesses, for example) and are referred to as social accounting matrices (SAMs)
(Graham 1988; Pyatt and Round 1979). The fourth approach involves optimization,
which maximizes (or minimizes) a value when a choice between competing alternatives
is presented. For example, when comparing the impact from climate change with the
economic cost of mitigation, the ideal global carbon price can be established (Nordhaus
and Boyer 2000; Nordhaus 2008). The final approach—not identified by Meadows and
Robinson (2002) and tied to complexity theory—is agent based modeling (Bonabeau
2002; Johnson 2002; Gilbert 2002).
71

These different methods are often combined. One example of this is Computable
General Equilibrium Models (CGEs), which (often) combine econometric, input output
tables and optimization methods (Dixon and Parmenter 1996; Partridge and Rickman
1998; Partridge and Rickman 2010; Partridge and Rickman 2010). CGEs calculate
economic growth endogenously (using econometrics, normally, though they can use
system dynamics instead) and equilibrate prices between consumers and producers
(optimization) and keep track of all of the intersectoral flows (input-output tables). This
class of models is used widely.
IFs is another combined-type model. It draws on econometrics heavily to establish
relationships between driving variables. It is conceptualized using systems dynamics
approaches emphasizing stocks, flows and feed-back loops. It embeds economic
production in an input output table, and then this in a SAM. It does not explicitly use
optimization routines (as these are seen as being unrealistic for real-world application)
but does approximate optimization in some cases when determining price.
International Futures (IFs) system is the world’s largest global integrated assessment
model. It has been under development for over 35 years, primarily by Barry B Hughes. It
is a tool uniquely positioned to produce analysis that is integrated, systemic and crossdisciplinary. It has not been widely used for integrated analysis from the perspective of
IR theory.
The IFs model endogenizes variables from the following systems, represented in
Figure 16 below: population, economic, education, health, agriculture, energy,
infrastructure, domestic governance, international politics, the environment and
technology. It treats each of these systems for 183 countries interacting globally from
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2010 to 2100 (with trade flows, FDI, aid and migration). IFs is housed at the Frederick S
Pardee Center for International Futures at the Josef Korbel School of International
Studies at the University of Denver in the United States (Hughes, Dickson, and Irfan
2010; Hughes 1999; Hughes et al. 2009; Hughes et al. 2009; Hughes, Dickson, et al.
2011; Hughes and Hillebrand 2006).
The IFs tool has been used for analysis conducted for the National Intelligence
Council (United States National Intelligence Council 2008), the United Nations
Development Programme (Hughes, Irfan, et al. 2011), the United Nations Environment
Programme (United Nations Environment Programme 2007), the European Commission
(Moyer and Hughes 2012) and various other governmental and non-governmental
organizations. It is the primary tool of the African Futures Project, a collaboration
between the Pardee Center and the Institute for Security Studies, a Pan-African thinktank (Cilliers, Hughes, and Moyer 2011; Eshbaugh et al. 2012; Gehring et al. 2011;
Eshbaugh et al. 2011). It has also been used as a graduate level and under-graduate level
pedagogical tool at various universities.
IFs is designed to allow analysts to accomplish three things: 1) explore
relationships and longitudinal trends historically in order to 2) get a sense of where these
trends and relationships seem to be unfolding (base-case analysis) so that 3) we can ask
“what-if” questions that introduce wild-cards or allow us to ask questions about what
kinds of global change needs to happen to achieve specific human targets.
Philosophically, IFs is structured to consider three different spheres of interacting
systems: Natural, Social and Individual. These are represented in the Figure below. In
the inner-most circle, there is individual choice. This choice is both constrained and
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enabled by society. The middle-circle—that representing society—is constrained and
enabled by the outer-most circle, representing natural systems.

Figure 15: Conceptual Structure of IFs

The Figure 16 shows key links between all of the major sub-models represented
in IFs. While the sub-modules below do not exactly map to the conceptual systems in
Figure 15, there are overlaps. Agriculture, Energy and the Environment largely represent
Natural systems. These provide the general foundation for modeling. In other words,
without understanding the broader constraints and opportunities associated with changing
stocks of fossil fuels and changing demand for global agricultural output, long-term
forecasts are limited.
Next, domestic governance systems represent social systems. Domestic
governance can be conceptualized as an emergent property of individual action that
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provides security and overcomes collective action problems. Governments have the
ability to direct funds at other social systems, such as education, health and infrastructure.
These broader social goods then begin to move conceptually towards more
individual systems, such as actual human life (population) and specific individual levels
of development. Individuals are the units of the social system, just as societies and
individuals are units of natural systems all standing in complex interaction.
Certain components in IFs have cross-cutting system impacts, such as technology.
Technology writ large—the ability to apply knowledge to work more efficiently—is a
complex variable that spans natural, social and individual systems. Natural systems
constrain what is physically possible with improvements and change in technologies.
Societies produce norms and policies that both enable and constrain the application of
technologies. Individuals are the eventual source of new technologies as well as the direct
application of technologies to specific ends.
There are key connections within and across each of these systems for the
software. For example, energy systems are necessary for economic systems to function,
and market-based mechanisms regulate the degree to which energy systems enable or
constrain individual and social choice. Environmental systems operate in similar ways,
though with different incentive structures. These systems provide the underlying set of
elements that allow for human life to continue, but are not as frequently regulated by
market mechanisms (for example as caused by the “tragedy of the commons”) and are
more frequently controlled by social systems (governments).
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Figure 16: Block Diagram of IFs with Key Linkages

Social systems—almost entirely referencing governments in the IFs model—play
a vital role in allocating resources and consuming goods that are aimed to promote
security and improve human development that generally fall outside of the purview of
market interactions. Within IFs, governments earn revenues through taxation and spend it
in two ways: either directly transferring money to citizens in the forms of welfare or
pensions, or by consuming goods and services. In IFs, governments can consume from
the following categories:

education, health, military, R&D, infrastructure or

administrative costs. Domestic governance (and the linkages between natural and
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individual systems) is documented in the fifth Patterns of Potential Human Progress
(PPHP) series focusing on governance (Hughes, Joshi, et al.).
Behavior of those operating within social systems—what I’m referring to as
“individual behavior”—forms the conceptual core of the IFs model. Structurally, the
model is not agent-based, but philosophically, the individual choice and development
tends to be the ultimate focus of the project. The core of the model is the nexus between
the population system and the economic system. The population model is an agent-cohort
component model that represents both sexes across time for 5 year cohorts. It
endogenously calculates both birth and death rates and uses UN population division
variables for an exogenous treatment of migration. The economic model is a quasicomputable general equilibrium model that “chases” equilibrium, but never actually
achieves it at any point in time. It represents six capital sectors (manufactures, materials,
energy, agriculture, services and ICT), female participation in labor and both skilled and
unskilled labor. It endogenously calculates levels of productivity based on a multi-factor
representation of human capital, social capital, physical capital and knowledge.
Three key human development systems stem from the Demographic-Economic
nexus. They have been written about in the Pardee Center’s Patterns of Potential Human
Progress (PPHP) series: Education (Hughes, Dickson, and Irfan 2010), Health (Hughes,
Dickson, et al. 2011) and Infrastructure (Hughes, Rothman, et al.). Each of these systems
further endogenized the calculation of changes in economic productivity tied to current
levels of stocks and constrained by government budgets. Such an expansive integrated
treatment of productivity exists nowhere else in the world.
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The final block in the “individual” section of the overall stylized representation of
the IFs model is technology. Technological change is embedded throughout the IFs
system in relationships such as continued improvements in energy efficiency, or
reductions in food loss. It is also measured physically, as a capital stock, a government
investment category and in physical access measures (mobile phones, broadband, etc).

Conclusion
The dependent variable explored in this project is the character of interstate
interaction as calibrated by the historic occurrence of conflict. This is measured through
quantified Realist and Liberal accounts that can be forecasted (both with well understood
stocks and flows). The only way to measure and forecast this dependent variable is
through an integrated assessment model. IFs is the only model publically available that
can be used to construct such a forecast.
Up to this point, this dissertation has cut into the seemingly intractable complexity
of forecasting interstate relations by first identifying the kinds of dependent variables that
we can forecast both continuity and change: those previously quantified with well
understood stocks and flows. It then dove into the literature on war to talk about the
specific pieces of literature that could be leveraged in a long-term forecast, arguing that
we could forecast the “gas” on the rag, but certainly not the spark. The occurrence of
conflict is the calibration tool for this project.
Understanding our dependent variable doe not a forecast make. Long-term
forecasting requires a strong methodological foundation and this chapter explored the
importance of both conceptual and applied systems thinking. This built to an introduction
of the tool used for this analysis: the International Futures model.
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We are now in a place to evaluate the role of International Relations theory vis-àvis this project. IR provides tools for understanding the behavior of states in the
international system and it has already been quantified in interesting ways. The next
chapter first explores standard Realist and Liberal accounts of state behavior in the
international system. It eventually argues for a third way of quantifying behavior that is
sensitive to complex networks of interdependence and culture.
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4. International Relations: Standard and Integrated Approaches to
Understanding State Behavior
“Seek simplicity, but distrust it”
–Alfred North Whitehead

Introduction
Up to this point I have argued that state interaction matters, and that we should be
interested in quantifying the character of this over long time horizons for the purpose of
planning (Chapter 1). I then pieced together a broad foundation for doing this, first by
identifying the kinds of dependent variables that we could talk about reasonably over
long time horizons, and the specific dependent variable that I was going to use to
calibrate my model. The forecast model used in this dissertation must have well
understood stocks and flows, and should relate to broad structural pressures driving state
behavior (Chapter 2). I also presented a conceptual and applied way of thinking about
and producing these forecasts (Chapter 3).
I now turn to the theoretical substance of my quantified indices: the field of
International Relations (IR). I explore standard Liberal and Realist accounts of state
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behavior and identify how they have been historically operationalized. The two
substantive theories of IR 17 have been quantified at the macro level in the following
ways: Liberalism is measured as country-level or dyadic interaction in democracy, trade
or international organizations. Realism is measured as country-level percentage of
relative material power or dyad-level relative parity in politically relevant pairs. Both
approaches to measuring state behavior have been criticized. Much more on this in
Chapter 5.
My goal is to take these bodies of work and operationalize them in a way that can
be forecast within the International Futures (IFs) model. This is my orienting activity—
my project’s North Star—and it drives all decisions that I make. To that end, I am
interested in basing my evaluation of Liberalism and Realism on the ways that they have
been historically operationalized. I use the quantification done by others as the basis of
my assessment of the essential characteristics of each theoretical perspective.18
I talk below about Liberalism and Realism throughout this project in general
terms based on how they have been operationalized by others. This is incredibly
problematic. Neither substantive theory is one thing; instead, they are rich tapestries that
form an analytical backbone for asking questions about state behavior in the international
system. Some of the criticisms that I levy against Realism and Liberalism actually
originate internally to their respective research bodies. I highlight three criticisms of
standard quantifications of both Liberalism and Realism: excessive parsimonious,
17

I use the phrase “substantive theories” here and “standard bearers” elsewhere because Realism and
Liberalism have clearly stated objectives, well defined methods and a well structured and fairly uniform set
of conclusions and prescriptions for state behavior.
18

I am keenly aware of the problematic nature of talking about the “essence” of any theoretical position of
perspective. See Wolff and Resnick for a useful critique of my approach (1987).
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underwhelming treatment of complex networks, and a lack of focus on intersubjective
norms and cultures.
While Realism and Liberalism have been criticized, no third theoretical approach
to IR has emerged with a coherent research agenda that has been quantified at the macrolevel across time. The closest “third way” comes from theories that deploy a
constructivist framework. These approaches highlight the importance of socialization,
ideas and cultures as key drivers of behavior that are largely missed by rationalist
accounts of international relations.
Constructivist approaches do not have the same clear research agenda as Realism
or Liberalism. Constructivist methods may agree on ontological frameworks—the “stuff”
of the world out there—but they do not deploy a unified methods or assumptions. In fact,
many who use the constructivist method would argue that the failings of Realism and
Liberalism can be traced to an overreliance on inflexible independent variables. Those
using the constructivist approach may wish to avoid this rigidity.
One component that unites criticisms of Realism and Liberalism is that they are
overly parsimonious and do not actually map to things “out there”. Boiled down, Realism
is interested in the effects of material resources and Liberalism interdependence. While
parsimony can be a virtue, it can also lead to problems. If a theory claims that a single
independent variable drives state behavior, and state behavior does not conform to
expectations, then the theory must be taken into question and the assumptions expanded
on.
A second critical thread related to Realism and Liberalism stems from their lack
of focus on complex networks. Both substantive theories do take into consideration issues
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of connected relations between states. Liberalism does this by focusing on networks of
international organizations, trade and democratic community; Realism considers
networks in its treatments of alliances and state decisions to band-wagon or balance.
Neither approach, however, operationalizes these networks in complex ways leading
some authors to posit that they are empirically wrong.19 While this criticism is primarily
levied at Kantian Liberalism, it also applies to Realism.
A third critical thread is oriented towards the rationalist position of both Realism
and Liberalism and takes issue with their lack of treatment of inter-subjective meaning
making. Both substantive positions treat behavior as rational and oriented towards the
maximization of an objective “good”. This is problematic for many (mostly
constructivists) who argue that language, culture and norms are not static things that can
be responded to universally across time, but instead are fluid, changeable and contingent
on the iterative interaction between structures and agents.
While critical perspectives vis-à-vis the standard bearers of IR do have
similarities their differences should not be masked. They differ on their emphasis on
structure verses agents, material verses ideational, path-dependent verses pliable,
knowable verses unknowable, reductionist verses holist, just to name a few. The
differences of these alternative positions are great, and should never be attempted to be
brought together in one unified position.
To that end, I am interested in the standard-bearer, quantified accounts of IR, and
document them below. However, I am also interested in what they miss, and if there is a
19

Some strands of Liberalism have been operationalized using dyadic trade as a driver, which brings about
some nuance, but does not provide an understanding of complex networks. This is odd, as many strands of
neo-liberalism focus on complex interdependence which derives from networks of connections between
states.
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way to improve upon what has already been achieved. There may be a third, account that
can be shaken out of the cacophony of literature on international relations that uses extant
data to tell a slightly different story about relationships between states in the international
systems.
I use criticism rooted in conceptualizations of Liberalism and Realism drawn
from standard operationalization to produce an additional measure that I refer to as the
Cultures of Interaction Index (CoI Index). The CoI Index is not a third way of doing IR
theory. In many ways, the CoI Index augments standard Liberal accounts of state
interaction and refines methods of operationalization that relate to interdependence.
While I do not make the claim that the CoI Index is an entirely new approach to doing IR,
I do argue that it is a reasonable attempt to “get at” the operationalization of a measure
that is responsive to concerns of those who talk about inter-subjective meaning making,
norms and culture. Dyadic interaction can be non-Liberal but still retain high levels of the
CoI Index, though there is clearly correlation between the two measures (at an r^2 of
0.33, see later in this chapter). Historic examples of countries with high CoI Index scores
but low Liberal scores are found throughout the Middle East and North Africa, and were
prevalent in the Soviet Bloc. There has also been a historic convergence between the CoI
Index and operationalized Liberalism. The block diagram below highlights the eventual
output that this chapter builds towards. It is a simple model where the three
operationalized indices that I build each contribute to changes in the character of
interstate relations. In Chapter 5 I statistically evaluate whether the three IR indices can
be built together to form a better understanding of the behavior of states historically
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(using the calibrating dependent variable of the occurrence of international conflict). I
find that they do, in fact, explain more together than in isolation.

Figure 17: Overview of Quantified IR Theory and the Character of Interstate Interaction

IR Standard Bearer 1: Realism
"...the world remains what it always has been: international politics continues to occur in an anarchic, competitive,
self-help realm. This reality must be confronted, because it cannot be transcended"
-Christopher Layne20
“We must remember that power is relative, not absolute”
-Magnus Organski21
“It becomes clear that the qualities we think of as conferring power—wealth, resources, manpower, arms—may indeed
bring power, but not unless they are used to influence the behavior of others. They are the instruments of power, and an
instrument that is not used is worth nothing”
-Magnus Organski22

Realists identify the causes of state action from the structure of the International
Political System. While Realism is not a monolith, it is possible to draw on

20

(Layne 1994, 49)

21

(Organski 1958, 305)

22

(Organski 1958, 98)
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commonalities, which is my intention here. I am focused on the ways that it has been
historically quantified, though I feel it useful to explore the theory conceptually as well.
The arguments of Realism can be neatly mapped using the logic of Hobbes in
Leviathan (1914). All humans represent a threat to one another; even the weakest, armed
with a sword, could vitally wound the strongest in her sleep. Thus, an overarching
authority is needed to make sure that society does not descend into chaos. For domestic
systems (hierarchical), the state government fills that void and ensures that wanton
murder does not go unpunished. In the international system (anarchic), there is no
equivalent authority: this ordering principle shapes the character of the units and creates
a situation where—to draw from Thucydides—the strong will do what they can and the
weak will suffer what they must (1954).
The ordering principle of anarchy does not provide any insight as to why there is
variation in war and peace in the global system (Levy 1998, 142). If anarchy is a
transhistorical fact and the deeper driver of conflict, then, sans intervening variables, war
is a transhistorical fact. Thus, to understand the implications of Realism on understanding
international conflict, we must further explore the variables that help to explain the
historical variation in conflict and peace.
As even the weakest state can harm the vital interests of the strongest, and there
exists no overarching authority to stop them from doing so, state decisions take the form
of emphasizing material power (distribution of capabilities) to promote survival. As the
only thing that people listen to in Hobbesian anarchy is force, the relative amount of
capabilities between countries—the guns, soldiers and people a state has at its control—
drive the type of relationships that states will have with one another.
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Absolute power gains do not increase the relative security of one nation; if both
nations gain equally, then neither nation has improved their ability to defend themselves
from the other. Relative power gains, on the other hand, produce more security for the
country that is increasing power, as this now places them in a position to more effectively
fight off rival, now less powerful countries.
The concept of power that underlies Realist assumptions about the behavior of
states in the global system is based mainly on material capabilities. This definition is well
outlined by Dahl in what he refers to as an "intuitive" definition of power: "A has power
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do"
(1957, 202–3). Others echo the sentiments of this definition:
"Power can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something
they otherwise would not do...Power can also be conceived in terms of control
over outcomes" (Keohane 1977, 11).
Proximity is important because it indicates the capacity of one state to act on
another. Since proximity is a straightforward measure23, power becomes the contentious
variable. Drawing on the work of others, Tellis et. al. argue that the measurement of
power requires understanding that the concept is comprised of three separate parts:
"...power as 'resources,' as 'strategies,' and as 'outcomes'" (2000, 14). Others have rebranded this approach, referring to it as the power of being, this power filtered through
processes and the power of outcomes (Treverton and Jones 2005, ix, 1).
These three power perspectives build upon one another in their degree of
complexity. For example, the "power of being" is crude material power: the amount of
23

Though do not neglect even the complexity of measuring country proximity. This can be measured as the
length of border shared, the distance from capitals, the distance from a certain percentage of the population,
the distance between countries made contingent on missile capabilities, etc.
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resources available. This material power must be filtered through a process that makes it
useful. For example, how do we take resources—guns and people—and impart on them
the skills to be good soldiers? The final level of power is the ability to control outcomes.
Due to the complexity of the global system, this outcome-based power is the most elusive
in this triad to causally pin-down. It is also the type that all states actively seek.
This conceptualization of material power neglects alternative measures of power.
Josef Nye argues for smart-power which co-opts states, “…rather than coercing them"
(1990). Barnett and Duvall's conceptualization goes well beyond material power
measures, and further complicates conceptualizations of soft and smart-power.
“In general terms, power is the production, in and through social relations, of
effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own circumstances
and fate” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 8).
They argue that power is broken down into four types, and that these types can be
classified based on two variables: whether the power works through social relations or
direct agent interaction, and whether the power is constitutive or coercive. Thus, power
where one actor impacts another actor—compulsory power in their framework—is much
more closely aligned with realist conceptions of material power.
Realists refer mostly to hard, material power. Operationalized measures of power
are treated in Chapter 5, but an introduction may be in order. Measures of power have
been used in a wide range of academic studies, most notably the Composite Index of
National Capabilities (CINC), which operationalized power based on total population,
urban population, income, steel production, energy production, military personnel and
military expenditure. Kadera and Sorokin argue that the CINC has played a fundamental
role in the following IR accounts: expected utility models of war, polarity theories,
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hegemonic stability theory, long cycle theories and relative power cycle theory (2004). It
has also been, “…used as a control variable for empirical investigations of many other
substantive issues…” (Kadera and Sorokin 2004, 212).
Many observable phenomena fall out of Hobbes’ account of the “state of nature”,
described above. There is the security dilemma, the seemingly intractable position where
two states are mired in competition to gain more relative material power, thus
precipitating even more relative power amassing. The choice states have between
balancing and band-wagoning: when should they balance against the leading hegemonic
power and when should they join forces with an alternative alliance? Next, there is the
issue of hegemonic power transition, which argues that the “changing of guards” between
one dominant power and a rising power produces a context in which international conflict
is very likely. It is not the goal of this project to outline all of the colorful conclusions
drawn by the full range of Realist scholars. Instead, this section treats some of the main
Realist themes, debates and variants.
The security dilemma is a fundamental assumption that falls out of Realist theory.
“The lack of international sovereign not only permits wars to occur, but also
makes it difficult for states that are satisfied with the status quo to arrive at goals
that they recognize as being in their common interest” (Jervis 1978, 167).

As states are keen on their own survival, and the promotion of material power is
the only way to fruitfully accomplish this in international anarchy. As these structural
conditions are constant, certain kinds of behavior are likely to emerge. One of these
behaviors is a potentially intractable position that rival states can find themselves. Some
argue that this is the foundational problem in international relations (Booth 2008, 1). The
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block diagram below outlines the causal mechanisms of this phenomenon. This problem
can be exacerbated or mitigated depending on whether states pursue offensive or
defensive strategies.

Figure 18: Security Dilemma as a Systems Diagram

Both states in this model are concerned with arms buildup in the other state; the
perception of increased arms in one state is considered a threat by the other. As the
perception of threat increases, states are encouraged to further build up their own arms to
promote security. This, again, is perceived as a threat by the other state in the pair dyad.
This leads to further buildup, and the perpetuation of a vicious cycle.
Another phenomena that falls out of Realist conceptualizations is balancing.
Balancing happens when a country proactively counters the rise in capabilities in another
country with a rise in capabilities of their own to mitigate perceived threat. The balance
of power—as Vattel puts it through Bull— is a situation where no one state has
preponderance over the rest (Bull 1977, 97). For Waltz, this behavior is a trans-historic
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fact (1979). Organisky sums up the main thrust of the balance of power by arguing that,
when there is a multitude of actors with a range of material power capabilities, each of
whom is attempting to improve their own relative power position, “…there is a tendency
for the entire system to be in balance” (1958, 273). When such a situation exists, it is
claimed that peace will prevail, and that particularly smaller, vulnerable nations will
retain their independence.
The reason that states balance is to produce stability within an otherwise chaotic
international system. Singer and Deutsch define system level stability as,
"the probability that the system retains all of its essential characteristics; that no
single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive;
and that large-scale war does not occur" (1964, 390–1).
According to Little, its first usage was in reference to Italian city-states (2007, 4).
Writers have identified six different ways that nations may act in order to maintain the
balance: through armaments, seizing territory, buffer zones, alliances, intervention and
the practice of divide and conquer (Organski 1958, 275–7).
This approach to understanding state behavior in the international system has
come under much criticism. First, there is a fundamental misunderstanding about what
actually constitutes balancing. Haas has identified 8 distinct usages of the term (1953).
Little compares two standard accounts of balancing: Waltz (1979) and Mearshimer
(2001) using a treadmill as a metaphor: in Waltz’s account, the treadmill can slow
down—the intensity of structural drivers will decrease causing a stable international
system—when there are only two states running together (a bipolar system), for
Mearshimer, the treadmill will only slow down when there is one person running (global
hegemony), for the classical realists, such as Morgenthau, the treadmill only stops when
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there is a multitude of people running. The later argument of Mearshimer is much less an
account of “balancing” and much more an attempt to highlight the potential stability
produced by hegemony, assessed in the next sentence.
The pre-1945 Europe was quite violent because there were no nuclear weapons
and there was a multipolar world. The post 45 world was more peaceful because of
bipolarity.
“A bipolar system is more peaceful for three main reasons. First, the number of
conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is
easier, because imbalances of power are fewer and more easily averted. Third, the
prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and
of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less likely” (Mearsheimer 1990, 14).
Empirically, this account of states balancing in anarchy was explored by a group
of authors (Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth 2007). These authors found that balancing
occurred in around 50% of the case studied. In the other 50%, there was no balancing.
This kind of empirical inconsistency has led some to argue that there are different kinds
of balancing, and that states sometimes neglect to properly balance. Walt analyzes the
balance of threat (1985). He argues that balancing doesn’t happen all of the time, as
previous realist scholars argued, but only happens when one state perceives another state
to be a threat, which would not occur in all circumstances. For example, if the EU gains
in material capabilities relative to the US, there will be no counterbalancing, but there
would be if, for example, Iran acquired a nuclear weapon. Schweller explores underbalancing, which is the inability or unwillingness of certain states to balance against
perceived threats (2006). This lack of traditionally defined balancing stems primarily
from domestic political circumstances. Little furthers this and argues that "reverse
balancing" sometimes occurs, which represents,
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"...collaborative policies that are designed to promote stability by reducing the
level of arms or implementing measures that are designed to inhibit the use of
weapons” (2007, 172).
Others argues that the concept is inadequately nuances, as more fruitful analysis
would look at both polarity as well as concentration, which is, “…a function of: (1) the
number of major powers in the global system; and (2) the relative inequality of
capabilities among the major powers” (Mansfield 1993, 111).
The balance of power approach to exploring behavior in the international system
has been widely criticized (E. B. Haas 1953; Randall L. Schweller 2006; Organski 1958;
Little 2007). Hegemonic stability, power-transition, long-cycles and Kondratieff waves
have been put forward as alternatives to this approach. These models are diverse, but all
focus on change in centralized power in the international system and the behavior of
others in response to this consolidated material control. Some have argued that this genre
of theory does not belong in the Realist camp (Thompson 1988, 44) though others
disagree and claim that it shares the same assumptions as realists, but places a different
emphasis on the possibility for order in international anarchy (Levy 1998, 148). Because
of a focus on material power in anarchy, I argue that hegemonic stability, long-cycle
theory and power transition theory all fit well within a general understanding of realist
approaches to IR theory.
Levy argues that the key distinction between Realism isn’t between classical and
neo, but between theorists who explore balance of power or hegemonic stability (Levy
1998, 146).
“Hegemonic theory is a structural theory that incorporates power transition theory
and hegemonic stability theory and that downplays the importance of anarchy”
(Levy 1998, 146–7).
93

One key demarcation between hegemonic stability and the balance of power is a
focus on concentration and not polarity. Emphasizing the issue of concentration brings
about different kinds of questions, and may be empirically more interesting than focuses
on the issue of polairty (Mansfield 1993).
The origins of hegemonic stability theory are traced back to Kindleberger, though
he did not explicitly use the term (1973). Writing about the organization of the
international political economic system, he argued that a global hegemon was necessary
to bring about stability, and that this could only happen with one state in control: “…for
the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer”
(Kindleberger 1973, 305). While this leader did not represent global hierarchy, it was
able to set the rules of the game and incentivize/coerce others to participate.
International hegemony is defined as, “the leadership of one state over other states
in the system” (Gilpin 1981, 116). This hegemonic leadership must be taken explicitly,
and is nothing without direct action. It requires that, “one state is powerful enough to
maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations, and willing to do so” (Keohane
1977, 44). This state must have consolidated management over material resources,
specifically, it must be able to control, “…raw materials…sources of capital…markets,
and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods” (Keohane 1984,
32). The position of a hegemonic leader must be that of, “…an unrivaled position of
economic and military superiority among the core states,” who can, “…shape the
operation of the international system" (Goldstein 1988, 5).
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Proponents of hegemonic stability theory argue that periods of peace are relate to
and contingent on there being a global leader.
“Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an
international system of relative peace and security. Great Britain and the United
States created and enforced the rules of a liberal international economic order”
(Gilpin 1981, 31).
Others have argued that, while hegemonic situations do breed a certain kind of
cooperation, they are not the only source of it. There can be cooperation in the
international system in non-hegemonic situations (Keohane 1984, 32).
Periods of hegemonic peace are not the sole focus of this approach. Assumptions about
the rise and fall of global hegemons are very germane to the understanding of the future
of international conflict. This school of thought has been the only approach to IR theory
that offers explicit and rigorous sets of forecasts about the future of international conflict
(Thompson 1988, Chapter 12; Organski 1980, Chapter 17; Rasler 1994, Chapter 10;
Goldstein 1988, Chapter 15).
Modelski took the initial cut in measuring the concentration of global power in
the hands of hegemons over time by tracing the amount of total naval power that the great
power nations possessed from the 1500’s to the end of the 21st century (Modelski 1987;
Modelski 1988) The graph of this power concentration, reproduced below, indicated that
naval material power—a proxy for general material power and global reach—has ebbed
and flowed through history.
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Figure 19: Modelski and Global Naval Concentration (1988, 109), Author’s Red Line

“The long cycle of global politics refers to the process of fluctuations in the
concentration of global reach capabilities which provide one foundation for world
leadership” (Modelski 1988, 97).
This analysis of global hegemonic control, shown above, outline a series of
patterns in material power consolidation. If we set the threshold for hegemony at 40% of
total global naval power, indicated above by the red line, 6 periods of global rule are
identified:


the Portuguese until the last half of the 1500s



the Spanish for about 25 years up to 1600



the Dutch from the early 1600s to about 1650



the UK from the early 1700s through to the end of WWI with a blip in
the late 1700s up to the end of the Napoleonic wars



the massive hegemonic control of the US after the end of WWII
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It is argued that this oscillation between concentration and deconcentration does
not happen by chance; there are underlying sets of forces that help to drive the ebb and
flow of global power. First, there is the structure of the international system when a
global hegemon exists. The pyramid outlines the relationship between different kinds of
states in the international system coupled with their relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with the status quo. The global hegemon is understandably entirely satisfied with the
situation that it controls. As we move down the pyramid—from countries with more
global power to those with less global power—dissatisfaction with the system becomes
more apparent.

Figure 20: Organski's Hegemonic Control and System Satisfaction (1958, 331)

Though all nations subsumed within the power of the global hegemon represent
some level of dissatisfaction with the current global system, this does not indicate that
conflict will arise. For that to occur, power must be deconsolidated at the top, and a
challenger nation must rise to try to take the reins of global leadership.
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“Power transition arguments emphasize the destabilizing and conflictual
implications of a challenger catching up to a declining leader. As the transition is
accomplished…war between a rising challenger and a declining leader is most
probably” (Rasler 1994, 38).
The variation in concentration and deconcentration in material power must be
accounted for in this argument. It is clearly argued that these oscillations are not random
nor are they mechanical processes (Goldstein 1988, 6). Instead, the general consensus is
that there are three stages in the power transition: first, there is the stage of “potential
power”, where a nation is pre-industrial and lacks the means to exploit resources for the
end of power and control. The second stage—the transitional growth in power stage—
involves a move towards industrialization and the harnessing of previously latent power.
Power maturity is the third stage, and is marked by a stagnation of the radical growth of
the second stage (Organski 1980, 302–4). Organski argues that the third stage of power
deconcentration is not the fault of the mature nation, but is rather being driven by other
developing nations moving through the second stage of power transition. This further
emphasized the importance of the role of relative power in the face of absolute power
(Organski 1958, 305).
Goldstein identifies four potential causes of oscillation in global production which
leads to down-turns in hegemonic control of material power: the capital investment
theory (where long-term investments in, say, infrastructure begin to depreciate), the
innovation theory (where growth happens around key technological innovations, such as
the automobile), the capitalist crisis theory (where the long term rate of profit is reduced
by factors such as imperial overextension) and the war theory (where wars create
inflationary shocks causing long-term waves in overall production) (1988, 24). Levy
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chalks the fall of hegemons up to the following: “Differential rates of growth, the costs of
imperial overextension, and the development of vested domestic interests lead to the rise
and fall of hegemons” (Levy 1998, 148).
Rasler and Thompson make the power-transition-leads-to-war argument more
specific. They argue that it is not just the concentration of one global power relative to all
others, but the concentration of one global power relative to the next most powerful
region. Further, they claim that,
“…the most dangerous structural situation has been a deconcentrating global
system and a reconcentrating central regional system. Such conjunctures have
encouraged the outbreak of a series of global wars over the last five hundred
years” (Rasler 1994, 59).
This argument it outlined in the graph below. The y axis represents the relative
degree of power concentration in the hands of one global hegemon, or the most powerful
region. As the line moves down, there is less concentration in the system and power is
more widely shared. The grey vertical lines represent the occurrence of major, systemic
war. The occurrence of these conflicts tend to coincide with levels of deconcentrated
global material power. These conflicts also tend to produce high levels of concentration
in material power in a new global hegemon (Rasler 1994).
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Figure 21: Rasler and Thompson (1994, 68)

Hegemonic stability, power transition, long-cycle and Kondratieff waves all tell a
certain kind of compelling story about nations pursuing power in anarchy, staples of
realist thought. It is clear that some pattern does emerge within the long-reach of this
theory, and the arguments for global stability—defined as the absence of systemic wars—
in the presence of a strong global hegemon are compelling.
While the broad patterns identified by this approach appear compelling, there is
much that is left out. First, the explanations for the causes of the long-cycle of power
transitions are not entirely compelling. The list of explanations causing these fluxes is ad
hoc, and lacks empirical validity. It seems more likely that these scholars have not
identified the root of changes in the global system, but the fact that changes in the power
composition of the global system do occur. Separate from etiology, this is in itself
interesting. The implications of a de-concentrated global system on the likelihood of a
systemic war are a powerful argument separate from the attempts to divine the cause of
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the fall of system leaders. This is the value of this approach to understanding the future of
international conflict.

IR Standard Bearer 2: Liberalism
"We live in an era of interdependence. This vague phrase expresses a poorly understood but widespread
feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing"
-Robert O Keohane24

As with Realism, Liberalism is a substantive research agenda within the field of
IR. While not a monolith, boiled down to its essence (as historically operationalized at
the macro level), it emphasizes three types of interdependence that can mitigate the
corrosive impacts of an international system characterized by anarchy: through increased
trade, democratization and membership in regimes of global governance. These three
theoretical foundations can be traced back to Kant’s Perpetual Peace (Kant 1991).
Interdependence is the key driving variable in Liberalism and stands in opposition
to Realist claims that relative material gains are the key driver of behavior in the
international system. If Realist claims of conflict are indeed the general trend in the
international system then, “…institutionalized patterns of cooperation are particularly in
need of explanation” (Keohane 1982, 325). These qualities of cooperation are represented
by three kinds of interdependencies: institutional interdependence, material
interdependence and normative interdependence.
Institutional interdependence arises from membership in international
organizations and the signing or ratification of UN treaties. This is the most direct
measure of embeddedness in regimes of global governance found in the Kantian triad,

24

(Keohane 1977: 3)
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and one that I specifically focus on. Kant referred to these kinds of treaties and
organizations as being fundamental to perpetual peace. In his terms, treaties could lead to
more binding and comprehensive forms of governance, such as a federation of states
based on an international constitution. This was not, for Kant, the same as a world
government (1991, 102). Instead, each state would retain its substantive sovereignty
(domestic monopoly on the use of force) but their external sovereignty on the use of force
would be curtailed. This federation would be more binding than a treaty, though treaties
are likely to be necessary initially for the foundation of this kind of federation.
Thicker interdependencies between states are likely to arise from material and normative
interdependencies. Material interference may stem from engagement in trade among
states. When nations specialize in the production of specific goods and services for which
they have a relative advantage in production, comparative advantage is produced. Thus,
more states are taking more specialized products to the global market and are reliant on
others to import materials previously produced domestically.
Kant referred obliquely to global trade as being one of the cornerstones of
perpetual peace. He wrote that the world should embrace universal hospitality where all
people are free to move from one state to another. This would seem to promote
movement of labor, but not capital. However, while Kant may not have directly alluded
to the impact of globalization on security (he was writing at a time when levels of global
trade were small compared to the modern era) many have attributed this to his body of
work (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Russett
2001).
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Democratic domestic governance regimes are the source of normative
interdependence. The argument here is that states that value the same kind of governing
regime have certain ideational affinities with one another that form a kind of relational
interdependence. Some have referred to this not only as normative constraint, but also
structural constraint. I discuss that below, but believe that the normative driver is more
important for issues surrounding global governance.
Kant argued that republicanism was a crucial determinant of perpetual peace, as it
was the only form of government that separated the executive from the legislative branch
(1991, 101). Kant argued that, because decisions to go to war were made by the
population as a whole (at least those with the political rights to vote), that they would be
much less likely to engage in international conflict. Kant's claim is referred to in
contemporary terms as institutional or structural constraint that makes democracies less
likely to go to war (the war-proneness of democracies is debated below) (See the former
for a description of institutional constraint and the later for a general critique Doyle 1983;
Layne 1994). Other causal claims about the role of democracies and peace are referred to
as being normative (Maoz and Russett 1993). The normative account claims that bilateral
democracies will not go to war because they value the same kinds of things (pluralistic
decision making, transparency, etc).
I am interested in the enabling effect of the normative driver brought about by
dyadic democracies for implications for global governance. If two states are democratic,
there are two implications for global governance: the first is that bi-lateral democracies
may be more likely to trust one another as they have embraced similar domestic
governing structures and thus embed themselves in the same kinds of regimes,
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institutions and norms. The second is that the institutions that are created and promoted
by these organizations are likely to be more democratic and pluralistic.
Kantian Liberalism is most closely associated in academic literature with bilateral
peace and not global governance. There is much literature on exploring this issue, and I
use that as a foundation for forecasting this trend as an index. The literature indicates that
giving equal weight to the impact of democracy, IO embeddedness and levels of trade is
conceptually sound, and this is the strategy that I pursue later when I build my index of
Kantian Liberalism.
By far the largest amount of conceptual and empirical effort exploring Kantian
Liberalism’s relationship with peace has gone into exploring the implications of the
democratic peace. While there is not universal consensus (Spiro 1994; Layne 1994;
Farber and Gowa 1997; Cohen 1994), the overriding empirical evidence points to two
characteristics that define democratic interaction in the international system: 1) bilateral
democracies are less likely (if likely at all) to use violence to solve problems (Bremer
1993; Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller 1992; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and Russett
1993; Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Russett 1993) but 2) they are also more likely
to engage in violence with non-democratic states (Rousseau et al. 1996; Hegre et al.
2001; Eric Gartzke and Weisiger 2010)25.
The implications of high levels of dyadic trade on the occurrence of conflict have
also been explored, with a range of mixed results. Initial studies show clear pacific links
between levels of trade and pacific interstate relations (Domke 1988; Mansfield 1994;

25

See (Rousseau 2005) for an argument that democracies are more pacific with all regime types. Russett
makes this point repeatedly (see 2003 page 373).
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Oneal and Ray 1997; Reuveny and Heejoon Kang 1996; Reuveny and Heejoon Kang
1996). This rush of literature was met with some resistance, either due to concerns over
methodology (Kim and Rousseau 2005; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) or results
(Barbieri 2002; Barbieri 1996; Barbieri and Schneider 1999). This series of critiques of
the relationship between trade and conflict were responded to, and more recent
approaches have further honed the relationship between bilateral material
interdependence and the occurrence of conflict.
Oneal and Russett (1999) argue that the impact of trade as a mitigant of conflict
can be seen by exploring only politically relevant dyads (those that are contiguous or that
have a Great Power associated). Gartzke (2007) argues that the strong findings that
democracies cause peace but the weakness of conceptual accounts of this may be because
it is actually capitalist dyads that cause peace. Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) have a
different approach to explaining the relationship between trade and conflict and they
argue that bilateral trade reduces conflict (because the opportunity costs are too high), but
that high levels of multilateral trade increase the likelihood that two countries will engage
in conflict (because other trading partners will take up the slack caused by the lack of
trade between warring parties). In a broadly sweeping quantitative review of the drivers
of international conflict, Bennett and Stam find that international trade does have a
statistically significant and important pacifying impact on dyadic pressures for war
(Bennett and Stam 2000).
The third piece of the Kantian puzzle is embeddedness within international
political norms, regimes and institutions. This driver of Liberalism has received the least
amount of attention, and evidence on its overall impact on international peace is mixed.
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Bennett and Stam find no significant relationship between this variable and the
occurrence of conflict in their sweeping study. Russett and Oneal argue that this is a
byproduct of exploring the impact of membership in international organizations for all
dyads in the international system, and not just for politically relevant dyads (2001). When
politically relevant dyads are selected, membership in international organizations
becomes a significant pacifying effect.
More recently, Pevehouse and Russett have argued that international
organizations have a pacifying impact on bilateral relations when the members of those
international organizations are democracies (2006). A network effect was explored in a
piece arguing that traditional empirical measures of IO impacts on the security situation
were misleading, as they only explored the relationship of two states in one institution,
and not the broader impacts of multiple states' ability to effect indirect diplomatic and
normative pressure on other states to conform (Dorussen and Ward 2008). Others argue
that IOs are not simply one kind of thing, and show through empirical analysis that
security IOs are better at promoting peace than economic IOs, IOs that are more
thoroughly established are better at promoting peace, and, in line with the work of
Pevehouse and Russett, that IOs where there is homogeneity among members also helps
to promote peace (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004).
In a series of three articles, Bruce Russet and various colleagues explore the
relative impact of the three legs of the Kantian tripod on international conflict. While
methods change slightly, they find some consistency.
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Table 2: The Liberal Tripod in IR: Percentage Reduction in Conflict Contribution from Various Components
of Liberalism

Reduction in the
(Oneal, Russett,
Probability in
and Berbaum 2003)
Dyadic Conflict
Impact of Dyadic
86%
Democracy on
Conflict
Impact of Trade
32%
on Conflict
Impact of IO
43%
Membership on
Conflict

(Russett 2001)

(Russett, Oneal,
and Davis 1998)

33%

35%

43%

38%

24%

23%

It is not the endeavor of this project to reconcile all of the competing perspective,
methods, data sets and theories that pertain to the three pillars of Kantian Liberalism visà-vis international conflict. Instead, the above discussion was to promote the idea that
each of these aspects of Kantain Liberalism are likely important to issues of international
conflict. Whether a state is liberal seems to matter for peace. It is likely that, if it matters
for the absence of conflict, it may matter for the presence of cooperation.

Cultures of Interaction: Pulling some threads from the cacophony of
criticism
Above, I treated Realism and Liberalism in general terms that are relevant to how
they have been historically quantified. As stylized accounts of behavior in the
international system, they hold important insights. In Chapter 5 I test whether the
quantification of these theories explains more in conjunction or isolation. I show
statistically that they do, in fact, explain more as an aggregated index than as isolated
indices.
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This section brings together some of the criticisms of both Realism and
Liberalism and attempts to highlight a third approach to thinking about quantifying IR.
This approach which I call the Culture of Interaction Index is an attempt to “pull threads”
from the wide range of critiques of both Realism and Liberalism with the help of a more
constructivist orientation (Wendt 1999). To be relevant for my project this third approach
must satisfy the following:


be operationalizable on a large-scale from existing measures of state
behavior with historic series for most dyad years26



have reasonable historic longitudinal behavior across time



contribute to improving and building upon Realist and Liberal accounts



attempt to “get at” something that isn’t captured by either the Realist or
Liberal measures, even if in a very limited and possibly contentious way

Realism and Liberalism (as they have been historically operationalized at the
macro level) are criticized for various reasons. Here I make the argument and document
with citations that critical approaches can be broken down into three strands that build
sequentially. First, the theoretical foundations use univariate drivers (anarchy for
Realists, interdependence for Liberals) that may be overly simple. Second, and stemming
from the first, these substantive approaches do not treat complex networks with sufficient
depth and complexity. Finally, and building on the previous two criticisms, these

26

A dyad year is a measure that considers two countries for a single year, such as Belgium-Netherlands1980.
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substantive IR approaches do not treat intersubjective meaning making—such as
culture—adequately or at all.
Parsimony can be a useful thing: the model of state behavior that can explain
more using less can be considered “better”.27 The real world, however, tends to
complicate this: it is exceedingly easy to use fewer independent variables; it can be
exceedingly hard to know if you have “explained more”. Explaining a few “…big and
important things” (Waltz 1986, 329) is nice, but we must be concerned if our explanatory
power is sufficiently comprehensive to warrant the limited assumptions made (Sørensen
2009). Snyder says that, ”…it is enough that [a single theory] highlight ‘a small number
of big and important things’; and that is all that Kenneth Waltz…claims for his theory,”
(1996, 167) Donnelly persuasively counters:
Only for peculiar purposes would it be helpful to represent all animals as either
big or small. Conceptualizing color as either red or blue is not ‘more
parsimonious’ than the standard red-orange-yellow-green-blue-violet-spectrum
but a gross distortion. ‘The world’ and our analytical purposes set the limits of
useful parsimony (2009, 78).

The following pages argue that both Realism and Liberalism have been
historically operationalized in ways that are overly parsimonious. Both approaches miss
important things about the international system and the behavior of states. Theories
should be internally logically consistency and should also conform to real-events, out
there. If theories miss important things out, in the world, then there are intervening
variables that they have not considered.

27

This is referred to as “Occam’s razor” which privileges hypotheses that make fewer assumptions but
which makes no claim on the output of a model’s performance across time.
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Realism has been criticized because the world it theorizes does not seem to
conform to the actual world, out there. As cited previously, Keohane gets at this
particularly well: if the world is, as Realists claim, characterized by the security dilemma
that emphasize the importance of relative power gains, any, “…institutionalized patterns
of cooperation…” is really of interest (1982, 325). In the international system, patterns of
cooperation occur.
The lack of empirical verification has led many Realists to argue for the addition
of intermediate variables that augment the original and simple claims of Waltz. This has
led some to conclude that Realism is an approach to doing IR that is on its way out
(Vasquez 1997). Legro and Moravcsik make it clear:
The central problem is instead that the theoretical core of the realist approach has
been undermined by its own defenders—in particular so-called defensive and
neoclassical realists—who seek to address anomalies by recasting Realism in
forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent and less distinctive to
Realism (1999, 6)

The authors continue by arguing that new versions of Realism try to take into
consideration what earlier Realists had tried to argue against, like economic
interdependence. It would be a boon to Realism if it could be shown that, from
Machiavelli to Morgenthau the structural pushes and pulls were the same. For example,
minimalist Realism retains only anarchy and rationality as assumptions, watering down
the theoretical perspective beyond recognition.
Realist assumptions about the behavior of states in the international system—as
originally stated by Waltz—seem to be excessively parsimonious and require constant
fiddling: academics take them, add bits, remove bits and attempt to make them more
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palatable vis-à-vis the actual behavior of states in the international system. Liberalism—
as originally posited by Kant and as operationalized by many, identified previously in this
chapter—also makes limited assumptions about the world and draws large conclusions. If
interdependence existed at the same time as conflict, Liberalism is as susceptible to
criticism as Realism.
The Democratic Peace thesis—one of the legs of the Kantian tripod—has been
argued by some to not be a historic constant and thus also suffer from empirical
verification. Farber and Gowa claim that democratic peace may be more of an artifact of
Cold War alliances:
“…we find that there is no statistically significant relationship between
democracy and war before 1914…Our analysis shows that it is only after 1945
that the probability of war or serious disputes is significantly lower between
democratic states than between members of other pairs of states” (1995, 124).
There are various examples of conflict between countries that are arguably
democratic. Ecuador and Peru have gone to war three times since the middle of the 20th
century. Israel attacked democratic Lebanon in 1948, but had yet to vote. Many people
code the German Republic in the run-up to WWI as a democracy or a quasi democracy.
Finland allied themselves with the fascist powers in WWII from 1941-44 to avoid
annexation by the USSR, thus pitting them (a democracy) against allied democracies
(they were also bombed by the UK at one point). The US attacked the Philippines, then a
developing democracy, though they did not have time to hold elections before their loss
in 1899. Some code Spain as democratic in 1898, and this would put the SpanishAmerican war into question. Hitler was democratically elected, and legally suspended the
constitution. Various measures of Militarized Interstate Disputes with fatalities occur

111

between states that are very liberal, including Turkey and Cyprus in the 1990s. This is not
to mention Militarized Interstate Disputes that occur between states without fatalities that
are extremely liberal, like the Cod Wars of the 1950s and 70s between Iceland and the
United Kingdom.
The method for statistically evaluating the claims of democratic peace theorists is
also contentious. Some have argued that, because democracies represent such a small
proportion of the membership of the international society for the vast majority of history,
that their overall share of the sample size is so small as to artificially benefit proponents
of the Democratic Peace (Mearsheimer 1990, 50). Thus, the reason that so few
democracies have gone to war is a product of statistical method and coding (Spiro 1994,
51). Spiro finds that Doyle acknowledges that the war between Peru and Ecuador
occurred when they were both liberal (1994), but that it, "...came within one to three
years after the establishment of a liberal regime...before the pacifying effects of
Liberalism could be deeply ingrained" (Doyle 1983, 213).
A second assumption of Liberalism is trade can lead to higher levels of
interdependence that can help promote absolute gains and mitigate the corrosive impact
of the security dilemma. Some argue that this is not always the case. During the period of
rapid globalization, Liberalism has done much to promote stability. However, instead of
being a driver of peace in the early 20th century, it was actually a driver of war (Rowe
2005). This leads Rowe to state strongly: "This conclusion that globalization pacifies
international relations is not just premature, it is wrong" (2005, 408).
It is not simply that trade connection matters, but the degree to which dyads are
connected. Barbieri argues that there is a curvilinear relationship between trade
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integration on a dyadic basis and the occurrence of war. If a country has little to no trade
integration, there is an increased chance that they will go to war. If they have a very high
interdependence—whether asymmetrical or symmetrical—this will also increase their
chance of going to war. If dyadic pairings have a moderate level of trade integration, then
this will decrease the chance of going to war (1996). Therefore, simply increasing trade
integration does not reduce the chance of conflict.
In a separate piece, Barbieri and Schneider find a range of contradicting evidence
on the relationship between trade and peace concluding the following:
What are the origins of the contradictory explanations and evidence regarding the
impact of trade on interstate relations?...To date, no compelling theoretical
rationale has been offered for why empirical findings differ, other than the fact
that scholars pursue very different inquiries, with different samples, data,
measures or modeling techniques (1999, 399)

The final leg of the Kantian tripod—membership in a “federation” of states—has
not received as much intellectual attention of late. Membership in international
organizations and alliances has been statistically examined historically as a driver of
international conflict and found to have a relationship (identified earlier in this chapter).
Criticisms of this third leg typically come in the form of criticisms of global governance
regimes.
A second type of criticism levied at the most parsimonious versions of Liberalism
and Realism is that they do not sufficiently consider networks of states as key driving
variables of state behavior. This criticism is, in a way, an extension of the criticism of the
approaches for being overly parsimonious. In many ways, much of the thrust of IR in the
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1980’s was oriented towards making both Realism and Liberalism more sophisticated,
nuanced and empirically verifiable.
Looking at the drivers of either power or interdependence is not sufficient for a
full picture of behavior within the international system. There are more complex forms of
interdependence that can arise that cannot be explained by the standard versions of
Liberalism and Realism. The ways in which states interact—their histories, their policies
and their perception of one another—are all crucial driving variables of behavior of states
in the international system. This second criticism does not yet embrace the next move
towards culture and inter-subjective meaning making. It is an even more basic criticism
of the main drivers of standard Liberalism and Realism.
Keohane and Nye provide an alternative to the three-legged version of Kantian
Liberalism by promoting “complex interdependence” (1977). Three factors give rise to
complex interdependence: linkage strategies; agenda setting; transnational and
transgovernmental relations. These go beyond the standard, traditionally operationalized
set of Liberal measures.
Snyder provides an improvement on Realist approaches to understanding state
behavior by adding “process variables” (1996). Snyder’s goal is to increase the ability of
neo-realism to explain things, while not doing too much damage to the parsimony
promoted by Waltz. He does this by first parsing out “structural modifiers” which are
systems in the international system that change the direct impact of structure on state
behavior. These are the kinds of things that Nye is interested in his criticism of Realism
by pointing to non-power incentives and the, “…ability to communicate and cooperate”
(Snyder 1996, 168).
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Eventually Snyder latches onto the important kind of intervening variable that can
push forward the underlying logic of Realism without sacrificing excessive parsimony:
“Relations or relationships are not behavior itself, but the situational context of
behavior…Relationships lie between structure and interaction; they are the
conduit through which structural effects are transmitted to behavior” (Snyder
1996, 172).

Relationships can be added to the structural realist account to make it more
nuanced. Relationships also can provide the framework for analyzing “structural change”,
a common critique of Realist theory.
These are process variables. Process variables include alignments, conflicts,
capabilities and interdependence. Interaction Arenas can also form process or relationship
variables. Interaction can take place through preparedness, diplomacy and action (Snyder
1996).
For a third example of standard rationalist criticisms of Liberalism and Realism,
see Schweller’s Balance of Threat (Randall L. Schweller 2006). This account of Realism
takes the logic of balance of power but does not apply it to all dyads. It is not solely the
raw-power of the relationship (or relationships, as per broader alliances) that define the
state behavior but the character of the relationship. If the relationship is characterized by
animosity, then balancing behavior can occur. These modifications by Schweller are
meant to improve, and not refute, Waltzian versions of IR (Schweller 1997).
The third kind of criticism that I highlight in this section is an extension of the
first two: standard Realism and Liberalism do not sufficiently consider the role of norms,
values and cultures in the behavior of states in the international system. Constructivism is
an approach to doing IR that does not have the same substantive focus as either
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Liberalism or Realism, in fact, it has many foci. It cannot be boiled down to univariate
explanations. “Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of
normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action,
and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures” (Reus-Smit
2009, 209). Earlier approaches to understanding behavior in the international system did
flirt with the importance of the ideational structure of the international system. In many
ways, this is a key component (if not a foundation) of Liberal accounts of behavior in the
international system. However, the ideational components of Liberalism (and their childtheories, such as “complex interdependence” outlined above) made altogether different
assumptions about actor behavior, typically being rationalist.
The notion that the world is a social construction appears obvious, at face.
However, standard rationalist accounts of the field tend to gloss of this seemingly
fundamental component of the human experience. The field of constructivism represents
a partial (if not full) rejection of the rationalist project and instead an emphasis on the
importance of the way that language is used and understood to shape action and behavior
within the international system.
Constructivism gradually emerged as a separate method in the mid 1990s (though
it has been a philosophic argument that has existed for much time before that) as an
alternative pole in IR that emphasized the socially constructed character of relations in
the international system. These authors intended to take rationalist accounts of IR and to
show that they were actually only getting at a small piece of the actual puzzle in
explaining how states behave.
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Wendt writes prolifically in this vein. His Social Theory of International Politics
is the closest to a decisive text deploying this method. There, Wendt argues for a socially
constructed assessment of behavior in the international system, specifically around the
role of anarchy. According to this account, anarchy is not a thing out there that is the
fundamental deeper driver of behavior in the international system but is something that
states react to (as identified most clearly in his “Anarchy is what states make of it” piece).
Wendt puts forward three “cultures of anarchy” that are meant to operate within
the space that rationalists have typically identified as being one of the deep drivers of
behavior in the international system. Cultures of anarchy are socially constructed spaces
where states follow certain logics. For example, Wendt argues that we are currently
experiencing a global Lockean culture of anarchy, which is characterized by rivalry. This
rivalry is much different from the Hobbesian anarchy that had characterized state
relations from the Peace of Westphalia until probably some-time after WWII (the Cold
War?). Hobbesian anarchy is characterized by enmity. Wendt goes on to argue that there
could be pockets of Kantian anarchy (characterized by cooperation) forming, and that the
whole system is eventually moving in that direction.
Wendt also adds a second axis to his tripartite division between cultures of
anarchy: the degree to which a specifically socially constructed space is internalized by
different actors in the system. If the international system is structured according to a
Kantian logic of anarchy, but this social construction is very thin, then the system will
exhibit very different characteristics from a system where the Kantian anarchy is deeply
embedded as the driving logic of behavior of states in the international system.
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While Wendt’s formulation of cultures of anarchy takes place at the level of
analysis of the international system, they can be broken down to the level of bi-lateral
relations. My approach to understanding the quality of relationships within the
international system relies on evaluating the socially constructed character of
relationships between states at a bi-lateral level. I am not concerned with how these
bilateral relationships build to the level of the international system (at least not at this
stage of my research) but instead on the possible kinds of relationships that can exist
between states.
In terms of international conflict, the constructivist account is concerned with the
role of language in the formation and shaping of behavior: if the international system is
shaped by Kantian anarchy, then the likelihood of conflict will be different relative to
various structural drivers than if the international system is shaped by Hobbesian
anarchy.
Constructivist approaches tend to not emphasize rationalist, utility maximizing
behavior in actors. Instead, they tend to be interested in the type of culture that dominates
the system at a given point in time. Wendt most famously identified different types of
international “cultures” that can guide behavior of states at any given time (Wendt 1992;
1999). States can be guided by a culture of Hobbesian (characterized by enmity),
Lockean (characterized by rivalry) or Kantian (characterized by cooperation) anarchies.
Each of these “cultures of anarchy” can be internalized to differing degrees.
While much of Wendt’s criticism was levied at Realist accounts of international
anarchy (as compared with domestic hierarchy) being the key deeper driver of state
behavior, Wendt’s approach also works as a criticism of standard Liberal accounts of
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deep drivers of behavior. Interdependence, just like anarchy, can involve different
cultures that cause states to react very differently. Certainly interdependence leading up
to WWI was treated differently than it is today. That is a product of both a structural and
a cultural change in the international system.

IR Theory and Forecasting: Stocks and Flows
In Chapter 2 I argued that stocks and flows were important in conceptualizing and
operationalizing dependent variables where continuity and change can be reasonably
forecast over long time horizons. In that section the stocks and flows discussion was used
to highlight underlying characteristics of variables that are forecast, such as GDP or
population. The important stocks in these variables were capital and people, for example.
These stocks and their related flows are the cornerstone of quantitative forecasts of
Realism and Liberalism, but the conceptual framework of stocks and flows can also apply
to the theoretical positions of the three perspectives that I have explored in this chapter.
Realism and Liberalism are neither stocks nor flows: they are substantive
theoretical positions within the field of IR. The quantitative measures of Realism and
Liberalism that I use as forecast indices rely on the modeling of their stocks and flows
(discussed previously). This, however, is separate from thinking about how both
substantive approaches interact with states using this same system framework.
Culture operates in international relations like a stock. It exists between pairs of
states and helps to dictate how these states respond to external and internal shocks. This
notion is clearly demonstrated in the literature on Enduring International Rivalries (Diehl
and Goertz, 2000). Here, specific pairs of states have interactions characterized by stocks
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of conflictual culture. As with all stocks, it is difficult to move or change this
intersubjectively held meaning rapidly, and some states (India and Pakistan, for example)
find themselves embedded in poor relations for extended periods of time with little
recourse for change.
The stock of culture operating in a dyad changes for various reasons, and it is not
the job of this dissertation to fully evaluate that. It may be that both Realism and
Liberalism impact the stock of culture and push it either towards more cooperation or
more conflict. It may also be the case that the stock of culture mediates the way that
Liberalism and Realism impact state interaction. Because each of the three perspectives
that I have developed in this chapter are shown to explain more in conjunction than
isolation (see Chapter 5) there are likely dynamics at play among states that can be
further explored in later research projects.

Conclusion
The way in which Realism and Liberalism were described in this chapter was
oriented towards a simple understanding of the core of these theoretical traditions. As I
have used standard operationalization as my orienting point, and would argue that I am
invested in treating these perspectives seriously.The third approach that I attempt to draw
out from criticisms of both Liberalism and Realism is not a panacea nor do I believe that
it represents a third substantive research agenda within the field. Instead it is an ambitious
attempt to improve upon the historic operationalization of IR measures with sensitivity
towards constructivist understandings of intersubjective meaning making, norms and
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cultures. I take this sensitivity—along with a limited understanding of the impact of this
measure—and operationalize it in the next chapter.
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5. Building the Model and Historical Performance
“Nearly everyone knows that correlation is not causation”
-Michael Haas28

Introduction
In this chapter I first create historic measures of both Liberal and Realist indices.
Quantifying these indices lets us tell stories about the behavior of dyads in the
international system. For example, some pairs of states experience high levels of relative
material pressure (both states have about the same amount of guns, money and soldiers
and are also in physical proximity or one member is a Great Power) but they may have
more cordial relations because they tend to have very high levels of bilateral Liberalism.
By measuring this over time, we can trace how the relationships between states have
improved or deteriorated.
As argued in Chapter 4, traditional measures of both Realism and Liberalism have
been criticized for being overly parsimonious, not treating complex interaction well and
ignoring intersubjective norms, cultures and values. I present a third approach for

28

(M. Haas 1974, 59)

122

measuring the behavior of states in the international system that I refer to as the Cultures
of Interaction Index (CoI Index). This index is comprised of sub-indices that attempt to
capture some aspect of a culture of complex state interdependence that is not apparent in
either traditionally opearationalized measures of Liberalism or Realism. The limited goal
of the CoI Index is to build upon previous IR measures, specifically by treating
interdependencies—the core of Liberalism—in more depth. I leave the Liberal index as it
has historically been operationalized29 and attempt to add to this by producing a dyadicfirst calculation of interaction between states that may capture some Constructivist
notions of shared norms, cultures and language. The exact treatment of the CoI Index is
outlined in more depth, below.
Together, it is hoped that these three indices together tell a more colorful story
about international dyadic interaction.
Operationalizing complex theories with competing accounts is no trivial matter,
and I make no claim to have the definitive quantification of IR. While quantification
forces the theorist to make choices that exclude competing accounts, understanding the
operationalization at a dyad-year may be particularly confusing. This takes us back to our
discussion of levels of analysis in Chapter 2 where I was laying out the ground-work of
identifying

my

dependent

variable.

The

table

below

outlines

the

general

operationalization of each index, drawing distinctions especially between the Liberal
Index and the Cultures of Interaction Index.

29

I do not treat trade dyadically in the Liberal Index measure, as we do not have the capacity to forecast
dyadic trade. I also augment the historic measure by including UN treaties as a component of international
political system embeddedness.
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Table 3: Overview of Operationalization of IR Theory
Variables in
Calculation
GDP

Dyadic
Realist
Index

Population
GDP per
Capita
Military
Spending

System
Calculation
Make index of
total global
material power
by year. Divide
each country total
by global total
and apply to
politically
relevant dyads.

Dyadic
Calculation

Conceptual
Note

In dyad take
country with
least power and
divide it by
country with
most power.

This dyadic
measure gets
at the relative
distribution of
power in a
relationship
between two
countries.

In dyad take
country with
least global
liberal
engagement and
divide it by
country with
most
engagement

This dyadic
measure gets
at the relative
commitment
to global
liberal norms
(whether this
indicates
broader
dyadic
political
affinity or not)

Democracy

Dyadic
Liberal
Index

International
Organizations
UN Treaties

Trade

Make index of
the total
engagement that
one country has
with the
international
system liberal
measures.

International
Organizations

Cultures of
Interaction
Index

UN Treaties
None
Alliances
Diplomatic
Engagement
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By measuring
dyadically this
index rejects
Measure
the notion that
interaction
simple
between both
membership
states in dyad for
in an
each of the subinternational
measures
organization
or treaty is
relevant
decisions

made in any
given dyad.
Instead, it
argues for the
characteristics
of a "third
way"
promoted in
Chapter 4: it
is nuanced
(calculating
from the
dyad-level up
is a highly
customized
measure), it is
networked
(the number
of shared IOs,
for example)
and it tries to
get at
intersubjective
meaning (by
taking a full
and broad
range of
expected
indicators of
shared
international
political
system
affinity)

Distance

Trade

The Realist and Liberal measures that I create here have been used by other
authors for quantitative analysis (see, for example Bennett and Stam 2000; and
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Pevehouse and Russett 2006). The CoI Index, however, is created from the ground up,
and is not entirely the same as other macro-level, global measures of state behavior in the
international system. In some ways it builds upon previous measures, in other ways it
attempts to break new ground.
Uniqueness does not necessarily correlate with utility. I therefore conduct a
statistical test to explore whether the addition of the CoI Index in a combined IR Index
can more accurately predict the occurrence of historic conflict than either Liberalism or
Realism in isolation. If the CoI Index can be shown to add explanatory power to my
index measures of Liberalism and Realism, then I argue that it should be considered to be
an achievement in the field of quantifying IR theory. The CoI Index attempts to tell the
story on a macro level across all country-dyad-years from 1960 that builds upon Realism
and Liberalism as well as attempting to leverage aspects of criticism levied against these
standard-bearers of IR. It attempts to break down the parsimony by treating cooperation
in more complicated ways and hopefully pointing to a component of the culture of
interaction between dyads. This approach endeavors to “get at” the same thing that
Wendt identifies in his Cultures of Anarchy at a dyadic level and not a system level,
while fully understanding that achieving a macro-level measure of cultural characteristics
between two states is likely impossible.
This chapter outlines how the historic data were processed into a measure of
dyadic threat of conflict and how this historic measure performs relative to the actual
occurrence of historic conflict. While I do not expect a one-to-one relationship between
the index and the actual occurrence of conflict (as noted in previous sections, the threat of
international conflict is not the same as the actual occurrence of conflict), I do expect to
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see correlation. Also, this section will test one of the broader hypotheses of this project:
do multiple IR Indices aggregated together identify conflict more accurately than more
singularly focused approaches to measuring IR, such as Realism or Liberalism in
isolation?
I proceed by first identifying how each sub-component was constructed, how the
three indices were aggregated and then moves on to compare this with historic data. This
analysis forms the backbone of later chapters that forecasts these relationships over time.

Building the Realist Index
For Realists, relative material power is the deep driver of the behavior of states.
As outlined in Chapter 4, this stems from parsimonious assumptions about the “anarchic”
structure of the international system. Beyond this sweeping conceptual consensus, there
is less agreement on the operationalization of this school of thought.
In a general sense, the amount of Realist “pressure” across all pairs of states in the
international system is the same, as they all operate in a milieu structured by anarchy and
characterized by extreme uncertainty about future survival. If any state can be killed, all
states operate from a basis of constant fear. Hobbes emphasizes this when describing
human behavior in the state of nature. Even the weak can kill the strong when in,
“…confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself” (1914).
The variable that becomes instrumental—as described in detail in Chapter 3—is
the relative distribution of material power. As the unit of analysis is dyad-year, this
project is invested in measuring the amount of Realist pressure—as quantified by relative
material power—on the every pair of countries where data is available.
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I consider a dyad to be under Realist pressure if the distribution of material power
is a salient component of decision-making in bilateral relations. We know that it is not
true that all dyads experience the same amount of Realist pressure. Eritrea and Ethiopia
make fundamental decisions about domestic investment and external alliances based—in
large part—on the material resource distribution across borders. A range of enduring
rivalries are under similar pressures. Ethiopia and Indonesia, however, do not make
similar calculations when they interact in international groups and organizations.
Dyads experiencing Realist pressure—often referred to as “politically relevant
dyads”—are those that are physically proximate and/or contain one member that is a
Great Power (Lemke and Reed 2001). In these special relationships the relative
distribution of material resources—and particularly how that distribution between the pair
of countries is changing—is one of the components of diplomatic decision-making.
According to this measure—outlined in this section—countries with material
power parity have high levels of Realist pressure, assuming that they are either physically
proximate or one of the members is a Great Power. At first blush, this index most closely
aligns within the Realist theory of power transition (Organski 1980). Power transition
theory argues that the greatest degree of pressure on any dyadic relationship in the
international system occurs when relative material power between the pair of states is
most equal. This—as argued by Bennett and Stam (2000)—stands in sharp contrast to
balance of power theory, which argues that power equivalence between countries is more
likely to lead to pacific relations (Little 2007).
Both approaches’ theoretical claims have been empirically validated. Bennett and
Stam test the relative contribution of different IR theories to the actual occurrence of
128

conflict. These authors find that, when politically relevant dyads are used to create a
model that predicts the occurrence of war, both balance of power and power transition
have explanatory significance. The bi-polar balance of power after WWII is one of the
leading drivers of peace in this model. Power transition theory—with politically relevant
dyads and the occurrence of conflict being the criterion—contribute positively to the
occurrence of conflict.30
The dyadic Realist Index measures the degree to which relative material power
considerations play a role in actual international relations. This is true for both balance of
power theory and power transition theory, though with different ends. Power transition
theory clearly makes the claim that the relative distribution of power factors into state
decision making. The balance of power thesis also argues that the relative distribution of
material power between a pair of states plays a paramount role in decision-making: both
states must either build arms or alliances in order to maintain the balance, and thus
preserve the peace. Thus, whether power transition theory or balance of power theory is
empirically relevant the degree to which two politically relevant dyads share similar
levels of material power is an important determinant of whether power plays an
instrumental role in political decision-making, ceteris paribus.
The most widely used operationalization of relative material power in academia
has been the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) produced by the
Correlates of War (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, John 1972; Singer 1988). The measure
includes the relative country-level distribution of the following in the international

30

Though power transition theory does not always positively contribute to the occurrence of conflict and is
not a very impacting driver of either conflict or peace.
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system for a given year: military expenditures, military personnel, steel production,
energy consumption, urban population and total population (Singer and Stuckey, John
1972; Singer 1988).
The distribution for this variable across time for select Great Powers is shown in
the line-graph below. The story that this graph tells are largely the great-power political
history of the past two centuries. At the beginning of the 19th century, the UK was the
dominant country vis-à-vis material power with over 30% of the world’s resources. This
situation of unilateral dominance gradually eroded and the US passed all other Great
Powers at the beginning of the 20th century. The US remained the world’s leading power
until the early 1970s when it was passed by the Former Soviet Union. The US again
vaulted to the position of Great Power in the international system at the end of the Cold
War but was again passed by China before the 21st century began.

Figure 22: Historic Material Power CINC (v4.0) - Select Countries; Y-Axis Percent Material Power (Singer,
Bremer, and Stuckey, John 1972)

This operationalization of material power seems to be more relevant for a world
characterized by state interaction of the 19th and early 20th centuries, not the later stages
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of the Cold War and the 21st century. The index has been criticized for not adequately
treating new membership in the international system (Kadera and Sorokin 2004) and
generally overstating the relative power of the USSR and China (Chan 2005; Chan 2008;
Tessman and Chan 2004).
Three of the six drivers of CINC are particularly problematic in a globalized
world. Power projection now is very different from a world characterized by the great
and capital-intensive wars that dominated the first 150 years of this measure. The
inclusion of the size of urban populations is not a directly important determinate of
power. Large urban populations may drive economic growth, which is widely argued to
be a measure of national power, but the size of Manhattan—ceteris paribus—has a
negligible impact on the ability of the United States to project influence.
Second, energy consumption is not an appropriate measure of global power for
the 21st century. While energy consumption can be a good measure of overall economic
output (as each unit of GDP requires a unit of energy to produce) it penalizes a country’s
level of power the greater their energy efficiency. Energy consumption may be included
because it is a proxy for GDP and historic energy efficiency improvements were less
dramatic. If GDP is the reason that energy consumption is included in the measure, it is
still puzzling, as data on gross country output is available stretching back to the
beginning of the 19th century (Maddison 2007).
Finally, the inclusion of domestic steel production clearly damages the current
utility of the CINC measure. The fact that the US currently produces very little steel is an
indication of the power of the US, not the weakness of the US. Steel production is
relatively labor intensive. As labor is cheaper elsewhere, and the technology is relatively
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dispersed, the US produces little steel. A possible counter argument to this claim could be
that steel production is required for any large-scale military endeavor and that the lack of
production in the US indicates that this country is relatively less prepared for a military
engagement. In a world characterized by globalization and technologically very advanced
tools of war, the outsourcing of any component of a weapon is potentially harmful to
security and not just steel. This issue was explored in depth by Brooks (2005).
A second historically opearationalized measure of material power is derived
entirely from the size of naval power as one clear way that great-powers can project their
influence. Modelski and Thompson draw a range of conclusions from the line-graph,
below (1988 see Chapter 4 for a treatment of these conclusions; Rasler 1994 the line
graph below is from this source, which took the original work from Modelski and added
periods of Great Wars). The graph measures the percentage of naval power controlled by
the hegemon at any given point in time and indicates the occurrence of great wars. The
general conclusion is that periods of deconcentration in naval power lead to conflict.
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Figure 23: Great War and Deconcentration in Naval Power (Rasler 1994, 68)

This approach seems to “get at” something that occurs in the international
community: wars appear to occur when concentration of naval power is relatively low.
However, it is a small sample size (5 wars) and there is much variation in naval
concentration where wars do not take place (the lowest point of naval concentration does
not, in fact, correlate with war).
Alternative measures of relative national material power exist that are designed
with the future in mind. The Strategic Assessment Group (SAG) created an alternative
measure that uses, “…gross domestic product...,population, defense spending, and a less
precise factor that includes innovation in technology" (Treverton and Jones 2005, 3)31.
This series is operationalized within the IFs system and will represent the core of the
forecast Realist Index (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). While the index is forecast
31

This measure is not widely documented and the original creators of the index are not widely known. The
following individuals should be attributed with credit: Paul Herman, Evan Hillebrand with Barry Hughes.
The SAG was an organization within the CIA that has been more recently replaced by the Office of
Transnational Issues (see below).
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within IFs an historic longitudinal database of this measure of national power did not
exist before this project.
A fourth measure has been developed out of the Office of Transnational Issues
that is called the Global Power Index (GPI). It includes the following components: ICT
Capital, R&D Spending, Governance Quality, Working Age Population Quality
Adjusted, Foreign Aid, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, Energy Imports-Exports, GDP,
Military Spending and Nuclear Weapons (Treverton 2011). It is meant to capture a more
varied account of power in the international system by including non-traditional
measures.
Measuring relative national power is fraught with problems, and is an imprecise
science. The fundamental problem with measures of power is that they have no
dependent variable with which to compare and create a model of interacting independent
variables. The “ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not have done” is
not easily operationalized. Thus, power tends to be intuited. For example, when one of
the original creators of the SAG measure of political power was asked about the different
weightings assigned, s/he indicated that they used intuition and provided the example of
the weight on the population component: if it was adjusted too high, Bangladesh become
“too powerful”.32
Material power is also temporally contextual (not to mention contextual in many
other less macro ways as well). It thus becomes increasingly difficult to operationalize a
measure that spans a long time horizon. As my analysis of the CINC index demonstrated,
the types of variables useful for assessment in the 19th century are different from those
32

This quote is taken from the author’s personal experience in a Chatham House Rule workshop.
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used during the Cold War and will be different from those that are useful in the long-term
future.
In light of the discussion above, I created my own historic measure of relative
power based on the work of the Strategic Assessment Group. The three other measures
do not conform to my needs: the CINC measure does not conform to the current and
future nature of power; naval hegemony is difficult to measure and is only useful for
analysis involving great powers; the Global Power Index brings together both material
and ideational drivers of power, something I prefer to separate for this project. The SAG
measure was created to focus on material power and was created specifically with the IFs
forecast system in mind.
The SAG relative national capabilities index takes country values relative to
global totals for four variables: military spending, GDP at purchasing power parity, GDP
multiplied by GDP per capita at purchasing power parity and population. The relative
weight of each sub-index is identified in the bar graph below. GDP and population data
were taken from the World Bank and the IFs system (Hughes 2004; World Bank.
International Economics Dept. Development Data Group 2011). Military spending data
was taken from the equivalent sub-measure produced for the CINC power index (Kadera
and Sorokin 2004; Singer 1988; Singer and Stuckey, John 1972).

135

Weight of Sub-Components of
Forecasted Material Power Measure
Military Spending

GDP x GDP per capita at PPP
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Figure 24: Relative Contribution of Sub-Measures of Relative National Material Capabilities

Data was gathered for each of the 183 countries in IFs.33 For each year, country
values were compared as percentages of the total for that given year. Thus, if a country
had a population that was 1 billion and the total population was 5 billion, they would
have 20% of the global population. These annual percentage values were calculated for
each of the values in the previous paragraph. Weights were applied to these four values
taken from the SAG assessment. The equation for calculation national level material
power is shown below.

The US has by far the largest GDP in this time period at both market exchange
rates and purchasing power parity. For military spending, the US and Former Soviet

33

Again, see Appendix 1 for those countries
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Union have similar and increasing levels of spending up to the end of the Cold War, then
growth in US spending flattens, and Soviet spending falls significantly. US military
spending then increases significantly in the late 1990s and through the beginning of the
21st century. The term that captures a synthesis of technology and size is operationalized
by multiplying GDP at market exchange rates with GDP per capita at purchasing power
parity. The overall size of GDP at market exchange rates indicates how much can be
purchased by a country on international markets. The size of GDP per capita at
purchasing power parity is a standard measure of human development in a country
(though far from perfect). Historically, the US and Japan have dominated this measure
with 16% and 22% of global GDP * GDP per capita at purchasing power parity at the
turn of the century. The top five in 2000 are all large advanced economies: Japan,
United States, Germany, United Kingdom and France. China has the largest global
population—a measure of the total amount of people at its disposal—with 20%. This is
followed by India (17%), the USA (4.6%), Indonesia (3.4%) and Brazil (2.8%).
The figure below shows the distribution of relative power for China, India, Russia
and the US. In 1960 the US held nearly 27% of the world’s material power. This declined
to below 20% by the mid to late 1970s and has remained near this level until the
beginning of the 21st Century. China and India, on the other hand, have seen their relative
material power slowly and steadily increase across time from 7% and 5%, respectively, to
10% and 6%. Russian power starts above 10% of global power and remains there until
the end of the Cold War, when military spending was constricted considerably. Russian
power may intuitively seem low to readers, but remember that this measure does not
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consider nuclear weapons (one main driver of Cold War power measures) and it is just
measuring Russian power, not the full Former Soviet Union.
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Figure 25: Relative Material Power Historic Measure - Author Creation from Various Sources using HermanHillebrand Method (Treverton 2011; Treverton and Jones 2005)

This project is invested in exploring relationships between states. The countryyear data that I created above is not sufficient for this exploration. Thus, I take countryyear data and transform it into dyad-year data. Conceptually, I am interested in a
measure that can tell me the degree to which material power considerations play into
policy making decisions. Operationally, I create an algorithm that first identifies whether
the pair of countries is politically relevant and secondly how much proximity there is in
the distribution of power across the dyad. Formally, the algorithm is displayed below.
IF
> 2% OR
> 2% OR
+

= Shared Territory

THEN
IF
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>
THEN
=

/

=

/

ELSE

The index is then inverted and standardized.34 This brings the valence of the
Realist Index in line with the Liberal and Cultures of Interaction indices. In those
measures, absolutely higher values indicate an improved character of relations between
states. We also want high values to indicate more passive relations for the Realist Index
so combination is not problematic.
If country-year measures of relative material power are problematic—for the
reasons mentioned above—dyadic measures of historic material power meant to represent
actual pressure on a relationship are even more complicated. These macro-level-levelmeasures-turned-dyadic miss much nuance, especially potential Realist pressures that
would change a relationship’s dynamics over the short run.
The distribution of the Realist Index, across all dyad-years, is shown the vertical
histogram, below. Higher values indicate lower levels of Realist Index pressure on the
relationship. In other words, theoretically we would expect these relationships to be less
concerned with relative material power build-up, ceteris paribus.

34

Standardizing is a process of making different data-sets comparable by subtracting each individual value
in the data set by the mean of the entire data set and dividing by the standard deviation for the entire data
set. The output of standardization can be understood as the number of standard deviations above and below
the entire sample mean.
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Figure 26: Histogram Measuring Distribution of Dyadic Realist Index. Y Axis is number of Standard
Deviations Above or Below Mean

This distribution is radically different from the Liberal Index shown later in this
chapter. Here, the majority of dyad years—85.3% of all dyad years—lie at the top of the
distribution (with a standardized value of 0.198), indicating that there is no Realist
Pressure in operation and that the dyad is not politically relevant. More concretely, this
indicates that the large majority of country pairs do not actively consider relative material
power levels and shifts in their one-on-one diplomatic decision-making with one
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another.35 The very long, thin tail that falls below the distribution reflects the wide range
of Realist Pressures that can exist between dyads that are territorially contiguous or that
have one Great Power in the dyad.
The Dyadic Realist Index measures relationships longitudinally. Any value below
0.198 represents a politically relevant dyad, which means that relative material power is
more likely to figure into the decision making process as compared with other dyads. As
the vertical histogram above indicates, values can range from 0.198 to as low as -11.
The line-graph below shows three Dyadic Realist Index scores across time. The
blue line Dyadic Realist Index score is for Russia and the USA, which begins at around 4.5 and becomes more negative (indicating an increase in pressure) out towards the end
of the Cold War. Reductions in military spending help to reduce pressure between the
two countries through the 1990s. The red line in this graph shows the Realist pressure
between North and South Korea over time. It argues that the material pressure between
these states has declined over time, mainly due to the massive growth in South Korea and
the inability for North Korea to catch up. The green line is the power distribution between
Iran and Iraq, with a notable increase in pressure during the 1980s and a decline after
Gulf War I.

35

They may consider material power in their extended diplomatic engagement, but this dissertation does
not map extended alliance networks. See the Conclusion for a treatment of research next-steps, which
include alliance treatment in quantitative models that build upon the work done in this dissertation.
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Figure 27: Dyadic Realist Index: Selected Dyads

Dyad specific longitudinal trends reflect political relevance and relative material
power distribution. Dyad measures can be aggregated and averaged to reflect broader
group Realist Pressure across time as well. For example, all of the dyadic relationships
for one country can be averaged. This provides a quantitative measure of the total amount
of Realist Pressure for a given country or group.
Creating group averages for Realist Pressure across this historic time horizon
shows a general and sustained move towards less overall pressure; this would indicate
that—overall—relative material power is becoming a less important component of dyadic
decision-making. However, grouped longitudinal trends can be misleading. The number
of dyadic observations per year increases across this entire time horizon (from around
5000 observations in 1960 to nearly 16,000 observations by the turn of the century). This
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increase in dyads reduces the overall average Realist Pressure measure, as the addition of
new states brings relatively more dyads that lack political relevance.
The line-graph below only includes states in the Realist Index that existed in
1960. This shows a more plausible Realist account of the distribution of pressure across
time. According to Realist accounts, without global hierarchy there will always be dyads
in the international system that are forced to use the logic of relative material power gains
to make decisions. The longitudinal distribution of this pressure should be random, with
increases in pressure as the global distribution of power becomes more egalitarian and
decreases in pressure as the distribution of power becomes more asymmetrical. This linegraph confirms the Realist assumption that relative material power considerations have
played a consistent role in state decision-making across this time horizon. Instead of
pressure dissipating across the time horizon, the index below shows a gradual decline up
to the end of the Cold War and then an increase in pressure for this grouping of states.

Standard Deviations Around the Mean

Dyadic Realist Index - Average for All
Countries Living from 1960-2000
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-0.15
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-0.25
-0.3
Figure 28: Dyadic Realist Index: Average for All Historic Living Countries from 1960-2000
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It is the hypothesis of this chapter that the sub-components of IR theory explain
more in conjunction than they do in isolation. The Dyadic Realist Index—while “getting
at” some behavior in the international system—does not explain all dyadic behavior
between states. The line-graph below provides an example of this, and is a bridge towards
the next section that builds the Dyadic Liberal Index. Here we see three dyadic
relationships—between Belgium and the Netherlands, Japan and the USA, and France
and the UK—where relative material power calculi should be at the forefront of their
decision-making.36 Instead, these three dyads all experience pacific relations that can
hardly be characterized by relative material power considerations. There are clearly other
explanatory variables at play that must be evaluated, and we turn to these in the following
sections.

36

Though it may be interesting to note that there have been historic tensions between the US and Japan
along with the UK and France.
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Figure 29: Dyadic Realist Index Select Passive Dyads

Building the Liberal Index
The Dyadic Liberal Index measures the degree to which two countries share
traditional values that are thought to impact interdependence and is influenced from the
writing of Immanual Kant (1991). Kant wrote about three key components of a lasting
and perpetual peace: trade, democracy and a commitment to international organizations.
The measures of Liberalism have been widely operationalized at a national level (Russett,
Oneal, and Davis 1998), though I make some important conceptual improvements on the
treatment of embeddedness in international political organizations. I repeat this countrylevel operationalization and then turn this into a dyad-year measure of the shared level of
Liberalism.

145

Conceptually, the Dyadic Liberal Index used in this project measures the degree
to which two countries are driven by interdependencies at a global level. This is not how
Liberalism is always treated conceptually, and even operationally. I treat Liberalism in
this way because I want to forecast it in IFs to 2050. We do not have the capability to
forecast dyadic levels of trade on a global basis—the variable that is most frequently
operationalized on the basis of dyads in studies of Liberalism—but we can forecast trade
between one country and the rest of the world. This constraint, along with the fact that
Liberalism has been operationalized along these lines previously, points to my logic of
choice. The dyadic operationalization of the Liberal Index is a measure of states’ global
involvement in systems that are meant to foster interdependence and promote a lasting
peace. They are not dyadic measures of policy alignment, diplomatic connection or the
degree to which the two countries in question enjoy positive relations.
An additional concern may arise that I am also changing the historic
operationalization of Liberalism by including a measure of treaty signings and
ratifications to the measure of international organizations. Typical measures only include
global membership in IGOs and do not treat treaty membership. I have added treaty
membership for two reasons. First, it is a new data set that I am bringing to the field that
has conceptual consistency with the third leg of the Kantian tripod. Second, this is a
choice made in the interest of creating a long-term forecast. We cannot forecast events
like the signing of a treaty or the admission to an IGO of a given country. Instead of
relying on these events that appear to be discrete at our level of analysis, aggregating
across measures produces an overall index that can be more easily forecast.
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I begin—as I did with the Dyadic Realist Index—by constructing the Dyadic
Liberal Index at a country-level. This requires building three, equally weighted parts:
democracy, trade and embeddedness in international political organizations. I then take
this country-year index and turn it into a dyad-year index by adding up the total
Liberalism for the dyad-year and dividing by the total possible Liberalism for the most
liberal dyad-year in my sample. This creates an index. To remain consistent with my
operationalization of the Dyadic Realist Index, I standardize this index. This process is
explained below and the behavior of each sub-measure is explored. The equation below
is the underlying logic of the index. Variables with sub-script “threshold” are the upper
or lower limits across the entire historic data set for the outlier country.
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Historically, the sub-components of the Liberal Index grew rapidly, and mostly
after the end of the Cold War. Global exports as a percentage of GDP have experienced
accelerated growth since 1965. They increased from about 10% in 1965 to about 20% by
the mid 1990’s. Since then levels have increased to nearly 30% of total GDP. Global
democracy (as measured by Polity) actually declined from the 1960s to the late 1970s and
then experienced a rebound to levels seen in the early 1960s. The end of the Cold War
caused democracy levels to spike—over a 55% increase—from 1989 to 2010.
Embeddedness in International Political systems—the measure identified as being
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comprised of UN Treaties and IO memberships across time—has grown rapidly and
consistently across time, especially after 1989. The sections below elaborate on this, but
focus much of their attention on the measure of embeddedness in the international
political system, a relatively unfamiliar measure. The historic behavior of trade and
democracy have been thoroughly documented (Huntington 1984; Kindleberger 1975).
Embeddedness in International Political Systems
The first component of the index was a measure of commitment to the
international system through membership in international organizations and UN treaties.
These are the same values used in the creation of the Cultures of Interaction Index,
described below, but operationalized differently. Instead of being measured initially on a
bilateral basis, these were measured single country commitments to treaties and
international organizations in the international system. In other words, instead of
measuring how many treaties and international organizations a pair of countries shared
membership in, this measure explored the total number of international organizations and
treaties that a country participated in.
The international organization data was taken from the Correlates of War project
(Correlates of War Project 2008; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). The
country-year number of memberships in international organizations was summed. An
index was then created using the highest total value of international organization
membership as the upper threshold (1) and the lowest number as the lowest threshold.
The second component of this measure was the total number of UN treaties that a country
had signed or ratified across time (United Nations 2011). If a country signed a treaty this
was scored as a 1. If they ratified a treaty, this was scored as a 2. The total number for
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each country-year were added up and an index was created with the upper value scored as
a 1 and the lowest value scored as a 0 with all other values scaled within that range.
These two sub-indices (the IGO membership and the UN Treaty data) were then
averaged. The historic performance of this measure is shown in the line-graph below.
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Figure 30: Average Country-Level Embeddedness in International Organizations and UN Treaties Across
Time. The Y Axis is a composite score that equally weights membership in IOs and UN Treaties, and doubly
weights ratified treaties over signed treaties.

Data on longitudinal country membership in international organizations is kept by
two organizations.37 The first, and perhaps most well known, is the data gathering work
of the Correlates of War Project. Originally this data was organized by Wallace and
Singer (1970). Current versions of this series are managed by Pevehouse, Nordstrom and
Warnke (2004). This group has collected data on an annual basis from 1815-2000.
The Center for Systemic Peace collects a data series in membership in conventional
intergovernmental organizations on a 5 year interval from 1952-1997 (M. G. Marshall,
37

The Union of International Associations is also a database for IGOs, INGOs and other civil society
actors, but is not broken down longitudinally on a country-basis. See here (Union of International
Associations 2001)
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Marshall, and Young 1999). These data sets are plotted against each other in the graph
below for the average number of memberships per country in the international system for
the full breadth of data available. Both of these data sources are comprehensive in their
country coverage, but the Correlates of War data has a more extensive temporal
coverage. Both measures also seem to be getting at the same thing, as they have similar
trajectories and slopes.
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Figure 31: Average Number of IO Memberships per Country – History (M. G. Marshall, Marshall, and Young
1999; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004)

Overall, membership in international organizations has increased throughout
the 20th century. There are notable exceptions to this. Two periods of stagnation in the
increase in membership occur around World War I and II. The next two periods of
negative growth or stagnant growth occur when state membership in the international
system increased relatively rapidly as the institution of colonialism fell in the late 1950s,
and again at the end of the Cold War. Adding new states to the international system that
begin with low IO membership pulls the global average down.
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The figure below shows membership in international organizations for the
Correlates of War database by UN population regions. Again, the trend demonstrates
strong and consistent growth across time. Notably, rich Western countries have higher
levels of embeddedness within international organizations throughout this time horizon,
with Asian, African and Latin American countries generally having less overall
embeddedness. Again, similar trends identified above can be seen in more detail, most
notably the end of the Cold War and the increase in states in Europe and Asia reducing
average membership.
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Figure 32: Membership in IOs for UN Regions (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004)

Membership in international organizations has long been the measure of choice in
exploring country embeddedness in international political systems38. UN treaties have
been generally overlooked. The database on UN treaties is freely available online
38

See a wide range of studies for this, including but not limited to: (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom
2004; Dorussen and Ward 2008; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003; Russett,
Oneal, and Davis 1998; Russett 2001)).
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(http://treaties.un.org/Home.aspx) and identifies the dates when countries either signed or
ratified treaties held by the Secretary General (United Nations 2011). The information is
not in an easily accessible form for macro-level analysis.
For this project, the UN Treaty information provided online was converted into an
accessible database. The countries where data was pulled were the 183 included in the
IFs system (See Appendix 1 for a list of these countries). Data was coded in two ways.
First, if a country signed or ratified a UN treaty in a given year, they were given a coding
of 1. These were then added up for each year from the end of WWII to 2010. Second, if a
country signed a treaty in a given year this was coded as 1, and if they ratified a treaty,
this was coded as 2. This second coding is used to forecast the index of IO
embeddedness. While it is arbitrary to claim that a ratified UN treaty is worth twice as
much as a signed UN treaty, there clearly should be a difference in weight between the
two acts. The global distribution of UN Treaty signatories is shown below. Two things
become apparent. First, there are two kinds of growth patterns. The slope of the global
average membership in UN treaties after WWII indicates that the global average score
was increasing at a fairly steady rate of around 220 points per year (that represents a
combination of signing and ratifying treaties, and could represent 110 ratified treaties,
220 signed treaties or a combination therein). After the end of the Cold War, the rate of
increase in signing and ratifying UN treaties increased substantially. Here, the average
global score increases by over 800 points per year. This is due to a large number of new
countries, mostly in Europe, that eagerly embedded themselves in the UN process.
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Figure 33: Composite Measure of Embeddedness in UN Treaties (United Nations 2011 with author
manipulation)

The UN data was also broken down by category. The categories are identified in
Appendix 2. For the graph below, UN Treaties were divided into Domestic Security,
Economic, Environmental, Human Rights and Military. The global average score
indicates that Economic, Human Rights and Environmental treaties have grown at
increasing rates increase about the end of the cold war. Military related treaties remain
quite low, and domestic security treaties have seen very limited growth for the entire time
horizon.
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Figure 34: United Nations Treaties for Selected Categories (United Nations 2011 with author manipulation)

Democracy
The next component of the liberal index was a measure of governance inclusion
taken from the Polity database project (M. G. Marshall and Jaggers 2009). The values of
this data measured democracy across time on an 11 point scale (0-10, with higher values
representing more democracy). This was re-scaled so that scores of 10 were given a value
of 1, and scores of 0 were given a value of 0 with all other values scaled within this
range.
Historic change in democracy levels has produced three “waves”, an idea
popularized by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1984). The first wave occurred after
WWI. The second after WWII and the de-colonial process. The third occurred at the end
of the Cold War. These transitions are represented in the line-graph below. The data on
democracy has a much longer time horizon than most series, stretching back to the early
19th century.
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Figure 35: Polity Project Democracy Measure – History (M. G. Marshall and Jaggers 2009)

Data clearly indicate that global average democracy levels have experienced three
clear transitions39. However, broken down into UN population divisions, this shift has
been far from even. North America and Oceana remain fairly consistently high (with the
later experiencing a decline in the post-colonial period). Levels of democracy follow the
three waves of Huntington in Europe, but the pattern is less clear in other regions. Latin
America grows democratically in the post-colonial period, but even more strongly as the
Cold War comes to an end. Asia grows right around the end of WWII and only rebounds
at the end of the Cold War. Finally, African democracy remains relatively low, growing
not in the de-colonial period, but up to the level of Asia by the end of the Cold War.

39

Huntington’s work is not without its detractors. See Doorenspleet for a review (2000).
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Figure 36: Average Democracy for UN Population Groupings – History (M. G. Marshall and Jaggers 2009)

Vis-à-vis governance inclusion, the overall historic trend has been up. This seems
to be likely to continue, as countries with large democratic deficits40 have experienced
democratic transitions since the beginning of 2011 with the Arab Spring and the
prospects for a more inclusive governance regime emerging appears strong.
Trade
The third element is a measure of a country level commitment to trade. This was
taken as an equal weighting of a country’s total trade levels and their imports and exports
as a percentage of GDP. Both absolute trade levels and trade levels relative to GDP were
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (2011). Absolute
trade levels were taken and an index from 0-1 was created using the lowest and highest
values available across time in the dataset. The relative trade levels were taken by first
adding up total exports and imports and dividing them by GDP (at market exchange
rates). Total trade as a percentage of GDP was then taken and an index was created using

40

A measure of the relationship between actual levels of democracy and expected levels, based on a basket
of human development indicators.
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the highest and lowest values across the entire time horizon (from 1960 to 200141). These
absolute and relative trade values were then averaged.
As the line-graph below demonstrates, global exports as a percentage of GDP
have increased at a fairly consistent rate across time. Starting in the 1960s with just over
12% of GDP being attributed to exports, the quantity of goods and services crossing
borders had increased by nearly 2.5 times before the impact of the Great Recession was
felt. This increase in trade has been attributed to many factors
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Figure 37: Global Exports as a Percentage of GDP – History

The three components of the liberal index were taken and averaged. If there were
nulls in any of the sub-components then the remaining components were averaged (so, if
a country was missing data on democracy but had data on trade and international
organizations/treaties, the latter two components were averaged).
Dyadic Liberal Index
41

There is dyadic data for trade and democracies beyond 2001 but I choose not to use it. There was not data
for IO membership after 2001, and this is a key component of both the Liberal Index and the CoI Index.
Thus, all historic data analysis stops at 2001. Further work on this project would extend the historic data
base.
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The Dyadic Liberal Index was created by taking the country-level Liberal Index
score for each pair of countries across time for each given year and finding the upper and
lower bounds. The pair of countries that were the most liberal in this index measure was
Germany and the Netherlands in 2001 (with a standardized score of 3.9). The least
liberal pair of countries was North Korea and Tanzania in 1961 (with a standardized
score of -1.7). These two values were then used to scale all results from 0-1. This index
was then standardized to reflect the distribution of the values in the same way that the
Dyadic Realist Index was created. The logic of the creation of the Dyadic Liberal Index
is shown below.
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Below is the vertical histogram of the Dyadic Liberal Index for all dyad-years. It
demonstrates two peaks, one above the mean and one below the mean. This indicates
that—between 1960 and 2001—the lion’s share of dyads in the international system are
either slightly liberal (as this peak occurs just north of the distribution mean) or fairly
non-liberal (as this peak happens at a full standard deviation below the mean). The shape
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of the historgram for the Dyadic Liberal Index has shifted across time. Historically the
two peaks were more pronounced (representing the two major alliances during the Cold
War) to a distribution in 2001 that is much more bell-shaped. The distribution of the
Dyadic Liberal Index is much more “normal” than the Dyadic Realist Index.

Figure 38: Histogram Measuring Distribution of Dyadic Liberal Index. Y Axis is number of Standard
Deviations Above or Below Mean for the Full Time Horizon

The two peaks in the Dyadic Liberal Index can be used to further draw
distinctions between Liberalism and the CoI Index (described below). The Cold War
distribution for the Dyadic Liberal Index shows peaks that are much more pronounced
than the histogram shown above (much greater above and below the mean relative to at
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the mean). The peak with lower absolute values is populated dyads in the Soviet Bloc
(very low Liberal scores, but very high CoI Index scores). Countries in the higher peak
were Western Democracies with equally high CoI Index scores and very Liberal. See the
cross sectional graph below plotting Liberalism and CoI Index scores for further
explanation of the difference between Liberal and CoI Indices.
The line-graph below shows dyadic Liberalism scores for selected countries
across time. The scale on the left is the number of standard deviations above or below the
mean for the entire sample size of data42. The data in this graph indicate that, in the mid1960’s the US and China were approximately as liberal as the average of all dyads over
this entire time period. This is largely due to the Liberalism of the US and not the
Liberalism of China43. This dyad grows relatively steadily across time, eventually
becoming fairly liberal (more liberal than the world average, as will be demonstrated
below). The bottom dyad in the line-graph below is North Korea and Burma, two of the
most illiberal states in the international system.

42

After each of the three sub-indices were created on 0-1 scales they were averaged into a single index. The
mean and standard deviation for that index (for the years 1960-2001) for all available dyads were taken.
Each individual dyadic index score was then subtracted from the mean and divided by the standard
deviation.
43

A shortcoming of this approach is that it does not treat relationships that are mixed regime types as
effectively as it could. For example, dyads that are mixed (like the US and China in 1965 with the former
very liberal and the later very illiberal) could be coded as having very low dyadic levels of Liberalism. It is
an empirical question as to whether these mixed dyads should be treated differently and in subsequent work
that will be explored.
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Figure 39: Liberal Index for Selected Dyads. Y-Axis is Number of Standard Deviations above or below the
Mean for the entire distribution of data from 1965-2001

Taking the global average of all standardized dyads across time tells a familiar
story about increasing levels of trade, democracy and membership in international
organizations. Measuring “up” from standardized dyads, the world was fairly illiberal
from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s. This was caused by a relative decline in global
average democracy for that period coupled with moderate growth in trade and strong
growth in embeddedness in international political organizations. However, after these
liberal doldrums, global dyadic average Liberalism grew rapidly. First, this was driven by
increases in trade and embeddedness in international political systems and then the rapid
democratization that occurred at the end of the Cold War. The line-graph below tells this
story.
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Figure 40: Liberal Index for World Average. Y-Axis is Number of Standard Deviations above or below the
Mean for the entire distribution of data from 1965-2001

The line graph below measures the average Dyadic Liberal Index score for World
Bank income groups. This measure was taken by looking at the average Dyadic Liberal
Index score for all dyads that share membership in the groups below. First, the
distribution across time correlates to levels of income, with High Income countries
having higher average Dyadic Liberal Index scores than Upper Middle Income countries,
followed by Lower Middle Income countries and Low Income countries. Next, levels of
Average Dyadic Liberal Index scores increase across time for all income groups. The
steadiest increase occurs in both High and Upper-Middle Income groupings. Low and
Low-Middle Income groupings stagnate for much of the time horizon, growing only
through the 80s and 90s. Interestingly, in absolute terms, neither Low Income or LowMiddle Income groupings achieve absolute average liberal levels achieved by the High
Income World Bank group at any point in this distribution.
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Figure 41: Dyadic Liberal Index: World Bank Income Group Average Scores 44

Selected dyads that have a history of rivalry display a similar explanatory problem
to the Dyadic Realist Index. In the line-graph below are three dyads: India and Pakistan,
North and South Korea, and Iran and Iraq. Each dyad below experienced protracted
military engagements across these time periods that result in fatalities (as measured by
the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset) (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004).
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Figure 42: Dyadic Liberal Index Select Dyads
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Groupings fixed across time with 2011 membership
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Though their levels of bilateral conflict were similar, their levels of bilateral
Liberalism were not. The next section of this chapter will present the construction of the
third IR index deployed in this analysis. The final section will create a statistical model
that will evaluate the relative explanatory power of each index in isolation and as an
aggregate measure on the historic occurrence of international conflict.

Building the Cultures of Interaction Index
The Cultures of Interaction Index (CoI Index) is an attempt to get at something
that is neither fully Realist nor fully Liberal. It draws on both Liberal and Realist
standard operationalization approaches, using the dyadic focus that Realism uses
frequently and Liberalism uses occasionally, as well as many variables frequently used
by Liberalism. However, the output is not exactly Liberal and is certainly not Realist:
many fairly illiberal dyads can have very high CoI Index scores, like former Soviet Bloc
countries and many countries in the Middle East.
This index attempts to gauge the character of bilateral state interaction on a scale
ranging from friendly to antagonistic. It rests on the assumption that, if two states are
actively aligning foreign policy, treaty signing, international organization membership
and trade flows, that they are creating a culture of interaction that promotes cooperation.
It takes Wendt’s Cultures of Anarchy (which is conceptualized at the international system
level) and tries to gets at a similarly socially constructed behavior between states at the
dyadic level. In this sense the CoI Index can be said to range from a Kantian culture of
interaction, through a Lockean culture and towards a Hobbesian culture (from friendly
towards antagonistic). I assume that this kind of behavior can be identified through extant
indices.
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I argued in Chapter 4 that standard operationalization of both Liberalism and
Realism are vulnerable to three types of criticism: excessive parsimony, poor treatment
of complex interdependence and a lack of emphasis on cultures/intersubjective meaning
making. The CoI Index does not actually solve any of these criticisms in an absolute
sense. Instead it attempts to “pull threads” from these criticisms of IR and build a dyadic
measure that is more nuanced than either the Liberal or Realist Indices have been
historically operationalized.
One component of the increased nuance of the CoI Index relative to either
Liberalism or Realism is that it begins from the dyadic level. While some Liberal indices
have used dyadic trade as a sub-component but not in each sub-measure, the CoI Index
starts by measuring the treaties, organizations and trade relationships from the ground up.
Both Realist and Liberal indices started with country-year indices which are not dyad
specific. Beginning with dyads as the level and unit of analysis changes the focus of the
index. Here, countries can have great bilateral relationships while having very poor
bilateral levels of Liberalism and/or Realism. This complex interdependence will have an
impact on the intersubjective meaning-making at the dyadic level, in other words, the
culture. It considers complex interdependencies: standard Liberal measures consider a
country’s affinity with global norms, not country-specific norms. The CoI Index
measures a series of dyadic interdependencies that are contextual. It also is geared
towards thinking about culture: the variables chosen for the CoI are all operationalized
on a dyadic basis and are all oriented towards measuring complex interdependencies
between a pair of states.
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I create the CoI Index by manipulating five sub-indices. These are outlined in the
table below. For all of the data manipulation the countries included are the 183 that are
modeled within the International Futures system.
Table 4: Defining the CoI Index

International
Organization
Membership

Original Data

Manipulation Description

Correlates of
War

Measured Total Number of Shared IGOs
Between Dyad Year

United Nations
Measured Total Number of Shared Treaty
Treaty
Signatories Between Dyad Year Weighing
Database
Ratified Treaties More
Correlates of
Binary Presence of Diplomatic Connection
War
Correlates of Presence of Alliance Privileging Size of Overall
War
Alliance
Correlates of
Actual Trade Minus Expected (Gravity Model)
War

UN Treaty
Embeddedness
Diplomatic
Connection
Alliances
Trade

The logic of the calculation of the CoI Index for two countries is shown in the
equation below. Each variable with the sub-text “threshold” is the highest level that any
of the dyadic measures reach in the base-year. For the historic data, that is 2001.
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The first sub-index of the CoI Index is taken from the Correlates of War
Intergovernmental Organization Database (Correlates of War Project 2008; Pevehouse,
Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). This data series measures whether 213 states are
166

members of 495 different international organizations (again, the full number of countries
is parsed down to the IFs list of 183). The data stretches as far back as 1815 (Bavaria was
a member of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine in that year, for
example) through 1965 in five year intervals. From 1965 forward, the data is annual until
2000.
We expect states interests to align when they are members of similar international
governmental organization networks. This is not to say that shared IGO membership
indicates that two states have a fully converged set of interests, just that this is one
measure of state initiated activity that is oriented towards an alignment of interests in an
international space.
This data was then taken on a bilateral basis. This approach explores these
relationships in great granularity by country-pair for each year. I am interested in
measuring the number of IGOs that every two pairs of countries in the world share
membership in for every year. For example, pairs of countries in Western and Northern
Europe tend to be members of very many of the same international organizations. I
assume that their international diplomatic policy choices are more aligned than countries
that have relatively fewer diplomatic connections of this type. The line-graph below
averages the standardized shared number of IGO memberships for each dyad pair within
that region.
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Figure 43: Culture of Interaction Index Selected Regions
The second sub-index used to create the CoI Index was taken from the United
Nations Multilateral Treaties Database (United Nations 2011). This database records all
multilateral treaties that are deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
The database identifies the treaty name, countries who have committed themselves to the
treaty and the degree to which they are committed demarcated by those who signed the
treaties and those who ratified them45.
The individual UN treaty scores for countries were then added up. Scores were
weighted differently for treaty signatory as compared to ratification. Ratification was

45

Previous to this project this data did not exist in an easily manipulatable form (ie., in list form, for
example). The data is freely available to those who query the author.
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deemed to be twice as important as signing a treaty46. The line graph below identifies the
average global distribution for countries signing/ratifying multilateral treaties kept with
the United Nations Secretary General. The pattern is clearly up across time, with an even
greater increase in the rate of growth at the end of the Cold War. Here, many new Eastern
European countries deeply embedded themselves in international treaties.
Again, this data was taken at the level of dyadic relationships. The figure below
identifies select countries and their bilateral UN treaty alignment across time. Finland and
the Netherlands have a historically strong bilateral alignment of UN treaty signings (they
have the highest 2010 values, and are consistently high across the total time horizon).
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Figure 44: Selected Dyadic Embeddedness in Treaties (Author Compilation)
The third sub-index used to create the CoI Index is the level of Diplomatic
Connection between pairs of countries across time. This series is also produced by the
46

It is important to note that this is an imperfect weighting. If countries are democratic and the ratification
of international treaties has to pass through a system of congress or parliament then it is important to note
that it is much more difficult to ratify than sign treaties. This general constraint does not exist for
authoritarian countries who can generally more easily ratify treaties.
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Correlates of War project (Bayer 2006). This series measures—at a dyadic level—the
diplomatic interaction of all states in the international system across levels of
commitment. The data is available from 1817 to 2005, generally in intervals of three or
five years.
Diplomatic connection between countries indicates an interest in formalizing
relations. Typically, the most powerful states in the international system have both
diplomatic connections abroad and many connections at home as well. For example, in
2001 164 countries had embassies in the US and the US had embassies in 162 countries.
In the same year, 125 countries had embassies in China while China had embassies in
152 countries. In contrast, 12 countries established embassies in Chad, and Chad
established only 18 abroad (Europa Publications Limited 2001).
This variable performs tends to reflect both wealth (identified in the paragraph
above) and political machinations. The line graph below identifies relationships between
selected countries. The blue line represents India and Pakistan, which have experienced
tumultuous relations across time, with the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 clearly souring
relations. The green line—representing Argentina and the UK—also identifies trends in
the relations between states. Up to 1970 the relationship was not fully reciprocal until the
1970s; a product of income and distance. After the relationship increased to full bilateral
embassies, the Falklands War caused a reduction in diplomatic exchange. The third line
represents the exchange between the US and Vietnam. Before the early 1980s there was
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no bilateral embassies between the countries. The establishment of embassies was one
important step on the path to smoothing bilateral relations more broadly47.

Figure 45: Diplomatic Exchange Index - Correlates of War (Bayer 2006)
I take this value and create an index from 0-1, with values of 1 indicating full,
bilateral embassy exchanges and values of 0 representing no exchange.
The fourth sub-index that is used to create the CoI Index is diplomatic alliances.
This measure is equally weighted between the presence of a bilateral alliance and the
broader strength of that alliance. The data is, again, taken from the Correlates of War
project (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). This measure is relatively straight-forward
conceptually and as an applied sub-index to the CoI Index. Conceptually, if countries are
allies then they are less likely to go to war with one another.
The final sub-index to the CoI Index is a measure of actual trade versus expected
trade on a bilateral basis. This measure is a proxy for the quality of state relationships
47

The measure before 1975 for Vietnam was only for North Vietnam and the US. Next, the values for this
data are interpolated between five year series for presentation and data smoothness.
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across time that has received some attention in the literature on conflict (Keshk, Pollins,
and Reuveny 2004), but not in the way that it is used in this project. This measure
identifies which partners countries are trading with more than their level of GDP and
their proximity would indicate. This is not the same measure as was used in the Liberal
Index. Countries with very high levels of Liberalism can have low levels of expected-toactual trade values.
For this project a gravity model was constructed where the output variable was
bilateral measures of trade and the independent variables were overall levels of country
income, physical distance and the year. The gravity model has been widely deployed for
econometric analysis across time (Anderson 1979; Mátyás 1998; Mátyás 1997). The
construction of the model for this project used data on geodesic distance from the Centre
d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales, a leading French data source for
issues on trade and international economics. The distance data used is called distw, which
calculates distance between countries weighted for the proximity of people, not territory.
In other words, if two countries are touching territorially but have actual population
centers at great distances (think about the US and Russia, for example) this measure will
characterize the dyad as being more distant than their territorial proximity would suggest
(Mayer and Zignago 2006). For data on national income, Gross Domestic Product at
Market Exchange was used from the International Futures system, which itself draws on
a variety of sources (Hughes 2007). Trade flow information was again taken from the
Correlates of War project, which measures bilateral trade flows across time (Barbieri,
Keshk, and Pollins 2009).
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The actual regression was created using logs of bilateral GDP and trade flows to
represent diminishing marginal returns to increases in flow size. The actual model output
(with three independent variables) produced an r-squared of 0.65 with significant t ratios
and p values for everything (at the level of 99%). See Appendix 3 for full model results.
The equation used is the following:
Expected Bilateral Trade = -39.43 + 1.69 + (Sum of Log GDP for Two Countries) +
0.000385 * (Inverted Weighted Distance) + (0.0129 * Year)
Using this formula I created an expected trade value for all dyads across time. I
compared this with the actual value of bilateral trade between countries, subtracting the
later from the former. Some examples of the performance of the gravity model are shown
in the three line-graphs below.
The first example is from the bilateral relationship between the US and Vietnam
over time, beginning in the first year of available data, 1976. This shows an initially very
low level of actual trade to expected, a reflection of the history of conflict and distrust
between the countries. The relationship between these countries improves dramatically
throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, eventually indicating that Vietnam and the
US are trading at higher levels than expected48.

48

Values interpolated for 1982,1983, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993
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Figure 46: Actual Verses Expected Bilateral Trade - US and Vietnam
The second example comes from the trade relationship between Argentina and the
United Kingdom. Early data shows that the pair of countries experienced fairly strong
trade relationships, higher than would be expected based solely on their physical
proximity and the size of their economy. The Falklands War brings about a dramatic
reduction in the size of trade relative to expected values. This relative souring of the
relationship between the two countries extends throughout the early 1990s and eventually
improves and reaches expected trade values again.
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Figure 47: Actual Verses Expected Bilateral Trade - Argentina and UK
The final example of the performance of this index is between two countries that
have had historically strong relationships stemming from colonialism. The relative size of
the economies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Belgium and their physical
proximity would indicate that their levels of bilateral trade would be relatively quite low,
but their political proximity and the strong economic ties that extended post colonialism
show much higher actual trade to expected trade.
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Figure 48: Actual Verses Expected Bilateral Trade - DRC and Belgium
The scores of actual trade to relative trade are subtracted and turned into a 0-1
index.
The five sub-indices are standardized to identify the relative distance of each
country around the mean distribution of the sub-index. In other words, the standardization
process allows for the internal comparison of sub-indices across sub-indices, as well as
providing a score that is not bound by upper and lower limits. The standardized subindices were then averaged into a Cultures of Interaction standardized output.
The number of observations for the CoI Index from 1960 to 200 is 457,960. The
distribution of the standardized score (see the vertical histogram, below) show a handful
of relationships that fall more than 2 standard deviations above the mean (8,058
observations fall more than 2 standard deviations above the mean, or 1.8% of all dyad
years).
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Figure 49: Histogram Measuring Distribution of Dyadic Cultures of Interaction Index. Y Axis is number of
Standard Deviations Above or Below Mean

Evaluation of Indices
I have argued that an integrated analysis can be conceptually parsimonious (but
not excessively) while including impacts from a range of theoretical and applied systems.
I have argued in Chapter 3 that IR theory might benefit from an approach that
understands Realism and Liberalism to be mutually beneficial theoretical tools that
should be used in conjunction to evaluate state behavior in the international system. I
have also made the claim that criticism of standard-bearer approaches to IR point to a
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third type of approach that embraces nuance, complex interdependence and culture. I
introduced the actual measure of that above.
In this section I am interested in evaluating how these IR indices behave when
modeled with the historic occurrence of international conflict. I test whether the three
approaches to IR that I have constructed above have more explanatory power in isolation,
or as an aggregate index. If I can show that the three operationalized theories have utility
as an aggregate index then I can justify using a combined quantitative measure of Realist,
Liberal and the CoI Index to tell stories about international relations historically as well
as forecast this measure to 2050. I choose conflict as my independent variable because it
represents the ultimate deterioration of dyadic relations. Two states can experience a
deterioration of relations that falls short of conflict, but conflict represents one extreme
stage of state behavior that we can measure.
One claim of this project is that there is a distinction between the CoI Index and
the Liberal Index score. They both contain some of the same variables, so we would
expect correlation. In fact, the CoI Index builds upon Liberalism and should be seen as a
complimentary measure. Conceptually and operationally, however, the measures are
distinct. As was argued before, the Liberal Index operationalized dyadically represented
the level of interdependence of the pair of states at the global level.49 The CoI, instead,
is a dyad specific measure. It measures dyadic policy alignment. Two countries can score
very high on the Dyadic Liberal Index and very low on the CoI Index.

49

I operationalized Liberalism globally for two main reasons: it is normally treated as such, and I needed a
measure that I could forecast over a long time horizon within IFs and dyadic trade is not treated in IFs.
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The cross-sectional plot below shows the relationship between the CoI Index and
the Liberalism Index for all dyad years. Each dyad-year is represented by a black dot.
The shaded red areas indicate the largest concentration of dyad-years within the
distribution. First, it is clear that there is some relationship, but that it is not a one-to-one
interaction between the two measures. If you fit a line to this distribution, it produces an
r-squared measure of 0.33, indicating that 33 percent of the variation in the y axis around
the regression line is being explained by the x axis.
Many dyad-years fall either above or below the regression line. Many Soviet
states were very il-Liberal but also had fairly high CoI scores, a pattern shared by
authoritarian regimes from South America in the 1970s. Dyad-years that more recently
experienced high levels of Culture of Interaction but low levels of Liberalism were North
African. There are examples of countries at the other end of the spectrum that experience
high levels of dyadic Liberalism but low CoI Index scores. These dyad-years tend to be
less powerful states who are at a distance (Luxemburg and Mongolia in 1999, for
example, dyad years where one member is newly democratic (Estonia and Norway in
1991), dyad-years where one state is newly independent (Denmark and The Gambia in
1965) or a combination of all three (New Zealand and Mauritius in 1968).
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Figure 50: Cross-Sectional Plot of Cultures of Interaction Index and Liberal Index Dyadic Score Results - Red
Indicates High Density

The cross-sectional plot below identifies the relationship between the CoI Index
and the Realist Index. It demonstrates a weak relationship, in general (with an r-square of
0.10 with a linear fit). Dyad years at the bottom right—with very high CoI Index scores,
but much Realist pressure—are mainly Western European medium to large states. These
include the UK and France, Norway and Denmark and France and Italy (all for various
years). Dyad years at the bottom left are mainly from earlier in the time horizon and
include relatively materially poor states with poor relations. These include Oman and
Somalia, Mali and Burkina Faso and Chad and Niger. At the top-right of this cross
sectional plot—countries with very high CoI Index scores yet very little realist pressure.
These dyad years include states mainly in Western Europe that are either territorially not
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contiguous, or that have large discrepancies in relative power, such as Luxemburg and all
other Western European states, for example. At the top-left of this cross sectional plot lie
the overwhelming majority of dyad years in our distribution. Again, the density of dyads
in the distribution is highlighted by the red shading. Most dyad years experience no
realist pressure (identified above in the distribution analysis of the historic index) and
thus clump at the top of this cross-sectional plot.

Figure 51: Cross- Sectional Plot of Cultures of Interaction Index and Realist Index Dyadic Results - Red
Indicates Higher Density

The relationship between the Realist Index and the Liberal Index is even weaker
than the relationship between the CoI Index and the Realist Index. A linear regression
between the two indices shows a linear curve to with an r-square of 0.01. While the
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strength of relationship is much worse, an exploration of the particular dyad-years in each
of the four quadrants shows similar patterns to the relationship between the CoI Index
and the Realist Index, discussed above. This should not be surprising, as the overall
distribution of the results is dominated by the very large number of dyad years that are
scored as having no pressure by not being politically relevant.

Figure 52: Cross Sectional Plot of Realist and Liberal Index Dyadic Results - Red Indicates Higher Density

There are many ways that these three indices could be brought together into one
synthetic representation of the threat of dyadic interactions in the international system:
one variable could drive weights for other variables algorithmically, for example. For the
purposes of this project, it was determined that the simplest synthesis of these three
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indices would be the most straightforward for analysis. For the synthetic index, the CoI,
Realist and Liberal indices were aggregated. I also compare the Realist and Liberal
Indices in an aggregated index with the historic occurrence of conflict. This is to build a
case for my forecast approach, discussed in the next chapter, where the CoI cannot be
endogenized within IFs.
The purpose of the analysis that follows is not to create a model of the occurrence
of international conflict with the most robust statistical fit. This kind of work has been
done by others, starting with Wright (1964) and extending through the Correlates of War
project (Singer 1972; Singer and Small 1994; Wallace and Singer 1970). More recently
Bennett and Stam (2004) have produced a comprehensive statistical analysis of the
relationship between the occurrence of war and driver variables mentioned earlier in this
project.
The purpose of this dissertation is not to replicate this work. The occurrence of
conflict is a difficult thing to measure statistically for a variety of problems (King and
Zeng 2001). This is true of both domestic and international conflict. In the field of
domestic conflict, this has produced two kinds of measures, one that is probabilistic and
the other that is an index. The probabilistic measure captures the best statistical
relationship with the historic occurrence of conflict (just like the authors did in the
previous paragraph). This is useful, but insufficient for a full quantitative analysis of
conflict.
Conflict happens for a wide variety of reasons and probabilistic measures provide
much emphasis to historic drivers. An example may prove useful. One recent attempt to
predict the occurrence of domestic conflict using a probabilistic measure was produced
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by Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr (2012) and used measures that have evolved from work
done on the State Fragility Task Force (Esty et al. 2007; Goldstone et al. 2010). The
results of this study widely miss the mark when it comes to the actual occurrence of the
Arab Spring. The Peace and Conflict 2012 report measures the “risk of future instability
between 2010 and 2012” to be “low” for the following countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Lybia,
Syria and Tunisia. However, far from having a low risk of future instability, each of
these countries experienced large-scale domestic conflict in this time period.
This is not to say that probabilistic measures are not useful for anlaysis. On the
contrary, they are an important step in furthering our understanding of the drivers of
conflict, be they domestic or international. However, they are not a panacea, and index
measures—conceptually sound and statistically relevant—can provide additional insight
into how likely conflict is moving across time.
One central hypothesis of this project is that a synthesized model of international
relations will have a more meaningful relationship with the actual occurrence of conflict
than any of the three key theories of international relations explored. To test this I have to
explore my five international relations models (Realism, Liberalism, CoI, Realism +
Liberalism + CoI, Realism + Liberalism) with the historic occurrence of conflict. This
section of the dissertation performs that evaluation. It concludes that, yes, the integrated
model of international relations theories performs better than any of the models in
isolation.
To test this I take two measures of international conflict and subject my five
indices to a logistic regression analysis. I measure the occurrence of conflict in two
related datasets. The first is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset produced by
184

the Correlates of War. This dataset measures whenever a militarized conflict between two
states occurred and whether a fatality occurred. MIDs can be of a very low threshold, and
can involve seeming “accidents” and other miscommunications between pairs of states in
the international system. MIDs were defined in Chapter 1 and include conflicts, “…that
range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Jones, Bremer,
and Singer 1996, 163). The other measure used for this analysis is the Correlates of War
account of actual interstate war. The threshold of this conflict is much higher (1,000
battle field deaths), and involves the deployment of actual troops, full military operations
and the declaration of war (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).
Logistic regressions are useful for measuring nominal dependent variable data
with a probability that it will occur based on an independent variable value. These
methods are suitable for analyzing variables with characteristics similar to the occurrence
of historic conflict (as it can be represented as a binary). The distribution of the
independent and dependent variables in my sample make many statistical samples
problematic. See the figure below for a visual representation of the problem: the vast
majority (over 99.5%) of observations have a dependent variable with a value of “0”
(representing no conflict). The incredibly small number of independent variables can
skew my results and vastly under-estimate the occurrence the prediction of a “1” (King
and Zeng 2001).
This is not a problem for my analysis because the end of this hypothesis testing is
not the creation of a model with the best statistical fit to the historic occurrence of
conflict. As argued in Chapter 2, this has been done by others (Bennett and Stam 2004).
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Instead, I am interested in comparing the relative strength of the different indices related
to the historic occurrence of conflict.
Logistic regressions model independent variables against a binary dependent
variable. This is done by fitting the data with a sigmoid-curve (more commonly referred
to as an “s-curve”). It is superior to linear regressions when dealing with binary output
variables that are not normally distributed (though this is still problematic, see King and
Zeng 2000 as noted above). The logistic regression equation is demonstrated below.

The cross sectional plot below shows the distribution of the aggregate measure of
the character of bilateral relations in the international system along the x axis and the
occurrence or non-occurrence of a fatal conflict dyad year along the y axis. A logistic
regression was used to test the goodness of fit of the aggregate index measure and
compare it to the three IR indices standing in isolation.
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Figure 53: Y Axis is Fatal Dyadic Conflicts (1 for yes, 0 for no). X Axis is the Aggregate Index Score Measured
in Standard Deviations Around the Mean

The results of a logistic regression are reported as Chi-Square values. Higher
values indicate that the model fit is stronger than lower values. The five models that I test
are the following: the first three models are simply the Dyadic Realist, Liberal or
Cultures of Interaction Indices separately regressed against one measure of conflict. The
fourth model (referred below to as “Integrated”) is a simple aggregation of the three
indices. The fifth model integrates Realist and Liberal indices to explore the additional
contribution of the CoI Index and the lay the foundation for my forecast. Each model
includes only one independent variable and one dependent variable.
I tested a range of relationships between independent dependent variables. I
altered independent variables by shifting the sample size from politically relevant dyads
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to the full data series. I changed dependent variables by including two measures of
international conflict: MIDs and the sample taken using the higher 1,000 battle field
deaths threshold. See Appendix 4 for the full series of results for these tests. In general,
the full integrated model (aggregating the Dyadic Realist Index, Dyadic Liberal Index
and the CoI Index) performed more strongly than any of the three IR measures in
isolation. The bar graph below shows the chi square results from runs of the model using
only politically relevant dyads (those with a Great Power or territorial contiguity) as the
filter for the independent variable and dyad years with with 1,000 or more battle field
deaths. The results indicate that, for politically relevant dyads, the aggregate index
(simply adding up the Dyadic Realist, Liberal and CoI Indices) produce a better
explanatory model than any of the approaches in isolation.

Results from Logistic Regression for MIDs
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Figure 54: Logistic Regression Results: Politically Relevant Dyads and MIDs

The test results shown in Appendix 4 manipulate the independent data in the
following two ways:
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Full Variables, 457k Rows: This is the full set of dyad year variables from 19602001.



Full Variables with Realist Pressure 67k Rows: These include only dyad years
that are politically relevant (where the dyad is territorially contiguous and/or
includes one Great Power).

Each index (Realist, Liberal, CoI, Integrated with Realism and Liberalism and Full
Integrated) is then regressed against two dependent variables (the low or high battle field
death threshold). Out of these comparative studies, the integrated measure proved to be
the most explanatory in all but one situation. The Dyadic Realist Index was of greater
explanatory power when the lower battle field death threshold was used for all data points
(457,000 rows). This confirms a well established fact in the quantitative study of conflict:
politically relevant dyads (especially territorially contiguous) are the most likely to
engage in conflict.
Overall, however, the integrated measure did a better job in predicting the historic
occurrence of conflict vis-à-vis the IR indices in isolation or Realism and Liberalism
combined. This quantitative test of historic data shows that an integrated approach can be
more effective. It provides credibility for my theoretical framework and my forecasting
methodology explored in the next chapter.
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6. The Base Case of International Futures (IFs)
Introduction
Kantian Liberalism, Cultures of Interaction and Realism form the backbone of
this forecast analysis. The previous chapter argued that each theoretical framework was
one piece in a larger puzzle, and that emphasizing any approach in exclusion of any other
would not tell as full a story about the future of international relations in the international
system to 2050. I provided quantitative support for using an aggregate measure of IR
theory.
This section takes these indices and explores their behaviour in the Base Case of
IFs. The Base Case is a scenario that extends political and technological trends and
decisions made over the last 20 years out to 2050. No large-scale technological breakthrough is included in this scenario (such as artificial intelligence, or cost effective carbon
capture and sequestration). There are also no catastrophic events explicitly modeled (such
as a massive change in natural constants) beyond those already included within historic
data series that get transferred through to model structure.
In many ways the Base Case of IFs paints a positive picture of development over
the next 40 years. Economic growth continues, education is expanded and health
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measures all improve. The grand challenges of transitioning away from fossil fuel
dependence and towards renewable energy are met with little disruption to the global
economy. Climate change impacts are generally small. Base Case behavior and
assumptions are outline in Appendix 5, reprinted from a Human Development Report
Research Paper (Hughes, Irfan, et al. 2011, 13–14).
This chapter begins by assessing the Base Case behavior of the Realist Dyadic
Index. This index is measured in the same way as the Realist Index used in Chapter 5
and draws on the work of Herman and Hillebrand (Treverton 2011). Power transitions
become an important piece of this analysis, and I conclude that relative material power
pressures will remain a salient concern of many states over the next 40 years.
Next, I explore Kantian Liberalism’s three components, spending more time
documenting the treatment of Government Embeddedness in International Organizations,
as this is a new addition to the IFs model. This section concludes that the world is—on
whole—becoming more liberal and that this historically has been an important theoretical
and empirical contributor to the mitigation of international conflict.
Third, this section explains how the Base Case treats the Cultures of Interaction
Index. The CoI Index is a granular measure of dyadic alignment in the international
system. As such, it cannot be endogenized within the IFs model. Instead of treating this
as an internally calculated variable in IFs, I initialize data in 2010 using 2001 values, and
keep them constant across time. This variable becomes the major conceptual uncertainty
in this forecast and orients my further policy recommendations. Where states experience
a deterioration of dyadic relations, the CoI index can mitigate this. States with the
potential for deterioration should explicitly improve the sub-measures that go into the CoI
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Index (align foreign policy, sign treaties and attempt to build a culture internal to the
dyad that promotes cooperation).
The global average score for each of the three indices, along with the overall sum
of these scores, is shown below. This highlights this chapter’s general conclusion: the
world is becoming less conflictual based on the combination of Kantian Liberal,
Complex Liberal and Realist Indices, across time. While the Realist Index score remains
relatively stagnant—indicating that overall Realist pressures are likely to persist—various
forms of interdependence are on the rise. I conclude that, relying on Base Case
assumptions, the future for conflict in the international system is increasingly a thing of
the past.
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Figure 55: World Average Scores for IR Measures: Y-Axis Standard Deviations Around 2010 Mean

While, on the aggregate, dyadic relationships in the international system are
forecast to improve, there are dyads and regions that are at increasing pressure from
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constrained resources and shifting relative power distributions. Future conflicts look
likely to arise in specific dyads discussed below. The concluding section of this chapter
identifies specific vulnerable groupings.
A Reminder on Measurements and Aggregations
The measurement of index scores in this chapter and their aggregation may
confuse some. Most generally, readers are encouraged to remember that higher scores
indicate more pacific dyadic state relationships. Lower scores—for any index or subindex—identify more tense dyadic relations based on drivers from the specific index in
question. This general rule is augmented below in the table which highlights the specific
meaning of higher or lower scores for each index.
First, the output of each index is the number of standard deviations that the dyad
scores for the index above or below the mean value for 2010 for the entire distribution of
all dyads. The higher the score in any given index highlights the Higher scores indicate
more standard deviations above the mean—and thus a better overall quality of dyadic
interaction—but means specific things to each sub-index. See the table below for an
overview of how different measures are treated and what higher or lower values
conceptually indicate.
Table 5: Note on Measurement and Indices

Kantian
Liberalism

High Numbers Indicate
Global norms of
interdependence play
strongly into dyadic
decision-making
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Low Numbers Indicate
Global norms of
interdependence do not play
into dyadic decision-making

Cultures of
Interaction

Overall
Realist

Overall IR
Index
Average

Dyad partners share high
levels of bilateral affinity
in foreign policy choices
The dyadic distribution of
resources figures little
into dyadic decisionmaking
There is less overall
threat in this dyad.
Relations are more likely
to be cooperative than
conflictual.

Dyad partners share low levels
of bilateral affinity in policy
choices/are not politically
relevant
The dyadic distribution of
material resources is important
in dyadic decision-making
There is a higher level of threat
in this dyad. These states are
more likely to be conflictual
than cooperative

Aggregating dyad scores can be tricky, and done in various ways. The first way to
calculate a group average score is internal to that group. In other words, take the score for
each dyad within the group and average that score. The second way is across groups
without over-lap. For this, I take the average Dyadic Liberal Index score for each pair of
states where one member of the dyad is a member of one group and another member of
the dyad is a member of the other group. An example of this is the average Dyadic
Liberal Index between the BRICs and OECD groups. The third way to measure average
Dyadic Liberal Index scores is to take the score of each dyad with the rest of the world.
Each section below uses various aggregation methods with dyadic scores and is explicit
about the approach used in each case.

Realism in IFs
The previous chapter measured and explored a Dyadic Realist Index that was
based solely on relative material power distribution. Relative material power is the
cornerstone of Realism. I argued that—whether you were a proponent of Power
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Transition Theory of Balance of Power—that higher levels of material parity require a
dyad to pay more attention to that variable across time. I begin this section by exploring
the forecasted Dyadic Realist Index for relative material power.
It is the contention of this project that it is impossible to actually operationalize
Realist measures of power on a macro-level scale across time because of one primary
reason: there is no agreed upon dependent variable that can be operationalized. If power
is the ability of A to get B to do what B would have otherwise not done, how could that
be measured?
IR Realism: Relative Material Power
The relative material power index used for this analysis was describe by
Treverton and Jones (2005). The index is comprised of four sub-measures, identified,
with their relative weightings, below. The weightings in the index were developed
through a qualitative process by Hillebrand and Herman that remains publically
unavailable. The measure is identical to the historic measure used in the previous chapter.
The largest contributor to the relative material power measure in the forecast is
GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Purchasing Power Parity is used in lieu of
Market Exchange Rates (MER) because, when poor countries mobilize for conflict, the
resources that they are drawing on are largely domestic and not international. Using MER
would undervalue these domestic assets. The next largest contribution is overall military
spending, representing just less than 30% of the index. The fourth component is the
overall size of the population. Population size is important and is typically a component
of relative material power measures. It is most useful as a proxy for the relative number
of humans that can be brought to bear in a conflict. For example, if Singapore and
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Indonesia went to war—assuming that the other sub-components of the realist measure
were equal—the size of Indonesia would make them a relatively stronger contender. The
final measure is GDP multiplied by GDP per capita at PPP. This is a tacit representation
of the technology possessed by a country. Countries and regions with high levels of
technology tend to be those with high levels of GDP accompanied with high levels of per
capita GDP. Large levels of GDP allow these nations to marshal resources for the
development of R&D. High levels of per capita GDP indicate a work force with high
levels of development.
The base-case forecast of the relative material power distribution for all countries
in the world is shown below. The vast majority of countries—180 out of 183—
individually have less than 5% of global material power. Only 17 countries have more
than 1% of relative material power, representing less than 10% of all countries
represented in IFs. The line-graph below demonstrates the widely discussed transition
between great powers that is forecasted to occur in the coming decades. The top line is a
measurement of the relative power of the United States. In 2012, this index measures US
material power at 24% of the global total. The next line is China, whose relative material
power is measured at 13%. The relative power of the US declines and China rises, with
the two crossing in the decade of the 2030s. The third line—India—nearly catches up to
the US by the end of the time horizon.
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Figure 56: Relative Material Power Base Case: All Countries in IFs

The relative power transition that occurs in the line graph above reflects the subcomponents of the realist index. GDP at PPP is currently largest in the US, measuring
about 12 trillion dollars (in 2000 US dollars), with China and India trailing with
economies of 8 trillion USD and 3 trillion USD, respectively. In the base-case, this
changes dramatically. Over the total time horizon, the US economy grows at an average
1.7% annually, with China growing at 3.7% and India growing at a staggering 5%. This
causes China’s economy to pass the US at purchasing power parity in 10 years. India’s
economy is larger than the US by the end of this time horizon. In terms of population,
China and India have populations that are far larger than the population of the US: India
is 3.8 times the size of the US and China is 4.4 times larger. The population of China is
forecast to plateau in the middle of the time horizon. This is due largely to increasing
education, economic growth, and the impact of the one-child policy of the 1970s. India’s
population is forecast to continue growing to 2050, passing China in the early 2030s. The
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US population is forecast to also continue growing through this time horizon, increasing
to just over 400 million by 2050. In terms of per capita GDP at PPP, the US has the
strong advantage, and this is expected to remain across the entire time horizon. US GDP
per capita is nearly 40,000 per year (in 2000 dollars) and is forecast to grow to nearly
60,000 per year by 2050. China and India both have much lower levels in 2010—just
over 6,000 USD and under 3,000 USD respectively. These are forecast to grow
substantially, China increasing over four times its current value and India five times. The
final component of the power index is military spending. Currently, the US spends more
money on the military than the next 17 countries combined (nearly 415 billion USD in
2000 dollars). This is forecast to transition dramatically over the next 40 years as the
green line in the line-graph below. By 2020, the US will spend more than the next 6
countries combined. By 2050, China will spend more than the US on the military. This
indicates both the rise of China and her military spending but also the relative increase in
equality of government military spending.50

50

The GINI coefficient for government military spending in IFs is the following: 2010 = .76; 2020 = .69;
2030 = .65; 2040 = .62 and 2050 = .59
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The time horizon begins with nine countries above the base-case threshold for
identifying a great power: 2 percent of total relative global material power. These are, in
order from most power to least, the US, China, India, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom,
France, Brazil and Russia. By the end of the time horizon, the number of great powers is
reduced from nine to five. The remaining powers are, in order, China, USA, India, Brazil
and Japan. The distribution of power in the international system is currently largely in the
hands of the US, with China and India growing rapidly. Membership in this group
remains the same. The next most powerful countries—those that have considerable
material resources but are not in the same class as China, India and the US—are whittled
down across time by growth in both the top three Great Powers, and the rest of the world.
This is indicated in the line graph below. Currently, the top three have nearly 45 percent
of the world’s material power, increasing over time to nearly 50 percent. The rest of the
world grows slightly, and ends the time horizon with 40 percent of the world’s power.
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The second-tier Great Powers, however, see their relative material resources decline from
less than 20 percent of the world’s power to just over 10 percent.
Relative Material Power Distribution Select Groups
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Figure 58: Relative Material Power for Great Powers, Second Tier Powers and Rest of World

Twenty three countries out of 183 double their relative material power across the
time horizon. The greatest relative improvement occurs in Turkmenistan and Angola,
which see their power increase by a factor of more than 3.5 times. Of the 23 countries
that double their power, 17 are African. At the other extreme, six countries experience
their power cut in half. They are all European with the greatest reduction in power
occurring in Montenegro, Italy and Greece.
The Dyadic Realist Index forecast was measured in the same way as the historic
measure. In the first year all dyads were first separated into either politically relevant
dyads or non-politically relevant dyads. This was done by an algorithm that considered
two things: first, whether there was a great power in the dyad (measured as having 2
percent of global material power) and secondly whether the dyad was territorially
contiguous. If either of these criterion were met, then the relative material power as a
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percentage of the less endowed member of the dyad was divided by the more endowed
member.
Higher Dyadic Realist Index scores indicate that relative material power
distribution is less of a decisive issue in decision making between a pair of states.
Incrementally lower absolute values of the Dyadic Realist Index indicate that relative
material power distribution increases in importance in decision-making across the dyadyear, ceteris paribus. The absolute value of the Dyadic Realist Index measures the
number of standard deviations above or below the mean for the total dyad-year
distribution in 2010.
Globally, the average of all Dyadic Realist Index scores measuring material
power proximity increases in absolute terms, indicating a decline in the degree to which
questions of relative power distribution are an important piece of decision making, ceteris
paribus. This is because the number of states classified as Great Powers reduces, and this
lowers the total amount of relative material power pressure in the system. In the basecase of IFs, four countries begin the time horizon as great powers (having more than 2
percent of global material power) but end the time horizon as non-great powers: France,
Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. By 2050 the base-case of IFs shows five great
powers: China, with 20 percent of material power, the US with 15 percent, India with 14
percent, Brazil with 3 percent and Japan with 2 percent.
By removing the four falling Great Powers, the Average Dyadic Realist Index
demonstrates a slight decline in the absolute value. Lower absolute values indicate an
increase in overall, global realist pressure. In the Base Case, this is forecast to be
relatively small, changing by only 0.001 standard deviations. The forecast is consistent
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with Realist claims of the continued relevance of material power distribution in decision
making and is also consistent with historic trends in average Dyadic Realist Index scores
remaining relatively static across time.
Average Dyadic Realist Index for Material Power: No Falling Great Powers
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Figure 59: Dyadic Realist Index for Relative Material Power - No Falling Great Powers

Moving from the global average of all Dyadic Realist Index scores to average
country-year scores tells a story first about Great Powers and non-Great Powers. To take
country-year scores, I averaged each dyad-year score for each of the 183 countries
modeled in IFs. This measure indicates the degree that—in general and across time—a
country makes foreign policy decisions that consider relative material power distribution,
ceteris paribus.
The average score for all non-Great Powers (not including the four that fall below
the Great Power threshold in the time horizon) is 0.156, well above the mean, indicating
that relative matieral power figures into only a limited amount of foreign policy
decisions. The average for Great Powers across the time horizon (including the four that
fall) is -2.09, two standard deviations below the mean, indicating that power distribution
is an important component of foreign policy decision-making. This is the result of the
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modeling strategy—informed by IR theory—which argued that Great Powers would need
to consider the material distribution between themselves and all countries in the
international system while countries who were below the Great Power threshold would
only need to be concerned with the power distribution between themselves and their
neighbors.
The average Dyadic Realist Index scores Across time, this pressure dissipates for
the four countries that fall out of the Great Power category: Russia, France, United
Kingdom and Germany. Across time, four former Great Powers become non-GreatPowers. This should decrease the amount of time focused on making decisions around the
role of the distribution of material resources in the international system ceteris paribus. In
modeling terms, these four countries experience the largest abslute increase in their
average Dyadic Realist Index scores, indicating that they experience a very large
reduction in the degree that material power plays into their foreign policy, ceteris
paribus.
Removing Great Powers from the analysis, the majority of countries experience
little or no change in their average Dyadic Realist Index scores across the time horizon.
The line-graph below takes the absolute change in the Dyadic Realist Index from 2010 to
2050 for each country and sorts them by most increase to most decrease, moving from
left to right. It shows that the majority of states in the international system—92 out of
183—will see the importance of relative material power remain within 0.005 standard
deviations of where it is in 2010, ceteris paribus.
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Figure 60: Absolute Standard Deviation Change by Country - No Great Powers

At the extremes, there are two groups: those who are forecast to see the
importance of relative material power decrese and those who are forecast to see it
increase. The five countries that experience the greatest absolute increase in the index
score—signaling a declining importance for relative material power in foreign policy—
are (in order from greatest absolute increase) Zambia, Jamaica, Oman, Portugal and
Zimbabwe. However, the greatest improvement is only 0.13 standard deviations. The
countreis with the greatest absolute decline in their average Realist Index scores are
(again, in order) Turkmenistan, Iran, Ghana, Algeria and Nigeria. The greatest change
here is a -0.25 standard deviation decline in the score.
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The non-Great Powers with the lowest average Dyadic Realist Index scores that
indicate that their decisionmaking is largely oriented towards relative material power
considerations are Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Libya. The five countries with
the highest scores are Cape Verde, Grenada, Maldives, Micronesia and Samoa.
Moving from average country-year scores to dyad scores provides an additional level of
granularity. Of the total number of dyads in the sample—over 33,000—only 8 experience
a deteoriation in dyadic material power that is over one standard deviation. These are the
following dyads, ranked from most deterioration to least.
Table 6: Dyads with Material Power Deterioration

Dyads with Deterioration in
Realist Relative Material
Power Measure of Greater
than 1 Standard Deviation
Turkmenistan Kazakhstan
USA
India
Nigeria
Japan
Uzbekistan Turkmenistan
Japan
Brazil
UAE
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Japan
Pakistan
Japan
The greatest transition occurs between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is
currently nearly four times as powerful as Turkmenistan. However, Turkmenistan is
forecasted to fully make up that difference in relative material power and be nearly at
material power parity with Turkmenistan over the coming decades.
Table 7: Dyads with Improvement in Material Power Less than 1 Standard Deviation

Dyads with
Improvement in
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Realist Relative
Material Power
Measure of Less
than 1 Standard
Deviation
Portugal Morocco
Italy
Brazil
Japan
India
Zimbabwe Zambia
Yemen
Oman

Liberalism in IFs
The world is becoming more liberal, in the Kantian sense. Global trade is
increasing, levels of democracy continue to rise and international organizations and
treaties are an increasingly relevant way to solve collective action problems and
disagreements in the international system. This kind of interdependence—not
characterized by bilateral interdependence but rather dependence to the international
system as a whole—is radically shifting how states behave.
The section explores the construction and behavior of the Dyadic Liberal Index,
comprised of measures of trade, democracy and embeddedness in international
organizations. I begin by documenting the structure of the international organization
embeddedness (GOVEMBED) model within IFs. The construction and behavior of this
variable is focused on more thoroughly than other variables that make up the Dyadic
Liberal Index because it is new to the IFs system and it requires documentation. Next, I
highlight the general structure and behavior of both democracy and trade in IFs.
This section ends by identifying the construction and behavior of the base-case Dyadic
Liberal Index from 2010 to 2050 in IFs. It concludes that, if base-case assumptions are
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upheld, that the majority of dyadic relationships will improve their levels of Kantian
Liberalism. While some dyads remain highly illiberal and even become less liberal across
time, they represent a small handful—less than 5%—of all dyads in the international
system. I also conclude that, while IFs forecasts great improvement in levels of dyadic
Liberalism across time, that great discrepancies across regions will remain even over the
next four decades.
IR Liberalism: International Organization Embeddedness in IFs
Prior to this dissertation, two of these legs of the Kantian tripod were forecasted
within the IFs system: democracy and trade. One contribution of this project is a forecast
of country embeddedness in international political systems. Thus, this section will treat
the later variable in much more depth, as the former two variables have been discussed
elsewhere (Hughes, Joshi, et al.; Hughes, Hossain, and Irfan 2007).
Throughout this project I have referred to the third leg of the Liberal tripod as
“embeddedness” in international political systems. In Perpetual Peace Kant identified
belonging to a “federation of states” as being an important driver of pacific relations
(Kant 1991). The third leg has been measured by looking at membership in IOs
(Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998). “Embeddedness” in
international organizations is meant to signal the degree to which a country has
committed itself to overcoming collective action problems (among other international
issues) through the world of international organizations and agreements.
I measure country-level embeddedness in international political institutions by exploring
two kinds of data that are conceptually related. The first is membership in international
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organizations. The second is country commitment to UN treaties through signing or
ratification.
There is a relationship between both the IO and UN measures, though it is far
from linear. The cross-sectional plot below highlights this, and places the measure of UN
treaties on the x axis and the IO membership on the y axis. It separates countries into
their UN Population categories and fits a second degree polynomial curve to this
relationship. The r^2 value is .55. This shows that North American, Latin American and
African countries are more likely to join IOs than sign UN treaties relative to the fit of the
curve. The opposite is true for European, Asian and Oceanic countries.

UN Regions
y= 34.2712 + 0.3595*(x) - 4.54E-04*(x^2)
R(SQR) = 0.5504
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Figure 61: Cross-Sectional Relationship Between UN Treaty Scores and IO Membership

To forecast IO embeddedness, this project creates an index that combines impacts
from both IO and UN Treaty scores. In the process of creating this index I was unable to
find guidance as to how to relatively weight IO membership to UN treaty
signatories/ratifiers. I decided to weight them generally “equally”, where the absolute
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average number of IO memberships should be weighted about as much as the total UN
treaty score. UN treaty scores were generally five times larger than IO embeddedness
scores for countries in the most recent years with the largest overall embeddedness. Thus,
and fairly arbitrarily, signing 5 UN treaties or signing one and ratifying two signals the
same level of embeddedness in international political organizations as being a member of
one international organization.
The overall index—referred hitherto as embeddedness in international political
organizations—is graphed below. The historic pattern is similar to the growth pattern of
both IO membership and UN Treaty scores, both graphed above. Again, we see the
global average score increase at the end of the Cold War which is an impact that stems
from the UN Treaty data, and not the IO membership data.
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Figure 62: Global Average Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems

There are no quantitative forecasts of embeddedness in international political
organizations, to my knowledge. This project, therefore, breaks new ground. The
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following section outlines the initial logic for forecasting this variable, some results and
then limitations. This forecast is a work-in-progress, and welcomes constructive and
creative criticism. The model that I constructed to forecast this variable included three
key drivers at this initial stage in the process, and should likely be augmented with an
algorithmic treatment of great powers at a later stage.
To forecast this variable I began with a conceptual account of why countries
embed themselves in international organizations and sign UN treaties. Neo-Liberal
Institutionalists have long claimed that such behavior is designed to change the cost of
decision-making in the international system to help overcome collective action problems
and signal trust-worthiness in anarchy. Following this logic, we should expect that
countries that are more willing to embed themselves in international organizations have
some resources that they would like to preserve and the means to preserve these
resources. With this in mind, I went about building a statistical model.
I explored numerous relationships between variables that I felt had conceptual salience
for the forecast of embeddedness in international political institutions. I found the
strongest statistical and conceptual model to include the following drivers: income per
capita at purchasing power parity, government expenses as a percentage of GDP and a
measure of relative material power51. I will explore each of these variables in turn, and
then will turn to the combined model.
The cross-sectional plot below maps the relationship between GDP per capita at
purchasing power parity and the measure of country embeddedness in international

51

Relative material power is an index constructed in IFs that measures levels of income, population size,
technological competence and governance effectiveness.
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political institutions. The relationship not insignificant (with an r^2 of 0.26) and an
upward sloping curve. Here, we expect countries with higher incomes to embed
themselves more in international political institutions.
y= 87.5525 + 3.08E-03*(x) - 1.38E-08*(x^2)
R(SQR) = 0.2608
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Figure 63: Cross-Sectional
Relationship Between GDP Per Capita at PPP and Country-Level Embeddedness in
Puerto Rico
International Political Systems

High income indicates that countires are likely to have the resources to invest in
embedding themselves in internatioanl organizations (it takes resources to staff IOs and
enforce laws that stem from UN ratification, for example). However, having material
resources alone doesn't necessarily indicate that the country in question is willing to
spend these on international organizations. For a measure of country willingness to invest
in bureaucratic solutions to problems, I plotted government expenditures as a percentage
of GDP against my measure of embeddedness in international organizations. That scatterplot is below. The r^2 is 0.22, and the curve is upward sloping. This indicates that, as the
porportion of the GDP that comes from governmental expenses increases, we would
expect them to be more embedded in international political systems.
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y= 68.1658 + 2.3943*(x)
R(SQR) = 0.2233
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Figure 64: Cross-Sectional Relationship between Government Expense as a Percentage of GDP and CountryLevel Embeddedness in International Political Systems

The third variable in this model is realtive material power, which is a measure of
income, population, technology and governance quality that is placed on a relative scale
of 0-100. The scatter plot below plots this with international political embeddedness. The
r^2 is very low (0.065), but the variable has a very significant contribution to the
multivariate model. The scatter-plot below highlights the upward sloping curve, and
indicates that, as countries have more material power, they are increasingly willing to
embed themselves in international political institutions. There may be a separate set of
relationships for Great Powers, tentatively identified in the graph below as the US, Japan,
China and India (any country with over 5% of global power). This issue is discussed
later.
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65: Cross-Sectional Relationship between Relative Material power and Country Embeddedness in
International Political Systems

The adjusted r^2 is .59, which is reasonable, and t and p values are all within the
range of significance. The specific data series used for this model are also identified in
Appendix 8—along with all statistical scores, which are significant. The equation used to
forecast this variable is the following:

International Political Embeddedness = 57.1 + (.00192 * GDP per capita at PPP) +
(1.443 * Government Expenses / GDP) + (18.378 * Relative Material Power)

Analyzing the results of this… The initial forecast of this variable indicates that
the overall trend in embeddedness in international organizations is likely to continue to
grow across time. The line graph below highlights this by identifying the history and
forecast of embeddedness in these international political organizations for key UN
regions to 2050. The average score in the highest region (Europe) is nearly 200. Latin

213

America and Asia will surpass this value sometime in the 2020s. Africa will nearly reach
this value by the end of the time horizon.
Country Embeddedness in International Organizations, History and Forecast
GOVEMBED[Working](UN Pop Africa)

GOVEMBED[Working](UN Pop Asia)
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Figure 66: History and Forecast of Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems for UN
Population Groupings

The distribution of IO embeddedness across time highlights that, even with the
relatively optimistic IFs forecast, that some central African countries will have the same
overall commitment to IOs in 2050 that places in Europe had achieved by the 1960s. A
series of maps by decade can be found in Appendix 5 that highlight these transitions
across time. The legends in the map are fixed, so values and colors are comparable
temporally. The map below shows the global distribution of IO embeddedness in 1960.
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Figure 67: Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - 1960

All countries on this map fall into the lowest three categories of IO
embeddedness, representing scores of 0-50, 50-100 or 100-150. Only four countries
achieve the 100-150 score range: Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Countries with higher levels of embeddedness are mostly in Europe as well as North and
South America. There are a handful of countries in Asia, and only two in Africa with
scores that are higher than the 0-50 range (Egypt and Ghana).
The distribution changes dramatically over the next 40 years. See the map below
of the distribution in 2000.
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Figure 68: Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - 2000

Here we see four categories of country embeddedness in IOs, ranging from scores
of 250-200, 200-150, 150-100, 100-50 and 50-0. In the highest score range, we find many
Western and Northern European countries. Moving to the next rage finds some Eastern
European countries and Russia. A large number of countries are found in the third and
forth categories. The third category—the same level of embeddedness as Britain, France,
Belgium and the Netherlands experienced in 1960—we find China, India, the US and
most of South and Central America. There are also pockets of this level of embeddedness
in Western Africa. For the next level—scores between 100-50; the same level of the US
in 1960—we find much of the Middle East, Central Asia, Central Africa, Southern Africa
and pockets of South East Asia and Eastern Africa. There are only two fully sovereign
nations in 2000 that had levels of commitment that were in the lowest range: North
Korea and Sierra Leon (Taiwan and Western Sahara appear as white in the map above,
but lack full sovereignty).
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Shifting our attention to the forecast for 2050, a much fuller picture emerges of
country embeddedness in international organizations. See the map below.

Figure 69: Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - 2050

Here we see the vast majority of members of the international system having
levels of embeddedness that are higher than what we have seen for any member in the
year 2000. The embeddedness scores from 2000 to 2050 are forecasted to growth
substantially, with average scores in Europe targeted to be nearly 600, and almost 900 in
North America. While wide-ranging growth in embeddedness in international
organizations is forecasted in this scenario, there are still pockets of very low levels of
embeddedness and commitment to IOs. Much of Central and Western Africa are
forecasted to have levels of embeddedness that score between 100-150, the same
category that we found France, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1960. Other
notable low-scoring countries are Burma, Nepal, North Korea and Tajikistan. At the very
low end, the model created for this project forecasts that Somalia, Eriteria and East Timor
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have levels of embeddedness in 2050 that are the same as India, Poland, Turkey, Ghana
and the US in 1960.
This approach to forecasting IO embeddedness is obviously not without its
problems. One key issue is the treatment of countries with very high levels of relative
material power (defined earlier in this paper). China, Japan, India and the USA are
currently the four countries with the largest relative material power resources.
Historically, these four countries were reticent to join IOs. Because our forecast has these
four countries continuing with relatively strong economic growth, there is very strong
growth in embeddedness. The line graph below highlights this problem.
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Figure 70: Country Embeddedness in International Political Systems - Key Great Powers

It is very likely that countries with very high levels of relative material power will
feel less of a need to project their interests through these international organizations.
Instead, they are likely less interested in binding themselves to international bureaucracy
and more interested in being able to go-it alone. Anecdotally, we can see this transition in
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the historic data on Russian embeddedness in international organizations. Prior to
opening their economy to increased market pressures and eventually moving away from
state based mechanisms of distributing surplus value, the USSR had relatively low levels
of embeddedness in these international organizations. This is particularly seen in the data
on UN embeddedness, shown below.

UN Embeddedness: Russian Transition
Belgium

Russian Federation

United States

350
300

Score

250
200
150
100
50
0
1950

1956

1962

1968

1974

1980

1986

1992

1998

2004

Year

Figure 71: UN Treaty Embeddedness - Russian Transition at End of Cold War

In the line graph above, Belgium represents one of the most committed countries
to signing and ratifying UN treaties across time. The US, as a great power, it is argued,
may feel less obligation to projecting interest through such institutions, and has lower
absolute levels of embeddedness in these treaties across time. Russia experiences a
transition as they move through the process of opening the country to outside influence in
the middle of the 1980s. This graph could be interpreted as Russian acknowledgement
that their reliance on their great material strength to project influence was waning, and
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that they would have to further rely on international institutions to work for change in the
international system.
IR Liberalism: Democracy in IFs
The current treatment of governance within the IFs model focuses on a path
dependent treatment of the diffusion of pluralistic governance regimes driven by levels of
income and levels of educational attainment. The forecast variable is the Polity score that
has been tailored to range from 0 (autocratic) to 20 (democratic).
Forecasting levels of democracy is not simple. A cross sectional relationship
between Polity's Democracy measure and GDP per capita at PPP yields an r^2 of 0.20.
While many countries with high incomes are also democratic, exceptions exist
(Singapore, Kuwait, among others). On the other end, there are many countries with high
levels of democracy but with very low levels of income (India, Mongolia and Paraguay,
for example).
The total number of years of education that a person has in a country is also
related to levels of democracy. This relationship is slightly more robust with an r^2 of
0.29. While most countries with the very highest levels of education are democratic
(Sweden, Australia, Germany, Canada all score 10) there are some outliers (South Korea
scores an 8). There is much more variation among countries with low levels of education
and democracy, with countries like Mali and Burundi having very low education but
scoring a 7 on the democracy scale, and other poorly educated countries like Rwanda and
Sudan scoring 1 and 0 respectively.
Combining GDP per capita at PPP with the average number of years a person has
at 15 yields a higher r^2 than either in isolation (0.40).
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Figure 72: Global Democracy - History and Forecast

IR Liberalism: Trade in IFs
To understand the IFs forecast of trade it is important to understand—at least in
general terms—the economic model structure. Productivity is endogenized in a CobbDouglas production function with insights from Solow (1956) and Romer (1990) where
improvements to labor interacting with capital derive from three sources: human capital
development, social capital development and physical capital development. The IFs
economic model is a 6 sector model (manufacturing, services, materials, agriculture,
energy and ICT) which are all initially aggregations of GTAP data (Hertel 1997) whose
relative shares shift dynamically based on levels of development. These sectors interact
with actors in a market, where firms, governments and households (skilled and unskilled)
buy and sell goods and prices "chase" equilibrium. This interaction is enveloped within a
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) structure (Leontief 1966).
Trade levels are forecasted using a pooled approach in contrast to a bilateral
approach. This pooled approach works by determining both import and export potential
for all sectors and all countries. Total global demand for trade by sector is also then
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determined. These two are normalized using something. Armington elasticities are also
important in identifying and determining longer term patterns of trade (1969).
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World
40

2010

35
30
25
20
15
10
1967

1975

1983

1991

1999

2007
Year

2016

2024

2032

2040

2048

Figure 73: Global Exports as a Percentage of GDP - History and Forecast

To forecast the impact of trade on Kantian Liberalism, I use a measure of imports
and exports of goods and services divided by country GDP. This is used in previous
approaches to evaluate the impact of Kantian Liberalism (Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum
2003; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Russett 2001). Historically, the distribution of this
has grown from less than 5% of GDP in 1960 to nearly 70% in the early 21st century.
IR Liberalism: Dyadic Kantian Liberal Index
As argued above, Kantian Liberalism has been on the march historically, and we
forecast this to continue across time. In the base year, 13 percent of all dyads scored one
standard deviation below the mean for the Dyadic Kantian Index indicating that they
were very illiberal pairs of states. By 2025, only 2.5 percent of all dyads scored one
standard deviation below the mean. By 2050, only 32 out of 16,653 dyads—a mere
0.2%—scored as being less than one standard deviation below the mean. The line-graph
below shows the distribution of illiberal dyads in selected years.
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Figure 74: Dyadic Kantian Liberalism - Illiberal Dyads for Selected Years

Aggregating dyadic scores by only averaging dyads that are internal to the
group—the line-graph below shows strong growth across time and for World Bank
regions. The High Income group begins with the highest level of average dyadic
Liberalism (averaging over one standard deviation above the mean) and continues to
grow, though with a decreasing rate, to 2050. The next two most liberal groups cluster
together generally across the time horizon and are made up of Europe and Central Asia
along with Latin America and Caribbean. The four groups that cluster at the bottom—
averaging around 0.5 standard deviations below the mean—are East Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, MENA and South Asia. These groups remain in the bottom four throughout the
time-horizon, though growth patterns change. MENA moves from the bottom of the
liberal index to the top, spurned largely from forecasts for strong economic growth and
democratization. While all other regions grow considerably, even the largest absolute
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value at the end of the second highest group (Europe and Central Asia) barely achieves
the 2010 value for High Income Economies.
Dyadic Liberal Index: World Bank Regions Internal Average
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Figure 75: Dyadic Liberal Index: World Bank Regions

The dyads that remain illiberal in 2050—defined here as being more than one
standard deviation below the mean in 2010—include the following. Of all of these dyads,
only two are politically relevant: Eritrea and Yemen, and Eritrea and Sudan.
Table 8: Most Illiberal Dyads in 2050

Most Illiberal States in 2050:
Organized from Most to Least
Eritrea
Myanmar
Korea North
Myanmar
Eritrea
Korea North
Afghanistan
Myanmar
Myanmar
Tajikistan
Micronesia; Fed.
Myanmar
Sts.
Afghanistan
Eritrea
Cameroon
Myanmar
Eritrea
Tajikistan
Central African
Myanmar
Republic
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Mauritania
Eritrea
Afghanistan
Cameroon
Myanmar
Myanmar
Korea North
Myanmar
Central African
Republic
Chad
Eritrea
Korea North
Myanmar
Cameroon
Eritrea
Eritrea
Gambia
Eritrea
Chad
Central African
Republic
Korea North
Eritrea

Myanmar
Micronesia; Fed.
Sts.
Korea North
Eritrea
Yemen
Rwanda
Tajikistan
Uganda
Eritrea
Myanmar
Mauritania
Micronesia; Fed.
Sts.
Sudan
Korea North
Yemen
Rwanda
Myanmar
Uganda
Eritrea
Korea North
Mauritania
Sudan

Cultures of Interaction Index
The Cultures of Interaction Index (CoI Index) is a measure that builds upon
standard Kantian Liberal accounts of interdependence—focusing on trade, democracy
and global IO memberships—to include variables calculated on a dyad-first basis. It
measures affinity between states by measuring levels of trade relative to expected values,
IGO membership, treaty signatories and ratifications, alliances, and diplomatic
connection.
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The IFs system is not able to forecast the CoI Index. This is conceptually because
changes in the dyadic measure tend to reflect (apparently) discrete policy choices at this
macro, long-term level of analysis instead of other underlying factors, such as income or
development. This is obviously an underwhelming component of this project. However
the creation of the CoI has put in place the foundation for the eventual forecast of
variables that “get at” more complex interdependence and possible cultural influences in
dyadic interaction. See the Conclusion for more on the next-steps in this extended
project.
Because this variable currently cannot be forecast, it remains one major
uncertainty moving forward. To treat this uncertainty, the Base Case of IFs takes the
initial value of the CoI Index for countries in 2001 (the most recent data point available)
and uses it as a constant throughout the forecast time horizon.
I experimented with extrapolating growth rates from the last 10 years of data from
the CoI Index, but this produced results that were unreasonable: some countries with
very high CoI scores saw slight declines in these last 10 years. These slight declines in
growth made widely understood “good” relationships to appear to deteriorate (for
example, the Netherlands and USA experience a massive deterioration in relations over
the next four decades using this approach).
The CoI Index thus becomes the main scenario handle in this analysis, used
conceptually. In the remaining section of this dissertation I explore output from the
model that tends demonstrates that some relationships are forecast to improve while
others are forecast to deteriorate. A policy-oriented conclusion is that, to avoid
deterioration to the point of conflict, leaders should focus on aligning foreign policy
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along the lines of the sub-components of the CoI Index. Immediately below is the line
graph for World Bank Regions and their CoI Index score.52
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Figure 76: CoI Index for World Bank Regions

The average country CoI with the rest of the world has a strong relationship (0.54
r^2) with the natural log of the historic relative material power measure (the main
component of the Realist Index score. This indicates that countries that have higher
levels of material power also have both the resources and incentive to project that abroad.
The cross-sectional plot demonstrates this, below.

52

World Bank Groupings were applied using 2011 grouping across time.
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CoI Index and Income Per Capita
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Figure 77: Average CoI Score for Countries and World verses Natural Log of Relative Material Power

This relationship produces an expected value for the overall culture that a country
fosters within the IR space. Countries that produce much higher scores relative to what
we expect can be thought of as “punching above their weight”. The table below
highlights the 10 countries that punch most “above their weight” and those that most
poorly perform in their average CoI score compared with what we would expect based on
their relative material power.53
Table 9: Which Countries Punch Above their Weight?

CoI verses Material Power: Who Punches Above their
Weight?
Top 10 Countries
Worst 10 Countries
Belgium
Korea North
53

The regression used to calculate expected values was taken from the following equation:

Expected CoI Average Index Score = (0.0064*(LN Relative Historic Power^2)+(0.1833* LN Relative Historic Power)
+ 0.9071

The following countries that lack full internationally recognized sovereignty were excluded from this
analysis: Taiwan, Hong Kong and Puerto Rico.
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Netherlands
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
France
Hungary
Norway
Bulgaria
Austria

Congo, Democratic Republic of
Myanmar
Qatar
Afghanistan
Somalia
Saudi Arabia
Angola
Brunei
Vietnam

If I did treat the CoI with extrapolate growth rates, negative rates would apply to
1,324 dyads. This represents less than 8% of the total dyads in the distribution and
indicates that this percentage of dyads experienced deterioration in their CoI score
between 1991 and 2001. Samples from dyads that experience negative growth highlight
the limits of a pure extrapolative method over more than sixteen thousand samples. Many
of the dyads that drop had very high CoI scores and showed stagnation across the last
decade of the 20th century, and a very slight decline. This decline over a 40 year time
horizon—even if slight—produces large negative scores that are implausible, and skews
forecast results.

Integrating IR Theory:
I argued in Chapter 4 that an integrated approach to doing international relations
analysis should provide more insight in explaining behavior in the international system
than using any theory in isolation. In Chapter 5 I used logistic regressions and large-n
data analysis to show that adding up indices representing Realism, Liberalism and
Cultures of Interaction produced a better statistical fit to the historic occurrence of
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international conflict than either of these indices alone, thus giving credence to my claims
in Chapter 4. This final section of Chapter 6 shows the final output of this analysis.
The Integrated IR Index score represents endogenously forecast values for the
Liberal Index and the Realist Index from 2010 to 2050. It is also initialized with 2001
values of the CoI Index, which are kept constant across time. Changes in the index
reflect changes in Realism and Liberalism within the dyad. The entire analysis hinges on
the following interaction: is interdependence and culture a more powerful driver of the
character of bilateral relations than pressure stemming from material resources over the
next 40 years? Which dyads are most likely to see a downward pressure on the quality of
their relationship, and how much of an increase in the CoI Index would be needed to offset this?
Overall, the integrated IR index grows over time. Regional scores for the
Integrated IR Index also increase steadily across time. This is shown in the line graph
below using World Bank regional grouping scores (the average score of each dyad within
the grouping with the rest of the world).54 This is not un-expected behavior, as these
average scores do not measure political relevance. As Realist pressure remains generally
stagnant at this level of analysis, the growth in Liberalism helps to drive this forward.
Macro-level analysis of this measure belies the possible occurrence of conflict at lower
levels of analysis.

54

This uses 2011 World Bank regional groupings.
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Figure 78: Integrated IR Index for WB Regions

The line graph below shows three time periods and the change in dyadic IR
scores. Each point represents a dyad-year score for 2010, 2025 and 2050 sorted from
most conflictual (to the left) to most convivial (to the right). The overall trend in
international relations is a shift to more cooperative relations, though challenges persist.
The dyads on the far left of the plot—those with the most conflictual relations—continue
to have very low scores, some nearly five standard deviations below the world average
score in 2010 out to 2050. Thus, even though the majority of dyads improve the character
of their relations over time, there will still be a handful that—even driven by a generally
rosy scenario like the Base Case in IFs—are likely to experience structural pressure on
their relationship in a negative direction.
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Figure 79: Full Distribution of Integrated IR Theories, 2010, 2025 and 2050

Individual country scores show some states to have generally more strained
overall relations than others. The table below shows the dyads with the lowest scores for
2010, 2025 and 2050 for the Integrated IR index that are politically relevant ranked from
lowest IR Index score at the top. The pairs of states on this list tend to be illiberal, have
poor cultures of interaction and share much material power parity. Moving across time,
many of the usual suspects remain with very poor relations. These results are less
insightful for policy prescription, but further validation that the approach to modeling is
successful.
Table 10: Dyads with Lowest Overall IR Index Score for 2010, 2025 and 2050

Lowest Integrated IR Scores for Politically Relevant Dyads in Select Years
2010
2025
2050
Congo;
Afghanistan Uzbekistan Afghanistan Uzbekistan
Democratic
Sudan
Republic of
Congo;
Sudan
Madagascar Mozambique
Afghanistan
Uzbekistan
Democratic
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Republic of
Sudan

Cuba

Haiti

Mozambique

Congo;
Democratic
Republic of
Samoa

Tonga

Uganda

Tanzania

Cuba

Honduras

Ethiopia

Cuba
Congo;
Democratic
Republic of
Congo;
Democratic
Republic of

Haiti

Sudan
Congo;
Democratic
Republic of
Samoa

Uganda

Cameroon

Niger

Tanzania

Eritrea

Sudan

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Congo;
Democratic
Republic of

Tanzania

Syria

Iraq

Ethiopia

Sudan

Iraq

Syria

Madagascar
Congo;
Democratic
Republic of
Eritrea
Eritrea

Sudan

Ethiopia

Sudan

Iraq

Qatar

Uganda

Congo;
Democratic
Republic of

Uganda
Tonga

Other states have overall Integrated IR scores that are extremely high. These
states tend to be small and deeply embedded in international political systems through
trade and membership in international organizations (and increasingly through
improvements in domestic decision-making inclusion). These states, like Luxembourg,
Hong Kong and Singapore, also have few enemies, and generally have very low Realist
pressure scores. The table below shows the top 5 dyads for each time period as well.
Again, these results are less relevant for policy prescription, but an additional validation
of the model performance across time.
Table 11: Dyads with Highest Overall IR Index Score for 2010, 2025 and 2050

Highest Integrated IR Index Dyads - Select Years
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2010
2025
2050
Netherlands Luxembourg
Singapore
Hong Kong
Singapore
Hong Kong
Luxembourg
Hungary
Netherlands Luxembourg Luxembourg Hong Kong
Luxembourg
Finland
Luxembourg Hong Kong Netherlands Luxembourg
Slovak Rep Luxembourg
Singapore
Luxembourg
Singapore
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Italy
Luxembourg
Hungary
Russia
Luxembourg

Across the full time horizon not one state experiences a deterioration in their
average Integrated IR index score with all other countries between 2010 and 2050. This
is caused by the massive increase in Liberalism which offsets any build-up in negative
pressure from Realism. However, average country-level Integrated IR scores can be
misleading. In many cases one country only experiences deterioration in Realist pressure
with only one other country and an improvement in Liberalism more generally with many
other politically non-relevant dyads. Because of the mitigating impact of averaging across
all dyads, it is useful to also identify those dyads that do experience an overall
deterioration in their Integrated IR Index scores between 2010 and 2050. These pairs of
states are those where improvements in interdependence do not off-set the deterioration
of impacts from Realist pressure.
The table below shows the politically relevant dyads with an overall deterioration
in their Integrated IR scores between 2010 and 2050 along with the dyad scores for subindices for 2050. The list is small, and is made up of a range of Great Power dyads and
non-Great Power dyads. The greatest deterioration comes between Japan and Nigeria,
who see their dyadic score drop 0.85 standard deviations in the 40 year time horizon.
This is due to the relative decline in Japanese material power and the rise in Nigeria.
Japan begins the time horizon with just less than 5% of the world's material resources and
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ends with 2.3%. Nigeria begins in 2010 with only 0.8% of material power and grows to
just under 2%. This shift places both countries on the threshold of Great Power status
(with Japan almost losing it, and Nigeria almost gaining it). This, coupled with slow
improvements in Liberalism in Nigeria, produce a deteriorated dyadic IR score. The
second largest reduction in the IR score is between the US and India, which sees an
overall drop in their Integrated IR score of 0.66 standard deviations from 2010 to 2050.
This is due to the dramatic convergence between the countries in their Realist index
score, and their already relatively high levels of Liberalism. Below I discuss this dyad in
more detail. Other dyads on this list experience increases in relative material parity with
already high levels of global interdependence (Algeria - Italy and Algeria - Spain), or
increases in power parity with low levels of Liberalism (Mauritania - Algeria, Nigeria Brazil). The reductions in these dyads assume that CoI Index scores remain the same in
2010. Each of these reductions can be ameliorated through an improvement in the CoI in
a dyad.
Table 12: Politically Relevant Dyads with Reduction in IR Index Score between 2010 and 2050

Nigeria
USA
Spain
Italy
Nigeria
Mauritania

Brazil
India
Algeria
Algeria
Japan
Algeria

CoI
Index

Realism
Index

Liberal
Index

Integrated
Index

2050

2050

2050

2050

1.7575
1.7849
1.909
1.8993
1.6563
1.7128

-4.301
-4.961
-3.783
-3.375
-4.494
-2.5

0.759
0.798
1.337
1.314
0.867
0.083

-1.7845
-2.3781
-0.537
-0.1617
-1.9707
-0.7042
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Change
to 2050
20102050
-0.143
-0.664
-0.165
-0.112
-0.85
-0.272

The evaluative techniques used above help to highlight the relative quality of the
model used (results are largely intuitive) as well as some important stylized facts (overall,
relations are getting better but a handful remain highly problematic. This is useful, but
only scratches the surface of the utility of a tool like the one created in this dissertation
project. Each of these indices can be explored for any dyad under any scenario (say,
greater BRICs growth, or faster reductions in fertility rates, for example). A full ranging
analysis would involve nearly an infinite number of uncertainties to model. Instead of
going down this path, the remainder of this chapter assessed various dyads and regions to
explore the implications for conflict over the next 40 years.
The three countries of the emerging global high table—China, India and the US—
each have dyadic interactions that pose challenges across this time horizon. The line
graph below explores this interaction for the US and China using the three sub-indices
created in this project along with the composite index. The CoI Index score is stable
across time and fixed at the 2010 global mean for this measure. The Liberal Index score
begins well below the global mean in 2010, then achieves this by 2030 and advances
beyond this to the end of the time horizon. The Realist Index score is quite low, and
declines to the middle of the time horizon and then begins to increase, as this is when
China passes the US and becomes the global material power leader. The Integrated
Index—the measure that performed better than any of the sub-measures combined in my
statistical analysis in Chapter 5—shows a relatively flat trend across time. There is a
slight increase to 2025, then a slight decline, then a slight increase again.
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Figure 80: Forecast for China - US for Sub Indices and Overall Index

This lack of massive decline in the Integrated Index between the US and China
may seem to be a good thing. Note the overall score in the graph above and compare it
with Figure 79 showing the distribution of all dyads across the time horizon. A score
ranging between -5 and -3.5 is very low, in fact, and indicates a relationship that could
quickly enter into a vicious cycle resulting in heightened tension between the states. This
may or may not lead to conflict across time. The policy recommendation for this
relationship is to conscientiously work at increasing the culture of interaction between the
two states.
A similar story can be told by looking at the line graph relationship between
China and India. here we see a similar level of CoI between the dyads across time, a
similar Liberal Index increase in the first half of the time horizon but a more stagnant
Realist Index score. This leads to an Integrated Index score that is absolutely very low
(again, see Figure 79 for an idea of where it fits in the overall distribution) that only
237

slightly increases across time. The policy recommendation for this dyad is to also find
ways to increase and improve the culture of interaction in order to avoid a protracted
conflict.
IR Index and Sub Indices for China - India
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Figure 81: Forecast for China - India for Sub Indices and Overall Index

The simple insight is that, in dyads where there are high levels of Realist pressure,
both Liberalism and CoI play an instrumental part in improving the overall relationship.
Two states that have high level of Realist pressure but more convivial relations are the
US and Japan. Their relationship is shown in the line graph below. Here, there is a much
higher CoI Index score that brings the overall Integrated IR index score up to a range that
is much closer to the global mean across time, and more likely to produce a relationship
that is positive.
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IR Index and Sub Indices for Japan - US
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Figure 82: Forecast for Japan - US for Sub Indices and Overall Index

While the China - US and China - India score is dangerously low (and remains
fairly low across the time horizon), the India - US score experiences a deterioration
across the forecast horizon (as noted above in Table 12). This reduction does not occur
immediately, but takes place after the first third of the time horizon as India's material
power is forecast to grow considerably. The line-graph below demonstrates this
dynamic. The policy take-away for this relationship is that, while the dyad enjoys a high
CoI Index score in the base year and a rising Liberal Index score across the time horizon,
care must be taken to further bring policies in line and orchestrate a culture of interaction
that continues to promote cooperation and understanding.
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IR Index and Sub Indices for India - US
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Figure 83: Forecast for India - US for Sub Indices and Overall Index

The previous analysis explored the three major players at the global High Table
over the next forty years. It argued that much work remained to be done to bring policies
in line in order to avoid a potential conflict (be that a direct conflict, or a proxy conflict
ala the Cold War). The two dyads most in danger were the China - India and China - US
with the India - US dyad also remaining vulnerable to a future conflict if the culture of
interaction was not improved.
This analysis now moves to regional dynamics by exploring regional dynamics
related to the Integrated IR Index. The first is the Middle-East. The line-graph below
shows the relationships between Iran and selected Middle-East countries. It shows a
similar pattern of growth seen in many areas, indicating that there is the prospect for
improved relations across time, though problems are likely to persist. The lowest score in
this graph is in the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a well-understood
dynamic in regional power dynamics, though this does increase considerably in the first
twenty years due to an increase in dyadic Liberalism. The highest score is with Lebanon,
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a reflection of close ties (through Hezbollah, for example) that only grows more strongly
across time. Iran and Iraq have strained relations, but these are forecast to improve with
time as well.
Integrated IR Index for Iran - Selected Countries
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Figure 84: Integrated IR Index for Iran - Selected Countries

Another obvious country to evaluate using this approach is Israel and her
relationship with the broader Middle-East. The line-graph below does this for selected
countries. It shows that Israel has very poor relations with Syria, Lebanon and Egypt,
though it shows improved relations with Iran and Iraq, both because Israel and these
countries are not considered to be politically relevant dyads due to their lack of contiguity
and Great Power status. This is a short-coming of this approach to analysis, and is slated
to be improved with follow-up work. See the Conclusion for more information. For
Israel's long-term perspective, the very low relations with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon are
particularly concerning. While Liberalism increases in these dyads, it is barely enough to
offset very low CoI Index scores and changing Realism. While policy prescription in this
context is particularly complicated in light of the dynamics of the Mid-East conflict,
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finding more areas of alignment (certainly around the issue of Palestine) should continue
to be at the heart of foreign policy.

Figure 85: Integrated IR Index for Israel - Select Countries

Central Asia experiences a rapid power transition between Turkmenistan and her
neighbors (identified in the section on the Base Case of Realism, above). This leads to
some Integrated IR Index scores that reduce in the Base Case. The line-graph below
documents key relationships for Kazakhstan—the current material power leader in the
region—and select neighbors. Even with strong growth in Liberalism through gas exports
in Turkmenistan, this relationship drops in the middle of the time horizon, though it does
not drop to the nadir of the relationship between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This is
one finding of this project that may require further investigation and is clearly policy
relevant.
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Figure 86: Integrated IR Index for Kazakhstan - Selected Countries

Moving to South Asia, India has relations with its neighbors that are generally
strained. The initial condition for the Integrated IR Index shows India to have generally
poor relations with China and Myanmar, and slightly better relations with many of its
other neighbors. That said, these improved relations are still generally at absolutely poor
levels (generally below one standard deviation below the mean, except for Sri Lanka).
Surprisingly, the relationship between India and Pakistan is shown to be of higher quality
than many would expect (still, more than 1.5 standard deviations below the mean). This
is largely due to their CoI Index starting point, which reflects concerted efforts on the
parts of both countries to retain diplomatic connection in the face of extended hostilities.
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Figure 88: Integrated IR Index for India - Selected Countries

Moving further South East, the line-graph below tracks the relationship between
Indonesia and some of her neighbors. The two countries with the lowest relations by the
Integrated IR Index approach are Australia and Vietnam. Both are considered to be
politically relevant and have similar (though not as much) relative power as Indonesia.
Also, both have experienced strained relations. Australia and Indonesia have had conflict
surrounding terrorism (the Bali bombing, for example) and domestic policy decisions (the
treatment of succession by East Timor). The strongest relationship is with Singapore due
to high CoI Index scores and Liberalism.
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Australia

Vietnam

Singapore

Thailand

3

Percent

2
1
0
-1
-2
2013

2017

2021

2025

2029
Year

2033

2037

2041

2045

2049

Figure 89: Integrated IR Index for Indonesia - Selected Countries

China's relations with neighbors are generally poor due to low levels of
Liberalism and CoI scores. The line-graph below shows this. It demonstrates that
relations generally improve, except for the US early in the time horizon and India late in
the time horizon. Even by 2050, though, none of the dyads in the graph below reach the
global mean in 2010 (though Russia comes close).
Integrated IR Index for China - Select Countries
USA

India

Japan

Myanmar

Vietnam

Russia

1

Percent

0
-1
-2
-3
-4
2013

2017

2021

2025

2029
Year

2033

Figure 90: Integrated IR Index for China - Selected Countries
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Traveling across the Pacific to South America, Brazil generally has better
relations with her neighbors than many of the countries explored above. The line-graph
above shows Brazil with fairly deteriorated relationships with both Colombia and
Venezuela, but these are both less than two standard deviations below the mean (see
China above for a comparison) and increase rapidly. Other key partnership in that
neighborhood also experience extended growth.

Figure 91: Integrated IR Indices for Brazil - Selected Countries

Moving again across the ocean to the East, Nigeria enjoys positive relations with
the other great powers of Africa (Egypt, Ethiopia and South Africa) but more deteriorated
relationships with their immediate neighbors. That said, the absolute value of the lowest
score (1.5 standard deviations below the mean in 2010 for Cameroon) is the quality of
relationship expected between China and Vietnam in 40 years (see Figure 89). The
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bubble demonstrated in the line-graph below is the impact of peak oil on Nigerian
Liberalism (major declines in overall exports), though relations still do not fall to the
level of 2010.
Integrated IR Index for Nigeria - Selected Countries
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Figure 92: Integrated IR Index for Nigeria - Select Countries

Conclusion
This chapter represents the culmination of the work of this project in building a
model that forecasts IR theory to 2050. The final section—producing analysis of dyadic
behavior, regional behavior and Great Power behavior—has demonstrated some of the
capabilities of this tool. While demonstrating capabilities, it has just scratched the surface
in terms of their exhaustion. Further analysis on the IR indices needs to be done taking
into consideration scenarios around the Base Case of IFs, further and more nuanced
treatment of regional great powers and the forecast of the CoI endogenous to the IFs
system.
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7. Extending the Analysis: Analyzing Structural Change Related to
Dyadic Conflict to 2050
Introduction
Modeling IR theory provides a starting-point for thinking systematically about
how dyadic relations are forecast to change across time. However, exploring Realist,
Liberal and cultural drivers also likely misses important structural shifts and pressures
within the international system. This chapter moves beyond a singular focus on IR and
considers other drivers of change in dyadic relations across time.
The Base Case forecast described in Chapter 6 is generally positive: even with
the stock of cultural interaction remaining at 2010 values, interdependence from
Liberalism continues to grow and outstrips negative pressures from Realism. However,
this positive development could be derailed by shifts in resource availability and other
structural transitions in the international system. The deeper drivers of the character of
state behavior explored in this chapter are the following: dwindling global production of
fossil fuel, changes in fresh water resource availability and the impact of state fragility.
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Conceptually, the Deep Drivers of state behavior operate directly on the IR
indices explored in Chapter 6 as well as directly on the character of dyadic interaction
first introduced in Chapter 1. The diagram below illustrates this. The forecast in Chapter
6 already considered the three left-most arrows in this diagram, as the impacts of future
structural changes are endogenized within the IFs system. However, the long arrow
showing the connection between the Deep Drivers and the Character of Dyadic
Interaction was not represented in Chapter 6.

Figure 93: Conceptual Relationship between Deep Drivers of State Behavior, IR Indices and Character of State
Behavior

The most interesting question answered by this type of analysis is whether
structural changes in the international system—coupled with pressures arising from
changes in the distribution of relative material power—have the real possibility of
derailing the overall gains in stocks of interdependence and cooperative culture. This
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chapter does not make any definitive conclusions to that end. However, this project has
put in place the foundational pieces that can eventually lead to a more thorough
evaluation of that question.
I conclude that pressures from Water Resources are likely to increase for specific
dyads across the Middle East and Central Asia over the next four decades. Disruptive
pressure arising from State Fragility is likely to decline across all politically relevant
dyads, though specific pairs of states will continue to experience poor relations because
of this driver of conflict. Finally, pressure arising from Fossil Fuel resources is likely to
increase for some Great Powers and states with very large overall reserves.
Fresh Water Resources
Fresh water resources are a fundamental component of human development. As
these water resources become increasingly stressed by overuse, aquifers will be drawn
down, and countries that share river basins will increasingly see water resources cloud
foreign policy decision-making. It is the goal of this section to highlight which dyads are
most likely to experience these pressures.
Water resource data is initialized in the IFs model using AQUASTAT data (FAO
AQUASTAT 2012). Water use per capita—the distal driver of water use in IFs—is
calculated using an equation that considers both agricultural production (as a proxy for
the amount of irrigated land) and the overall size of the population. Water use per capita
is multiplied by overall population to calculate overall water use. This is divided by the
net amount of freshwater entering a country in a given year.
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If countries use up to 20 percent of the net freshwater in a given year they are
considered to be water stressed (United Nations Environment Programme 2007). The
largest regional use of fresh water as a percentage of renewable resources occurs in
Northern Africa, where 2010 values show that nearly 80 percent of freshwater reserves
are being used on an annual basis. This number grows beyond 100 percent over the
coming three decades, indicating that water use in this region will begin drawing down
aquifers, that fresh water resources will be imported or that desalination processes will be
used to produce the resource. The second highest fresh water use as a percent of
renewable resources is the Middle East. Certain countries (such as Kuwait) currently use
well above their annual freshwater reserves and actively import water or produce
freshwater through desalination.
The two maps below trace water stress levels for the 183 countries modeled in IFs
for 2010 and 2050. First, in 2010, water stress is largely measured in the Middle East and
North Africa, with notable additions in North America, Europe, East Asia and Southern
Africa.

Figure 94: States Experiencing Water Stress – 2010
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By 2050, water stress levels have expanded considerably. This Base Case forecast
has water stress levels stretching from the Western Sahara to Japan. Countries that share
river basins and experience water stress are more likely to consider water resource issues
in foreign policy decision-making. High levels of up-stream water use (such as in the
Colorado River in the USA) have negative implications on down-stream water
availability and pollution levels. By 2050, 56 countries experience water stress. See
Appendix 6 for a list of these countries with the percentage of renewable water being
used.

Figure 95: States Experiencing Water Stress 2050

To measure the Dyadic Realist Index score for water resources, the first
algorithmic component was a measure of whether the two parties shared a river basin.
Shared river basin data was taken from the work of researchers at Peace Research
Institute of Oslo (Brochmann and Gleditsch 2006; Furlong, Petter Gleditsch, and Hegre
2006). Next, the IFs model measured the shared level of water stress, across the dyad. If
the level was above 20 percent, the model took that to be the lowest threshold for
identifying dyadic pressure related to water. In 2010 it took the upper bound of the
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threshold to be the dyad with the highest level of water stress. The global average Dyadic
Realist Index score for water shows an absolute decline across time. This corresponds
with increased levels of fresh water use as a percentage of renewable water.
Taking country average scores with the world for the Dyadic Index for water
resources demonstrates which states are likely to see water resources play an increasing
role in their foreign policy making across relationships. Those countries with a 0.1
standard deviation deterioration in their relationship or more are listed in the table below
ordered from greatest absolute change to least. Notably, much of this increase in water
stress occurs in Central Asia.
Table 13: Absolute Change and Level in 2050 of Water Stress for Average Dyadic Index Scores

Absolute
Change
from
Absolute
2010 to
Value in
2050
2050
Afghanistan
-0.309
-0.539
Iran
-0.304
-0.582
Sudan
-0.25
-0.511
Iraq
-0.204
-0.739
Pakistan
-0.175
-0.227
Tajikistan
-0.161
-0.376
Turkey
-0.148
-0.292
China
-0.142
-0.193
Turkmenistan
-0.137
-0.429
Syria
-0.127
-0.463
Kyrgyzstan
-0.123
-0.277
Kazakhstan
-0.11
-0.244
Uzbekistan
-0.1
-0.54
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The table above provides an overview of the importance of relative water
resources on a country basis. Moving down to a deeper level of granularity highlights
specific relationships that are likely to experience increased pressures arrising from water
resources. These dyads tend to be in areas that are less developed and include many pairs
of states where relationships are already tense. The 10 greatest overall deteriorations in
the dyadic measure of pressure occurs in the following pairs of states:
Table 14: Top 10 Dyads with Deteriorated Scores for Water Pressure

Top 10 Dyads with
Deteriorated Scores for
Water Pressure
Afghanistan
Iran
Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Iraq
Afghanistan
Iran
Iraq

Tajikistan
Iraq
Pakistan
Iran
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Syria
Turkmenistan
Pakistan
Turkey

Using the same logic as I tested in Chapter 5, I argue that measuring pressure
from water useage but not considering any other theoretical driver of the character of
dyadic interaction is misleading. Water stress between highly Liberal dyads in Europe is
unlikely to lead to serious conflict; water stress between Syria and Israel is likely
exaserbated by their character of interaction. I therefore take the dyadic water stress score
and add it to the Integrated IR Index score. The table below highlights dyads with the
lowest overall scores for the Integrated IR Index and Water Stress in 2025 and 2050.
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Table 15: Worst Dyadic Scores for Water plus Integrated IR Index in Selected Years

Worst Dyadic Scores for Water plus Integrated IR
Index in Selected Years
2025
2050
Afghanistan Uzbekistan Afghanistan
Uzbekistan
Israel
Syria
Afghanistan
Tajikistan
Libya
Niger
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Oman
Yemen
Israel
Syria
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Egypt
Sudan
Chad
Libya
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Egypt
Israel
Iraq
Syria
Jordan
Syria
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Egypt
Israel
Egypt
Sudan
Kazakhstan Turkmenistan

These dyads are concentrated in the Middle East, Central Asia and North-West
Africa. Many of these dyads have a very poor character of interaction already which is
likely to be exaserbated over time, such as Isreal and Syria or Egypt and Israel. Other
dyads are not on most foreign policy radars, such as Central Asia which is likely to
experience extended pressure from increased used of fresh water from a large agriculture
sector. This shift, coupled with a large regional transition in material power resources
(the rise of Turkmenistan, as discussed in Chapter 6) could lead to a situation where
changes made to the Amu River could drive concerns regarding the Aral Sea bringing
various groups into a conflictual situation.
Specific dyads are likley to experience deterioration in their Integrated IR Index
coupled with water stress, but this is not the case for the majority of dyads across time.
The line-graph below demonstrates this by taking all dyad scores for 2010, 2025 and
2050 and exploring their distribution when sorted from worst to best scores (left to right).
The overall trend is a positive shift up in relationships across these time horizons for well
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over 95% of dyads. However, as indicates in the small number of dyads with very poor
scores to the far left, even in 2050 dyads will remain with overall IR indices coupled with
water stress that are quite poor. The overall shift in imporvement across dyads does,
however, lend credence to the idea that water stress is unlikely to undermine increases in
overall interdependence and improvements to the overall stock of culture in the
international system.

Figure 96: Dyadic Integrated IR Scores with Water Resources - Selected Years

State Fragility
Domestic instability in one country can lead to conflict across countries for one of
two reasons. First, there are wars of distraction, which occur when the country
experiencing domestic instability attempts to attack their neighbor to unify the country
around a common enemy (that is not the domestic power structure). An example of this
kind of conflict occurred between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s when Saddam Hussein
attacked his neighbor, in part, to unify is fractured country.
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The second way that state fragility can lead to international conflict occurs when
the more stable neighbor state intervenes in the more unstable neighbor to produce
stability. Take, for example, the various incursions into Somalia from her neighbors in
recent years. Kenya recently engaged in bombing exercises, Ethiopia sent troops, etc. It is
not just neighbor states who engage in this type of behavior. Great Powers are also prone
to intervene in failing states in order to produce stability to protect interests, resources
and promote international norms. See, for example, the recent intervention in Libya,
condoned and actuated by Great Powers.
There exist two general approaches to measuring domestic instability. The first is
a probabilistic approach that fits the historic occurrence of instability (be that civil war,
abrupt regime change, genocide or revolution) to a statistical model. The most notable
example of this approach to measuring the occurrence of conflict is the Political
Instability Task Force (previously the State Failure Task Force). They found that a simple
probabilistic model of the occurrence of conflict could be made with four driving
variables: neighborhood effects, levels of international trade, infant mortality and degree
of regime anocracy.
The second approach to measuring domestic instability does not find the best fit
statistically to the historic occurrence of domestic conflict. Instead, it takes theoretically
salient categories and uses them to create an index measure of how unstable a country is.
These categories typically include a measure of economic performance, demographic
constraints, government character and the historic occurrence of conflict.
Both probabilistic and index measures of domestic instability are useful for
exploring the future of domestic conflict. Probabilistic measures tend to emphasize a
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handful of countries being highly prone to the occurrence of conflict, as demonstrated in
the line-graph below in the blue line. Index measures of domestic conflict, on the other
hand, tend to see domestic instability as being a characteristic of governance that changes
at different levels of development. This can be seen below in the linear distribution of the
George Mason index of state fragility below, the red line.
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Figure 97: Index verses Probabilistic Measures - State Fragility

It may seem, prima facie, that the probabilistic measure of conflict would be a
better determinant of the future occurrence of conflict. This has not proven to be the case.
For example, see the table below which shows the country ranking for the Maryland
Conflict and Peace Instability Ledger (a probabilistic measure) (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and
Gurr 2010) and the George Mason State Fragility Index (an index measure) (M. Marshall
and Cole 2009). In comparing the rankings of five Arab countries that experienced
domestic instability in 2011, the measure that performs better consistently is from George
Mason based on their country ranking. George Mason ranks all five countries below as
being more unstable than the Maryland Conflict and Peace Instability Ledger, even
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though the later measure is based on a statistical model fit to the historic occurrence of
conflict.
Table 16: Ranking Arab Spring Countries by Probabilistic and Index Approaches

Ranking of Select Arab Spring Countries for Two Measures of Domestic
Instability: Higher Number More Unstable
George Mason State
Maryland Conflict and Peace
Fragility Index, 2009
Instability Ledger, 2010
Yemen,
27
37
Republic of
Egypt, Arab
51
63
Republic of
Syrian Arab
80
117
Republic
95
115
Libya
117
132
Bahrain

This is likely to be a product of the (apparently) discrete nature of the occurrence
of conflict. An incredibly small percentage of total possible dyad-years or country-years
ever experience conflict (either domestically or internationally). Those that do may
cluster around a series of events that have similar driving variables (such as the extreme
democratic deficit experienced throughout the Arab world in 2011 coupled with cheap
and widely distributed technology).
For this reason I use the Government Risk Index in the IFs system to
operationalize the Dyadic Realist Index related to State Fragility. The Government Risk
Index is constructed using the same logic used in the construction of the George Mason
State Fragility Index in that it identifies a series of conceptually relevant categories of
variables related to domestic instability and operationalizes these categories. The table
below outlines the sub-components and categories of the Government Risk Index.
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Table 17: Components of IFs Government Risk Index

Components of the Government Risk Index in IFs
Conceptual Operationalized Description of Variable and Initialization
Category
Variable
Source
Perceived levels of corruption in country
initialized with Transparency International
Corruption
data
Measure of Governance Effectiveness
initialized with World Bank Governance
Effectiveness
Matters data.
Governance
Measure of regime type: either more
autocratic or more democratic initialized
Democracy
with Polity Project data.
Measure of economic freedom within a
Freedom
country initialized with Fraser Institute data.
Aggregate measure taken from Major
Instability
Episodes of Political Violence
Security
Aggregate measure taken from Major
Internal War
Episodes of Political Violence
The number of people living on less than
1.25 USD per day, initialized with World
Poverty
Bank data.
The distribution of income in a country,
Inequality
initialized with World Bank data.
Economy
Resource
Percentage of exports that come from
Export
energy, initialized from various sources.
Dependence
GDP divided by population and the rate of
Rate of Per
change therein across time, initialized from
Capita GDP
various sources.
Growth
Number of children dying in their first year
Infant
of life per 1,000, initialized with World
Mortality
Health Organization data.
Number of years of average life at birth in a
Health
Life
given year, initialized with World Health
Expectancy
Organization data.
Percentage of people who suffer from
Malnutrition
malnutrition, considering both quality and
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quantity of caloric intake, initialized with
World Health Organization data.
Percent of population with HIV/AIDS,
HIV Prevalence initialized with World Health Organization
data.
Percent of eligible students who attend
Primary Net
primary school, initialized with UNESCO
Enrollment
data.
Education
Average number of years spent in formal
Adult
education for a person aged 15 and above,
Education
initialized with UNESCO data.
Years
Percent of the population aged 15-29 as a
share of total adult population, initialized
Youth Bulge
with United Nations data.
Percent of the population above 65 years as a
share of total adult population, initialized
Population
Elderly Bulge
with United Nations data.
Percent of the total population that migrates
Urbanization
to urban areas, initialized with United
Rate
Nations data.
Water Use as a
Percent of fresh water resources used in a
Percentage of
given year, initialized with AQUASTAT
Total
data
Renewable
Environment
Percent change in agricultural yields relative
to 1990 levels stemming from climate
Climate
change (change in temperature and
Change
precipitation along with carbon fertilization)
initialized from various sources.

To take the above sub-components and calculate the Government Risk Index,
each sub-measure is indexed. This is the process of dividing the current value of a
country by the upper threshold for all countries across time. Next, each of the sub-index
values are averaged.
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In general terms, the Government Risk Index is forecasted in the Base Case to
improve across time. The line graph below demonstrates the behavior of this index for
World Bank regions. Here, lower levels indicate more domestic stability. High income
countries—the grey line at the bottom—are the most stable across time, with the next
closest region—Latin American and the Caribbean—not achieving their level of stability
in 2010 even by 2050. The world average improves by nearly 16% across this time
horizon. In terms of relative improvement, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa both
improve their domestic security relatively more quickly than either the Middle East and
North Africa or East Asia.
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Figure 98: Government Risk Index Scores - World Bank Regions

Across the entire forty year time horizon, there is not one country whose 2050
value exceeds its 2010 value, indicating that all countries improve in stability. The
countries that experience the smallest improvement in their domestic security are forecast
to experience future problems, including large increases in elderly populations, low rates
of growth in per capita income and negative impacts from climate change. The five
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countries that improve the least—in absolute terms—are New Zealand, Spain, Barbados,
Cyprus and Portugal. Other countries improve their domestic stability situation
significantly. Angola shows the greatest improvement in the forecast reducing their value
from the fourth most unstable in 2010 to the average for East Asia and the Pacific in
2050. Nigeria, Mozambique and India also are forecast to greatly improve their domestic
security situations.
The trends in the Governance Risk Index at the country level are also seen at the
dyad-level. When comparing the average Dyadic Realist Index score for each country
and the world (without considering the impact of Great Powers), 37 countries have an
overall reduction of more than one standard deviation. The countries with the greatest
reduction—in order—are Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Afghanistan and the Republic of
Congo. See Appendix 7 for a full list of state fragility forecasts to 2050 in IFs.
Table 18: Change in Average Dyadic Score for State Fragility

Change in Average Dyadic Index Score for Country and World for State Fragility
from 2010 to 2050
Greatest Improvement
Least Improvement
Absolute Improvement
Absolute Improvement
Score in in 2050 over
Score in in 2050 over
2050
2010 value
2050
2010 value
0.539
2.517
0.021
0.386
Angola
Togo
0.907
1.857
0.731
0.513
Nigeria
Bosnia
-0.1
1.777
0.177
0.554
Sudan
Libya
-0.467
1.7
0.898
0.593
Afghanistan
Tonga
Congo,
Guinea
0.385
1.651
-0.022
0.613
Republic of
Bissau
Equatorial
0.688
1.608
0.021
0.614
Mauritania
Guinea
Congo,
1.001
1.43
-1.439
0.621
Mozambique
Democratic
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Ethiopia
Papua New
Guinea
Turkmenistan

0.763

1.418

Republic of
Benin

0.578

1.39

Serbia

1.09

0.639

0.561

1.299

Madagascar

0.07

0.645

0.72

0.639

Including Great Powers into this analysis mirrors many of the conclusions drawn
in the previous section regarding the Dyadic Realist Index and changes in relative power
distributions. The Base Case of IFs forecasts that four countries will move from Great
Power status to Non-Great Power Status out to 2050. These four—as noted above—are
Russia, United Kingdom, France and Germany. When included in the Dyadic Realist
Index for State Fragility, they become the four countries that, on average with the rest of
the world, see the greatest reduction in their vulnerability to Realist pressures stemming
from state fragility. Again, this conceptually relates to the decreased global
responsibility—and capabilities—that keep a Non-Great Power from being unilaterally
active in policing issues of domestic instability.
Moving from the level of average country Dyadic Realist Index scores to the
actual dyad scores highlights the specific dyads that are more likely to experience
pressure stemming from domestic instability. Currently, the lowest Dyadic Realist Index
score related to state fragility is any relevant country—those contiguous and those who
are Great Powers—and Somalia. The next dyads at greatest pressure related to state
fragility are those countries that score the worst on the Government Risk Index. These
are, in order, Somalia, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Sudan.
In 2050 the distribution of the dyads that most experience Realist pressures related to
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domestic instability also correlate to the most unstable countries then, in order from most
unstable, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad and Myanmar.
88.3 percent of all dyads do not experience any pressure stemming from measures of
domestic instability. These dyads are not contiguous and do not have one member that is
a Great Power. Of the remaining 11.7 percent of dyads, no dyads experience an
intensification in their Dyadic Realist Index score relating to State Fragility because no
state in the Base Case of IFs shows a deterioration in their domestic political stability.
The impact of the four falling Great Powers can be seen in those dyadic
relationships that experience less impact from Realist pressures stemming from State
Fragility. The four falling Great Powers see their Dyadic Realist Index scores improve
considerably, in some cases by as much as 5 standard deviations. The y axis below is the
absolute number of standard deviations that a dyad has changed comparing 2010 and
2050 for the Dyadic Realist Index for State Fragility. The x-axis is a sorted number of
dyadic observations, from least change being closest to the graph origin and most change
further to the right. The right 35 percent of this graph shows how four falling Great
Powers change their perception of state fragility in the international system. The higher a
dyad scores on the y axis below, the lower the importance of state fragility in material
resource decision-making.
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Figure 99: Integrated IR Index plus State Fragility - Selected Years for Politically Relevant Dyads

Removing the impact of the falling Great Powers does little to change the
generally positive forecast for domestic instability within IFs. While all dyads improve
across time, those that improve the most correspond to those countries (discussed above)
that show great improvement in domestic stability. These include countries like Angola,
Nigeria and Sudan and their politically relevant dyads. Dyads that show the smallest
improvement include Japan and Barbados, USA and Barbados and Japan and Spain.
Again, while these three dyads improve (at the lowest, by 5 over the 2010 value) they
improve the least. By 2050, the dyads that experience the highest level of threat from the
Dyadic Realist Index related to State Failure reflect those states that are forecast to have
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the worst Government Risk Index scores, discussed above. These include Somalia,
Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad.
Fossil Fuel Resources
Moving through the next four decades, fossil fuel resources will continue to
remain a fundamental input to global economic production. IFs does not forecast peak
oil—where global production goes into steep decline—but rather a peak plateau—where
production neither declines or increases as the cost of fossil fuel production is made less
lucrative by renewable energy. While fossil fuels remain fundamentally important, they
also become consolidated in the hands of fewer states. Some of these states—like Qatar
and Turkmenistan—are likely to move from proximate players in the fossil fueled
economy to central stars. This will shift how Great Powers interact with states with large
fossil fuel resources in order to keep prices from becoming either too high or too low—a
condition that would either cripple the global economy or producers.
Currently, fossil fuels make up nearly 90% of total global energy production. This
crucial input to the global economy comes from three sources: natural gas, oil and coal.
Natural gas and oil are responsible for just over 30% of total energy production, while
coal is responsible for nearly 25%. In the Base Case, fossil fuel energy production as a
share of total energy production declines to 2050, eventually representing nearly 60% of
total global energy production. At this time, the three components of fossil fuels each
represent around 20% of total energy production, a fundamental and large component to
total production. The largest reduction in fossil fuel production comes from non-OPEC
countries, increasing the future importance of that political association (Bielecki 2002).
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Fossil fuels are traded on global markets. Casper Wienberger—former Secretary
of Defense for Reagan—referred to the Middle East as the, “…umbilical cord of the free
industrialized world” (Jhaveri 2004, 4). The implication for this is that prices are
determined by equilibrium between global supply and demand. As no one country
controls either supply or demand, the market for oil should be relatively stable, with no
state having sway over the machinations of the movement of resources into our out of
supply.
Even though global cartels exist to control the price of oil—though none currently
controls the price of gas—their influence tends to be mitigated by their desire for
government revenue which necessitates keeping global energy prices at levels that
promote global consumption. The Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) currently keeps global oil production at levels that both promote global
economic growth (oil that is too expensive hinders growth) yet high enough to not overdraw reserves and keep sufficient funds flowing to their domestic coffers.
Because fossil fuels are traded on a global market they become less of a
determinate of bilateral state relations for contiguous pairs. Think about Venezuela and
Columbia. Decisions made in Bogota and Caracas have little to do with Venezuela’s
large oil reserves and Columbia’s relative dearth. It is known by Columbia that—if
Venezuela were to shut off the tap and stop trading oil bilaterally, that they could go to
global markets to satisfy domestic energy demand.
While fossil fuel resources do not play into decision-making for all traditionally
defined politically relevant dyads (those with at least one Great Power and/or territorial
contiguity), they are for those that contain a Great Power and a state with large fossil fuel
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resources. The United States, for example, is interested in keeping the supply of oil and
natural gas freely flowing to promote global economic growth (Barnes and Jaffe 2006).
Countries with large oil and gas reserves are the focus of much US diplomatic
engagement, and occasionally military action. See Yergin’s Foreign Affairs piece on the
importance of energy security for G-8 countries (Yergin 2006; Yergin 1991).
It is not coincidence that many have argued that fossil fuels play a role in the
decision-making of Great Powers. Many have linked historic US foreign policy
decisions—such as the occurrence of conflict—with a country’s level of overall fossil
fuel resources. Most recently, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was connected to fossil fuels by
Jhaveri, who argues that the massive existing and potential reserves of oil were a key
driver of the decision to go to war, initially citing writing by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul
Wolfowitz and Richard Perle from 1998 indicating that Saddam Hussein’s existence in
power jeopardizes a large amount of fossil fuel resources (2004). Other authors speculate
about the impact of the rise of China and their foreign policy related to fossil fuels
(Downs 2004).
This section measures the Dyadic Realist Index for Fossil Fuel pressures between
dyads. It makes the claim that politically relevant dyads in this arena involve at least one
state is a great power and the other to contain large fossil fuel reserves. It then takes the
fossil fuel reserves of gas and oil for the most endowed partner and divides them by the
global total. States with very high levels of fossil fuel in dyads with Great Powers will
produce scores that indicate that fossil fuels play into material decisions taken related to
foreign policy within that dyad.
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IFs forecasts global energy production by six types: oil, gas, coal, hydro, nuclear
and renewable. The Base Case shows global production of fossil fuels to increase until
the mid-2030s and then plateau. However, this stagnation in growth in fossil fuels occurs
at a time when global energy production is on the incline. This is due to the massive
increase in growth in renewable energy resources. The line-graph below demonstrates
this massive transition in global energy production to 2050. By the end of this time
horizon, renewable energy is forecast to provide more than twice the amount of energy
than oil today.
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Figure 100: Energy Production by Type - World

The impressive increase in renewable energy occurs because it becomes relatively
less costly to produce than alternatives. This is due to two things: first, fossil fuels
become more expensive to produce as technological improvements that reduce cost are
out-stripped by deeper wells, less pure oil and more hazardous drilling environments.
Second, the cost of renewable energy declines as new technologies decrease the
investment required to build solar panels, turbines, etc and the transportation
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infrastructure gradually transitions from a singularly fossil fuel driven framework to a
fossil fuel/electricity hybrid framework.
Not only do fossil fuels remain a crucial component of global growth for the next
four decades, but they become increasingly isolated in the hands of fewer and fewer large
producers. Across this time horizon OPEC goes from producing 40% of the world’s total
oil to over 70%. The three countries with the highest levels of reserves—Russia, Iran and
Qatar—move from production today of nearly 25% of total natural gas to nearly 50% by
2050.
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Figure 101: Oil and Gas Production as Percent of World Total - Selected Groups

An increase in the concentration of fossil fuels and their continued importance
across the time horizon indicates that there is likely to be an increased pressure from the
Dyadic Realist Index across time. This is not true at a global level, and for the same
reason as discussed above: the absolute number of Great Powers declines across this
time horizon. Conceptually, this means that there are fewer states with the will and ability
to impact the decisions made by states that are relatively large holders of fossil fuels.
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Take the global average for the Dyadic Realist Index measuring fossil fuels—with
no falling Great Powers included—demonstrates that this will be an issue of increasing
importance across time. The line-graph below demonstrates this pressure. It remains
relatively stagnant for the next 30 years and then begins to deteriorate. The increasing
Realist pressure from this measure occurs in those states that remain large producers of
oil and gas across this time horizon.
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Figure 102: Dyadic Index for Fossil Fuels - World Average

On a country-average basis, the country with the lowest global average Dyadic
Index score for fossil fuels—indicating that these resources play into their foreign policy
decision making more broadly than any other country, is Russia. Russia has the world’s
largest reserves of natural gas (with more than 50% more than the second largest gas
reserves in Iran) and also substantial reserves of oil (the world’s 7th largest reserves
overall). They also begin the time horizon as a Great Power, thus making the size of
fossil fuel reserves in other countries germane to their own decision-making as well. The
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table below summarizes the top 10 countries in 2010 and 2050 for their average global
Dyadic Index score for fossil fuels.
Table 19: Top 10 Dyads with Most Deteriorated Dyadic Index for Fossil Fuels

Top 10 Dyads with
Most Deteriorated
Dyadic Index Score for
Fossil Fuels between
2010 and 2050
Russia
USA
Iran
Brazil
Saudi
China
Arabia
USA
India
China
Japan
Saudi
Brazil
Arabia
India
Iran
United
Russia
Kingdom
Germany
Qatar
France
Venezuela

The dyads where fossil fuels play the largest role are those with a member that
has great reserves, at any point in time. The dyadic relationships that experience the
largest amount of overall deterioration are those with one member that has a large amount
of fossil fuel resources that are currently under-developed. Dyads with one Great Power
and the following countries will experience an increasing importance of fossil fuel
resources in their political decision-making: Russia will become an increasingly
important country for mainly natural gas, but also oil reserves. With their decline as a
Great Power, their reserves will become an increasingly important feature of international
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life moving forward. Saudi Arabia will become an increasingly important player in
foreign policy decisions surrounding fossil fuel due to their massive oil reserves. Iraq—
having the second largest overall oil reserves—will also continue to be an increasingly
important player in this realm. Qatar has huge natural gas reserves—the world’s third
largest—but they remain only a medium-sized producer of natural gas—currently the
world’s 10th largest. This will rectify, and Qatar will become an increasingly important
player in the world of natural gas production, and thus an increasingly important country
when it comes to foreign policy decisions involving fossil fuels. Finally, Turkmenistan
will represent an increasingly important country regarding fossil fuel foreign policy
decisions. They currently have the world’s fourth largest reserves but are the world’s 31st
largest producer. This discrepancy will unlikely stand.

274

Figure 103: Integrated IR Index plus Fossil Fuels - Selected Years Politically Relevant Dyads

Overall Deep Drivers of State Behavior
I combine the different Deep Driver pressures described above to highlight dyads
and countries that experience multiple pressures. These pairs of states may be more
vulnerable to deteriorated relations across time. The next section of this Chapter 7 brings
these deep drivers together with the Integrated IR Index to identify the most vulnerable
dyads to conflict in the international system moving forward in a more comprehensive
measure. I reiterate that I am not deploying a conceptual framework for evaluating
exactly how these deep drivers impact state behavior in isolation or conjunction.
A key trend ameliorating negative pressure moving forward is improvements in
vulnerability to state fragility across time. State fragility—as operationalized in this
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project and defined earlier—is an index measure that captures general levels of human,
social, economic, political and environmental development. For the lion’s share of the
world’s countries these measures have been improving historically, and IFs forecasts this
to continue for the next four decades. This general improvement in human development
leads to an overall reduction in the chance that a state would experience a domestic
instability event, which would lead to dyadic pressures on contiguous states and Great
Powers.
While there is an absolute reduction in pressure stemming from state fragility,
concerns arising from water resources and fossil fuel resources may increase in many
regions. This will—in certain dyads—force resource availability to be a key component
of decision making in foreign policy. See the table below for IFs Base Case treatment of
various deep drivers.
Table 20: Base Case Behavior of Various Indices Related to Deep Drivers

Base Case Behavior of Various Deep Drivers of State Behavior
Global
Global
Average
Average
Dyadic Score
Countries/Regions of
Dyadic
without
Focus
Score
Falling Great
Powers
Middle East, North Africa,
Water
Deteriorates
Deteriorates
Central Asia
Resources
Improves
Improves
Those moving from Low
State
Income to Middle Income
Fragility Significantly Significantly
OPEC Countries and
Fossil
Improves
Deteriorates
Persistent Great Powers
Fuels
Summary
Improves
Improves
Various
Index
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Of the over 16,653 dyad years explored in this exercise, 126 experience
deterioration in the Deep Drivers of state behavior across the forty year time horizon
representing 0.5 percent of the total. These 126 pairs of states represent 6.5 percent of
politically relevant dyads (sample size of 1,944). The majority of dyads in the
international system do not experience negative pressure stemming from changes in the
deep drivers, discussed above, even without mitigating impacts from Liberalism and
improvements in the stock of cooperative culture. The change in this pressure on a dyad
basis across time is represented in the line-graph below, which organizes dyads by
selected years from most pressure (to the left) to least (to the right). The majority of
dyads that are politically relevant experience little to no pressure. A handful of these
dyads (about 10 percent) experience increasing pressure. Across time, the majority of
politically relevant dyads see reductions in these pressures. However, the lower 10
percent experience these pressures being as acute as they are today or actually
deteriorating.
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Figure 104: Deep Drivers of State Behavior - Politically Relevant Dyads Selected Years

While most dyads enjoy less pressure in 2050 compared with 2010, some dyads
are forecast to experience deteriorated relations based on the aggregation of these three
deep drivers of state behavior between 2010 and 2050. The reduction in scores occur in
water resources and changes in the production of fossil fuel resources as pressure from
state fragility reduces across the time horizon (noted above). The table below lists the 64
countries that are members in a dyad that experiences a reduction in their deep driver
score across this time horizon along with the number of dyads that they experience a
deteriorated interaction. The majority of these countries experience deterioration in either
water or fossil fuel scores and not in both, and many have state fragility scores that
improve only slightly.
Table 21: Dyads with Total Number of Relationships Deteriorated from 2010 to 2050 for Deep Drivers of State
Behavior

Dyads with Total Number of Relationships Deteriorated from 2010 to 2050 for Deep
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Japan
China
India
Iran
USA
Brazil
Iraq
Turkmenistan
Sudan
Turkey
Afghanistan
Russia
Azerbaijan
Qatar

16
14
14
12
12
11
10
8
7
7
6
6
5
5

Saudi Arabia

5

Suriname

5

Drivers of State Behavior
Syria
5
Mauritania
Venezuela
5
Morocco
Algeria
4
Somalia
Australia
4
Ethiopia
Egypt
4
Germany
Kyrgyzstan
4
Israel
Pakistan
4
Jordan
Spain
4
Kenya
Tajikistan
4
Mali
Uzbekistan
4
Norway
Armenia
3
Swaziland
Belgium
3
Ukraine
France
3
Bangladesh
Italy
3
Bhutan
Central
Kazakhstan
3
African
Republic
Lebanon
3
Chad

3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1

Cyprus
Djibouti
Eritrea
Georgia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Moldova
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Netherlands
Poland
Tunisia
Uganda

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

United Kingdom

1

1

Zimbabwe

1

Many of the countries at the top of this list are Great Powers and all experience
dyads that deteriorate because of increased pressure stemming from the centralization of
fossil fuel production. The logic here is that changes in fossil fuel production will
increasingly dominate some relationships (as described above). Removing Great Powers
from the equation, however, produces a slightly different story and highlights specific
states that are likely to experience increasing pressures from these drivers. The word
cloud, below, takes the data presented in the table above sans Great Powers. It shows
only countries that are members of a dyad that experience a deterioration across this time
horizon stemming from these three drivers and the font size corresponds to the number of
dyads in which they experience a reduction. It largely highlights dyads where state
fragility improves only slightly and where water resources are becoming a more acute
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issue. The countries on this list—especially those in large fonts—have historically
experienced conflict. It is certainly worrisome to see both Iran and Iraq as two countries
that are forecast to experience a large number of problematic dyadic relations.
Additionally, Central Asia remains a point of concern with Turkmenistan representing a
focal point for possible future conflict over Deep Drivers of state behavior.

Figure 105: Non-Great Powers with Deteriorated Relationships based on Three Deep Drivers of State Behavior
- Size of Font Equals Number of Deteriorated Relationships from 2010 to 2050

Assessing the behavior of deep drivers of state behavior without also considering
changes in the Integrated IR Index is misleading. In fact, the increasing pressure faced by
the countries in the word cloud above might be entirely off-set by improvements in
culture and increased interdependence. To more fully assess the future of interstate
relations I combine the deep drivers with the Integrated IR Index.

Behavior for Overall Combined Index
The future for dyadic conflict, on a global basis, is rosy. To a large degree the
world is becoming more interdependent in both simple and complex ways. These
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interdependencies create space for dyads to engage in virtuous cycles of foreign policy
that may lead to the lasting peace envisioned by Kant: more trade leads to more shared
IO membership and more thorough alignment of foreign policy interests in the
international system. Historic development would also indicate that the culture of
interstate interaction is moving towards more cooperation and away from more conflict.
These are all good things.
Not only are interdependencies deepening across the globe, but some negative
pressures are also on the decline. The next four decades show a decline in foreign policy
pressures related to material power considerations. This is based primarily on two
powerful trends. First, there is a reduction in the number of Great Powers in the
international system. The forecasts indicate that the falling Great Powers—Russia,
Germany, France and the United Kingdom—no longer have the ability to exert power as
effectively over the next 40 years. Such a reduction in the number of states with the
capacity to exert foreign policy influence widely would lead to an absolute reduction in
the overall amount of pressure stemming from relative material power considerations in
foreign policy decision making.
Additionally, international pressure stemming from domestic instability—leading
to wars of opportunity (Iran and Iraq in the 1980s) or wars of neighborhood or
international stability (Kenya and Somalia in 2012, or the US and Somalia in the
1990s)—are forecast to decline substantially. Domestic instability events have been on
the decline since the end of the Cold War, and I expect this transition to continue, driven
largely by increased levels of education, health and income.
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While the forecast for international conflict is generally positive, there are
exceptions. Some pressures persist—either stemming from the Realist Index or Deeper
Drivers explored in this chapter—and even intensify. First, the global shift from a
unipolar world with multiple second-tier Great Powers to a world of three first tier Great
Powers and two second tier Great Powers could lead to conflict. There is great
uncertainty surrounding the rise of China and India and whether and how it will lead to
shifting alliances and new proxy-conflicts, ala the Cold War. Second, other global power
transitions may lead to conflict in specific regions. In Central Asia, Turkmenistan is
forecast to grow significantly supported by very large natural gas reserves. Currently one
of the smaller powers in the region, it is likely to grow into one of the largest over the
next four decades. Shifts in material power concentrations can upset former patterns of
foreign policy interaction and can lead to conflict.
In certain regions water resources are becoming scarcer, and this could lead to
conflict. Currently, levels of water stress are highest across the Arabian Peninsula, with
many countries and dyads already drawing down water tables and importing fresh water.
Pressures in these dyads are forecast to continue to increase. The largest new threat from
water resources in dyads that share river basins comes in Central Asia, South Asia,
North-East Africa and parts of the Middle East. Fossil fuels will also continue to play a
critical role in the future of dyadic international relations. While renewable energy is
forecast to grow into a (if not the) critical source of global energy demands, fossil fuels
will remain available and cost-competitive for certain activities (such as space travel or
jet flight, among manufacturing and fertilizer use). While many states will pump away
their fossil fuels over the next two decades, states with large reserves will remain
282

crucially important—even relatively more important than they are today—when it comes
to energy production.
The final output of this project is a measure of the overall threat that a dyad
experiences in any year. This is a simple aggregation of Kantian Liberal, Cultures of
Interaction, Realist, Fossil Fuel, State Fragility and Water Resource Indices. The three
curves in the line-graph below demonstrate how this index distributes for all dyads in the
international system in 2010, 2025 and 2050. It is sorted—from left to right—by most
overall threat to the least. First, the curves shift up across time indicating that the majority
of dyads in the international system are forecast to experience better relations across time.
A second characteristic of this line graph is the extremes of the distribution: Both dyads
with very good levels of dyadic interaction—and, as a counter, very low levels of
threat—and those with very high levels of threat represent a very small percentage of the
distribution in 2010, and this distribution does not change significantly across time. There
exists a cohort of dyads in each time period with extremely positive and negative
relations.
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Figure 106: Integrated IR Index and Deep Drivers for All Dyads - Selected Years

The majority of dyads experience improved relations across time. However, there
are some that do not. These pairs of states do not see the ameliorating impacts of
interdependence operationalized in the Liberal Index out weight increased pressures from
the combination of shifts in relative material power, state fragility, water resources and
fossil fuels. The table below highlights countries and the number of relationships that
they are a part of that experience reductions.
Dyads with Total Number of Relationships Deteriorated from 2010 to 2050 for
Integrated IR Index and Deep Drivers of State Behavior
Iraq
10
Egypt
4
USA
3
Israel
1
Mauritania
10
India
4 Uzbekistan 3
Jordan
1
China
7
Pakistan
4
Ethiopia
2
Lesotho
1
Iran
7
Turkey
4
Kenya
2
Mali
1
Sudan
7
Chad
3
Swaziland
2
Mozambique
1
Afghanistan
6
Kazakhstan
3
Armenia
1
Myanmar
1
Kyrgyzstan
6
Lebanon
3
Australia
1
Nigeria
1
Solomon
Algeria
5
Morocco
3 Azerbaijan 1
1
Islands
Central
Japan
5
Somalia
3
African
1
Spain
1
Republic
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Russia
Saudi
Arabia
Brazil

5

Syria

3

Djibouti

1

Tunisia

1

5

Tajikistan

3

Ecuador

1

Uganda

1

4

Turkmenistan

3

Eritrea

1

The countries in the table above are the ultimate result of this project, and
represent countries that have long-term interstate security concerns, some more than
others. Iraq and Mauritania top the list, both with 10 dyadic relations that are forecast to
reduce in character across the time horizon. This is so for various reasons. First, neither
state is forecast to become very liberal, though Iraq becomes more liberal than Mauritania
by becoming an increasingly important producer of fossil fuels. However, the production
of fossil fuels in Iraq becomes an important pressure in their relations with Great Powers:
because they become increasingly important in this issue area, their domestic policy
choices are increasingly put under pressure. Both of these states are in regions where
fresh water use is already very high, and this is forecast to increase. Both Mauritania and
Iraq are also in neighborhoods where pressures from state fragility remain relatively high.
The top seven states in the table above—Iraq, Mauritania, China, Iran, Sudan,
Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan—all share characteristics. They share contiguous borders
with many states, remain fairly illiberal across the time horizon, share river basins that
are over-stretched and have regional issues with state fragility that are forecast to
continue. The largest number of states in the table above is located in the Middle East and
North Africa (14 out of 47 states) followed by Sub Saharan Africa (13) and Central Asia
(8). Remaining countries are scattered across the globe.
Deterioration of bilateral relations across this number of important dyads is an
important conclusion of this project. I have identified potential hot-spots using an
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integrated approach. Most notably, the future of interstate relations in Central Asia is
contentious, as it experiences all of the pressures conceptualized in this dissertation. The
great gas reserves of Turkmenistan will lead to its rise and transition to regional power
status. This, coupled with pressure from water resources, illiberal governments and the
continued specter of state fragility makes the region a potentially dangerous zone moving
forward. The Middle East and North Africa both remain concerns moving forward, as do
selected areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, most notably around the river basin that stretches
from Ethiopia to Egypt.

Conclusion
For the most part, the character of bilateral relationships in the international
system seems likely to improve over the next four decades, though challenges will
persist. Overall, this Base Case analysis forecasts that relationships will generally
strengthen, diplomatic ties will increase and some Realist pressures will decline. That
said there are still regions and dyads that will experience high levels of structural pressure
that may lead to deterioration in the character of their interaction. Much of this pressure
will come from increased pressures around water, fossil fuels and material power
transitions in dyads with already low levels of Liberalism.
It must be reiterated that these forecasts are from the Base Case of the IFs system.
Future work must focus on exploring uncertainty around this forecast through the
creation of scenarios. While the Base Case is a good place to start, it certainly is not a
sufficient place to end. Deterioration of globalization, state failure in China and many
other destabilizing events could negatively impact the story outlined in this chapter.
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8. Conclusions: Lots of Next Steps
This dissertation contributes to the fields of International Relations (IR) and
Integrated Assessment Modeling by operationalizing historic measures of IR theory from
1960 to 2001 and forecasting these indices from 2010 to 2050 in the International Futures
(IFs) model. In this project, I build a tool that can be used to quantitatively assess the
character of interaction between all sovereign dyads across this long time horizon. This
tool can be used to evaluate the logical outcomes of theoretical assumptions, produce
policy relevant analysis, and can be used as a pedagogical tool for teaching about IR.I
have used this dissertation to lay a foundation for a broader research agenda that creates
macro level, structured representations of the behavior of states in the international
system that are integrated across issue areas and that embrace pragmatism in analysis and
not ideology. I have not fully succeeded in this goal. I have not, for example, fully
structured a model of state interaction over long time horizons, nor have I shown how to
deeply integrate IR theory quantitatively. With those shortcomings in mind, I have
attempted to present myself as being opposed to the following three perspectives:
First, much quantitative analysis in the field of IR is not structured, and relies on
statistical evaluations of drivers of one dependent variable or another. Purely statistical
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approaches to doing analysis—for example, those deployed by Bennett and Stam
(citation)—are useful for pushing towards quantitative verification of theoretical
perspectives, but they must be augmented with model building approaches that embrace
formal structure. By that, I mean that it is problematic to evaluating the historic onset of
conflict by throwing every theoretical perspective into a model and seeing what emerges.
An alternative to this is an approach that starts with a structured representation of theory
(how material power interacts with alliance building, and how that drives culture, etc)
and builds up. I began to do this, but fell well short of a fully structured model of
international interaction across long time horizons. That failure in mind, I did approach
the problem of measuring the character of state interaction from a systems theory and
structured perspective.
Second, this dissertation presents an integrated approach to doing analysis, both
from a quantitative perspective as well as a qualitative perspective. The IFs system is
unique in providing a wide range of quantitative integration across key global systems. I
augment that by arguing that IR theory should also be treated as an integrated whole and
not as separate islands of insight that are to be drawn from. I show through statistical
analysis that this is reasonable, though my integration of IR theories is only of the most
thin kind (simple aggregation).
Finally, this dissertation challenges those would embrace IR theory from
perspectives that are ideologically driven. It is not true that relative material power is a
tranhistorical fact in the same way that it is not true that interdependence is a panacea.
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Instead, these different perspectives have the ability to provide ranges of insight that
should be seen as complimentary. This dissertation demonstrated that.
More specifically, this project creates historic measures of IR for all dyads from
1960 to 2001 by measuring Liberal, Realist and the Cultures of Interaction indices. I
improve on the previous operationalization of these indices in the following ways. First, I
create a new data set (country embeddedness in treaties held by the UN secretariat) and
integrate that data into the historic and forecast measure for Liberalism. Second, I
historically operationalize a measure of relative material power (using the
Hillebrand/Herman method) that previously did not exist in the public domain. Third, I
build a measure called the “Cultures of Interaction Index” (CoI Index) entirely from the
dyad-level up. This index leverages conceptual elements of Liberalism (such as complex
interdependences) and also attempts quantify, albeit imperfectly, a stock of cultural
engagement between pairs of countries. Derivations of this measure have already been
used in policy analysis both by and for the US government.55
This dissertation also contributes to the quantification of IR theory by showing
that standard quantifications of Liberalism and Realism provide more explanatory power
when used in concert to explain the historic occurrence of conflict than either do in
isolation. I also show that the newly created measure of CoI Index adds to the overall
explanatory power of the Liberal-Realist model. This logistic regression analysis

55

A version of the Cultures of Interaction graph analyzed against the natural log of the Hillebrand and
Herman Power Index is currently used in the draft of the Global Trends 2030 report, to be sent to the
incoming US president this fall. Also, the CoI Index has been used as a foundation for two contracts with
the US Intelligence Community and the Frederick S Pardee Center. The final output of that interaction will
be a long-term forecast of relative diplomatic power.
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provides further support for the assertion that general IR perspectives contain more
explanatory power when used in conjunction than isolation, and analysts should see them
as complimentary and not competing approaches to explaining behavior in the
international system.
This project contributes to the abovementioned fields by endogenizing both
Liberal and Realist indices within the IFs—and using the CoI Index exogenously—to
model dyadic behavior over a 40 year time horizon. This work informs analysis about the
changing character of dyadic interactions across long time horizons. The final output of
this dissertation project has policy relevance and identifies specific dyads that are most
likely to experience deterioration in the character of their interaction based on the IR
indices modeled.
This project contributes to long-term understandings of distal drivers of conflict in
the international system. Chapter 7 explores three theoretically relevant distal drivers of
dyadic conflict—drivers that both impact IR theories along with dyadic relations between
states. These are domestic state fragility, depleted water resources for dyads who share
river basins, and shifts in fossil fuel production for dyads with one Great Power.
I conclude that the future of international relations is generally positive with
increases in Liberalism likely to offset the majority of drivers of deteriorated relations,
even Deep Drivers discussed in Chapter 7. That said, there are still problematic regions
and relationships that deserve extended focus. Standard Realist pressures will exert
themselves on specific dyads, notably around the relationship between China - India and
China – US. Deep Drivers are forecast to have negative impacts on relations across the
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Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. Most notably, every country in Central Asia
experiences at least one reduction in bilateral relations over the next forty years. Future
work should include scenario analysis to frame more of the uncertainty in these forecasts
and conclusions.
In terms of policy, this dissertation does not provide specific recommendations,
such as “plan for war between Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan”. Instead, it extends the
horizon across which policy planners can scan in order to allocate resources that help
shape strategic alliances. Specifically, policy makers should be interested in the
following:


Gains in Classical Liberal drivers—trade, democracy and embeddedness in
international political systems—are forecast to improve state relations across the
great majority of dyads



Pressures from relative material power are forecast to have destabilizing impacts
on Great Powers relations in spite of gains made by Liberalism: China – India,
China – US and India – US



Stabilizing interventions brought about by state fragility are forecast to be less
common, though some states remain concerns over the next four decades:
Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Chad and Myanmar



Fossil fuel production is forecast to become increasingly concentrated (mostly in
OPEC countries) and will continue to remain a key for Great Power planning
even as the world moves towards greater renewable energy production
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Water resources are forecast to become more constrained in key river basins
(North-East Africa, Middle East, Central Asia), leading to the possibility of
deteriorated relations among states in these regions



The following states experience a confluence of pressures that do not outstrip
gains from Liberalism, and should be of general concern: Iraq, Mauritania,
China, Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan



Central Asia remains a serious concern for deteriorated interstate relations driven
by low levels of growth in Liberalism coupled with the rapid rise of Turkmenistan
(and their increased importance as a gas exporter), pressure from water stress and
slow improvement in state fragility

While this project has contributed to the field—both in terms of long-term
forecasts and applied international relations analysis—there are certainly shortcomings.
One of the most glaring is the lack of treatment of alliances and networks across
countries. The real test of a dyads relationship has to do not only with the variables
captured in this analysis, but also with variables that we have yet been unable to quantify.
Whether the US and China enjoy stable relations moving forward is heavily contingent
on the degree to which they are both embedded in a similar alliance network or whether
they are embedded in distinct alliance networks with the emergence of a new bi-polar
world.
While neglecting alliances has been a hindrance to analysis, our ability to think
about the future of networks and relationships will be greatly enhanced by the variables
created in this forecasting exercise. Specifically, the Cultures of Interaction index sub292

components provide fertile ground for future research (perhaps using methods like cluster
analysis) to determine political affinity historically in order to hopefully model it in the
future. The work of this project essentially lays the foundation for future forecast work
on alliances and networks.
The treatment of Great Powers in this work should be improved upon. I did not
consider regional power dynamics. For example, in Chapter 6 I produced results
showing that Iran and Israel enjoyed a reasonable relationship and we know that this is
not the case. This criticism can be levied at other regions as well, including in the African
context. One way to treat this with more nuance is to add an additional component to my
algorithm that determines whether a dyad is politically relevant. Instead of being driven
by a global power threshold, this could be driven by a regional power threshold that
would capture the relationship between Iran and Israel, for example. A problem with this
would be the identification of regional boundaries in a reasonable way.
As stated in Chapter 2, we are all stuck with the "problem of the future". We are
compelled to find out as much as we can about what is likely to happen, but we have an
absolute inability to know what events will transpire. This project has taken a mighty stab
at trying to formally model and understand the future of interstate relations in the
international system. It has demonstrated policy, pedagogical and theoretical relevance.
It has also shown that we have good reason to expect a future international system that is
generally better behaved than today, along with evidence to aim resources at mitigating
conflicts that may emerge around the next bend of history.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Countries in International Futures
Afghanistan

Denmark

Liberia

Albania

Djibouti

Libya

Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas,
The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados

Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab
Republic of
El Salvador
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia

Samoa
Sao Tome and
Principe

Lithuania

Saudi Arabia

Luxembourg

Senegal

Madagascar

Serbia

Malawi

Sierra Leone

Malaysia

Singapore

Maldives
Mali

Slovak Republic
Slovenia

Ethiopia

Malta

Solomon Islands

Fiji
Finland
France

Somalia
South Africa
Spain

Belarus

Gabon

Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil

Gambia, The
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece

Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Federated
States of
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique

Grenada

Myanmar

Guatemala
Guinea

Namibia
Nepal

Brunei

Guinea-Bissau

Netherlands

Bulgaria
Burkina Faso

Guyana
Haiti

New Zealand
Nicaragua
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Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab
Republic
Taiwan, China
Tajikistan
Macedonia, Former
Yugoslav Republic
of
Thailand
Timor-Leste

Burundi
Cambodia

Honduras
Hungary

Niger
Nigeria

Cameroon

Iceland

Norway

Canada
Cape Verde
Central
African
Republic
Chad

India
Indonesia

Palestine
Oman

Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and
Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey

Iran, Islamic
Republic of

Pakistan

Turkmenistan

Panama
Papua New
Guinea

Uganda

Iraq

Chile

Ireland

China

Israel

Paraguay

Hong Kong
Colombia
Comoros
Congo,
Republic of
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire

Italy
Jamaica
Japan

Peru
Philippines
Poland

United Arab
Emirates
United Kingdom
Tanzania
United States

Jordan

Portugal

Uruguay

Kazakhstan
Kenya

Uzbekistan
Vanuatu

Croatia

Kuwait

Cuba

Kyrgyzstan
Laos, People's
Democratic
Republic

Puerto Rico
Qatar
Korea,
Republic of
Romania

Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Korea,
Democratic
People's
Republic of
Congo,
Democratic
Republic of

Ukraine

Venezuela
Vietnam

Russian
Federation

Yemen, Republic of

Latvia

Rwanda

Zambia

Lebanon

St. Lucia

Zimbabwe

Lesotho

St. Vincent
and the
Grenadines
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Appendix 2: UN Treaty Categorization
The categorization of UN Treaties into sub-categories. Note, the “political” sub-category
was not displayed above.
Sub-Set 1
1

CHAPTER
I

2

CHAPTER
II

3

CHAPTER
III

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

CHAPTER
IV
CHAPTER
V
CHAPTER
VI
CHAPTER
VII
CHAPTER
VIII
CHAPTER
IX
CHAPTER
X
CHAPTER
XI
CHAPTER
XII
CHAPTER
XIII

Charter of the United
Nations and Statute
of the International
Court of Justice
Pacific Settlement of
International
Disputes
Privileges and
Immunities,
Diplomatic and
Consular Relations,
etc
Human Rights
Refugees and
Stateless Persons
Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic
Substances

Political

Political

Political

Human Rights
Political

Human Rights

Obscene Publications

Domestic

Health

Political
Economic
Economic

Navigation

Economic

Economic Statistics

Economic
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Human Rights

Domestic

Traffic in Persons

International Trade
and Development
Transport and
Communications

Sub-Set 2

Political

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

CHAPTER
XIV
CHAPTER
XV
CHAPTER
XVI
CHAPTER
XVII
CHAPTER
XVIII
CHAPTER
XIX
CHAPTER
XX
CHAPTER
XXI
CHAPTER
XXII
CHAPTER
XXIII
CHAPTER
XXIV
CHAPTER
XXV
CHAPTER
XXVI
CHAPTER
XXVII
CHAPTER
XXVIII
CHAPTER
XXIX

Educational and
Cultural Matters
Declaration of Death
of Missing Persons

Domestic

Status of Women

Human Rights

Freedom of
Information

Political

Penal Matters

Human Rights

Commodities

Economic

Maintenance
Obligations

Economic

Law of the Sea

Political

Commercial
Arbitration

Economic

Law of Treaties

Political

Outer Space

Political

Economic

Telecommunications

Political

Economic

Disarmament

Military

Political

Environment

Political

Environmental

Fiscal Matters

Economic

Miscellaneous

Political
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Appendix 3: Gravity Model Regression Results
Dependent Variable

=

Independent Variable 1

=

Independent Variable 2
Independent Variable 3

=
=

Level of Dyadic
Trade
Log of GDP
Summed
Distance
Year

Coef_of_X1:
Coef_of_X2:
Coef_of_X3:
Y Intercept
R-Square
Adj R-Square

=
=
=
=
=
=

1.69
.000385
.0129
-39.43
0.645
0.645

SE of Y-Intercept
SE_of_X1:
SE_of_X2:
SE_of_X3:
t-Value of Y-Intercept
t-Value_of_X1:
t-Value_of_X2:
t-Value_of_X3:
Prob of Y-Intercept
Prob_of_X1:
Prob_of_X2:
Prob_of_X3:
Multiple R
Std Error of Estimate

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

1.15
.0028
.000002
.000584
-34.02
605.77
220.42
22.17
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.781224
3.35
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Appendix 4: Logistic Regression Results
R^2

Chi
Square
Test

Prob >
Chi
Square

COW Direct
Actors

0.0098

10.45

0.0012

COW Direct
Actors

0.131

139.75

<.0001

COW Direct
Actors

0

0.01544

0.9011

COW Direct
Actors

0.146

155.6

<.0001

COW Direct
Actors

0.1403

149.52

<.0001

Liberalism
Standardized

MID Fatality

0.0037

35.48

<.0001

Realism
Standardized

MID Fatality

0.0792

757.98

<.0001

MID Fatality

0.0036

35.4544

<.0001

MID Fatality

0.0739

706.58

<.0001

MID Fatality

0.0824

788.32

<.0001

COW Direct
Actors

0.0552

45.27

<.0001

Data
Independent
Description
Variable
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables,
457k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist

Dependent
Variable

Liberalism
Standardized
Realism
Standardized
Cultures of
Interaction,
Standardized
Aggregation
of CoI,
Liberal and
Realism
Aggregation
of Liberal
and Realism

Cultures of
Interaction,
Standardized
Aggregation
of CoI,
Liberal and
Realism
Aggregation
of Liberal
and Realism
Liberalism
Standardized
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Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows

Realism
Standardized

COW Direct
Actors

0.0579

47.46

<.0001

Cultures of
Interaction,
Standardized

COW Direct
Actors

0.0354

29.046

<.0001

Aggregation
of CoI,
Liberal and
Realism

COW Direct
Actors

0.1001

82.05

<.0001

Aggregation
of Liberal
and Realism

COW Direct
Actors

0.0795

65.16

<.0001

Liberalism
Standardized

MID Fatality

0.0416

257.88

<.0001

Realism
Standardized

MID Fatality

0.0251

155.527

<.0001
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Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows
Full
Variables
with
Realist
Pressure,
67k Rows

Cultures of
Interaction,
Standardized

MID Fatality

0.0244

151.511

<.0001

Aggregation
of CoI,
Liberal and
Realism

MID Fatality

0.563

348.856

<.0001

Aggregation
of Liberal
and Realism

MID Fatality

0.421

260.88

<.0001
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Appendix 5: Base Case Characteristics of International Futures
International Futures Base Case Characteristic – Version 6.43
Economy

Global GDP
growth
ranges from
3-4%
annually

Population

Fertility
rates
decline in
all regions

Education

Primary
education
gross
enrollment
is over
100% by
2025

Health

AIDs deaths
fall to less than
1 million
people
annually by
2040

Government

Political
freedom
increases at
the global
level
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Technology

Energy
efficiency
improves at
.5% annually

Agriculture

Energy

Environment

Cereal yields
improve
globally at
about 0.03
tonnes per
hectare per
year

Energy
from oil,
gas and
coal
dominate
global
production
for the
next two
decades

Annual carbon
emissions grow
for the next 2
decades then
plateau

Economic
production
continues to
diversify
towards
services and
ICT

Life
Expectancy
improves in
all regions

International
trade as a
percentage
of GDP
ticks up
about 0.5
percentage
points
annually

Migration
trends are
extrapolated
from
historic
patterns

Secondary
gross
enrollment
levels reach
80% by
2025

Communicable
disease deaths
decrease by
half over 35
years

Tertiary
gross
enrollment
is over 30%
by 2025

Noncommunicable
disease deaths
increase 1.5
times over 35
years

Economic
freedom
increases at
the global
level

Energy
production
costs decrease
exogenously
differently for
each type
covered (coal,
oil, gas,
hydro, nuclear
and otherrenewable)

Overall crop
land increases
by about 1
million
hectares per
year

Renewable
energy
production
surpasses
any single
fossil fuel
by 2040

Democracy
improves

Global
convergence
of
productivity
to system
leader in
technology

Overall
grazing land
increases by
about 2 million
hectares per
year

Hydrogen
and
nuclear
energy
production
stagnate
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Carbon buildup
in the
atmosphere
grows
throughout the
first half of the
21st century
going beyond
500 PPM by
2050

Foreign
Direct
Investment
as a
percentage
of GDP
increases at
nearly 0.04
percentage
points
annually
Foreign Aid
more than
doubles in
40 years
from 6
trillion USD
to over 12
trillion

World
literacy
levels are
over 90%
by 2030

Global
smoking rates
decline to the
level in 1980
in 25 years

Corruption is
reduced

Efficacy and
Rule of Law
are improved
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Overall fish
harvest
remains
constant

Appendix 6: Fresh Water Renewable Resources Percent Used in 2050
Countries Ranked By Water Stress in 2050 with Percent
Water Stress Shown
1 - Kuwait
7,418
29 - Taiwan
53.77
2 - UAE
1,555
30 - India
50.21
3 - Saudi Arabia
1,190
31 - Belgium
41.87
4 - Libya
1,029
32 - Macedonia
37.22
5 - Palestine
671.1
33 - Kazakhstan
36.64
6 - Yemen
398.1
34 - Lebanon
35.1
7 - Qatar
334.2
35 - Spain
34.29
8 - Oman
201.4
36 - Zimbabwe
33.45
9 - Jordan
190.7
37 - Bulgaria
31.92
10 - Turkmenistan
163.3
38 - Armenia
31.18
11 - Israel
157.2
39 - Mauritania
29.67
12 - Uzbekistan
149.3
40 - Mauritius
29.55
13 - Egypt
145.3
41 - Sri Lanka
29
14 - Tajikistan
116.9
42 - Ukraine
28.51
15 - Syria
114.3
43 - South Africa
28.5
16 - Iraq
112.6
44 - Cyprus
27.44
17 - Sudan
105.1
45 - USA
26.75
18 - Afghanistan
82.17
46 - Korea South 25.62
19 - Iran
81.02
47 - Timor-Leste
24.73
20 - Tunisia
77.87
48 - Germany
24.61
21 - Kyrgyzstan
74.62
49 - Thailand
22.72
22 - Pakistan
74.6
50 - China
22.44
23 - Azerbaijan
70.63
51 - Italy
21.14
24 - Swaziland
59.11
52 - Moldova
20.79
25 - Morocco
58.47
53 - Turkey
20.7
54 – Dominican
26 - Algeria
58.39
20.67
Republic
27 - Puerto Rico
58.38
55 - Hungary
20.56
28 - Somalia
56
56 - Cuba
20.18
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Appendix 7: Government Risk Index scores for countries in 2010 and 2050
Government Risk Index Most Unstable to Least
2010
2050
Somalia
0.545
Somalia
Congo, Democratic
Afghanistan
0.496
Republic of
Congo, Democratic
0.489
Afghanistan
Republic of
Angola
0.483
Chad
Sudan
0.475
Myanmar
Chad
0.467
Burundi
Myanmar
0.454
Eritrea
Eritrea
0.441 Central African Republic
Congo, Republic of
0.43
Sudan
Burundi
0.423
Cote d'Ivoire
Central African Republic 0.418
Rwanda
Yemen
0.408
Madagascar
Nigeria
0.406
Guinea Bissau
Rwanda
0.405
Mauritania
Sierra Leon
0.405
Togo
Equatorial Guinea
0.404
Haiti
Cote d'Ivoire
0.398
Libya
Papua New Guinea
0.395
Niger
Swaziland
0.391
Iraq
Turkmenistan
0.39
Guinea
Liberia
0.387
Zimbabwe
Laos
0.386
Swaziland
Uganda
0.386
Yemen
Uzbekistan
0.385
Sierra Leon
Ethiopia
0.383
Korea North
Guinea Bissau
0.381
Gambia
Haiti
0.381
Iran
Niger
0.381
Congo, Republic of
Nepal
0.38
Liberia
Mauritania
0.378
Cameroon
Gambia
0.377
Tajikistan
Iraq
0.377
Saudi Arabia
Burkina Faso
0.376
Laos
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0.484
0.443
0.385
0.384
0.377
0.365
0.364
0.352
0.351
0.345
0.344
0.343
0.342
0.341
0.341
0.328
0.328
0.324
0.322
0.321
0.321
0.32
0.319
0.315
0.314
0.312
0.312
0.311
0.311
0.31
0.306
0.304
0.303

Madagascar
Korea North
Azerbaijan
Zimbabwe
Guinea
Djibouti
Pakistan
Cameroon
Mozambique
Mali
Libya
Togo
Algeria
Cambodia
Iran
Gabon
Tajikistan
Zambia
Vietnam
Saudi Arabia
Timor-Leste
Malawi
Russia
Syria
Tanzania
Comoros
Lesotho
India
Senegal
China
Kuwait
Solomon Islands
Philippines

0.376
0.374
0.373
0.372
0.37
0.369
0.367
0.364
0.363
0.362
0.358
0.357
0.355
0.355
0.353
0.352
0.351
0.349
0.346
0.343
0.341
0.339
0.339
0.339
0.339
0.338
0.337
0.336
0.336
0.335
0.335
0.331
0.33

Bangladesh

0.329

Belarus
Kazakhstan
Oman
Egypt

0.328
0.327
0.326
0.324
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Angola
Burkina Faso
Nepal
Comoros
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Papua New Guinea
Pakistan
Belarus
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Syria
Vietnam
Kuwait
Solomon Islands
Senegal
Algeria
Benin
Egypt
Venezuela
Bosnia
Zambia
Kazakhstan
Ethiopia
Morocco
Mali
Palestine
Fiji
Russia
Cambodia
Federated States of
Micronesia
Colombia
Malawi
Honduras
Sao Tome and Principe

0.302
0.299
0.299
0.298
0.298
0.298
0.298
0.296
0.296
0.295
0.292
0.291
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.287
0.286
0.284
0.283
0.282
0.281
0.281
0.28
0.28
0.278
0.277
0.277
0.276
0.275
0.274
0.274
0.273
0.271
0.27
0.269
0.268
0.268

Colombia
Sri Lanka
Venezuela
Guatemala
Palestine
Kenya
Namibia
Fiji
Morocco
Thailand
Benin
Indonesia
Sao Tome and Principe
Maldives
Federated States of
Micronesia
Bahrain
Honduras
Cuba
Qatar
Tunisia
UAE
Bhutan
Bolivia
South Africa
Ecuador
Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Bosnia
Paraguay
Nicaragua
Ghana
Turkey
Vanuatu
Guyana
Botswana
Tonga
Mongolia
Armenia

0.323
0.322
0.322
0.318
0.315
0.314
0.313
0.311
0.31
0.309
0.308
0.307
0.305
0.304

Tunisia
Cuba
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Lesotho
China
Guatemala
Tonga
Jordan
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Thailand
Bahrain
Oman

0.268
0.267
0.267
0.267
0.264
0.263
0.262
0.262
0.261
0.261
0.26
0.26
0.258
0.256

0.303

UAE

0.256

0.302
0.301
0.297
0.295
0.295
0.295
0.293
0.293
0.292
0.291
0.291
0.291
0.29
0.289
0.287
0.286
0.283
0.283
0.277
0.275
0.275
0.274
0.273

Kyrgyzstan
Kenya
Armenia
Maldives
Mozambique
Paraguay
Tanzania
Namibia
Qatar
Ecuador
Timor-Leste
Bangladesh
Ghana
Indonesia
Guyana
India
Georgia
Samoa
Serbia
Vanuatu
Bolivia
Ukraine
Lebanon

0.253
0.251
0.247
0.247
0.247
0.245
0.245
0.243
0.243
0.24
0.239
0.238
0.237
0.237
0.236
0.231
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.229
0.229
0.228

308

Samoa
Peru
Lebanon
Belize
Georgia
Suriname
Trinidad
Brunei
Dominican Republic
Mexico
Ukraine
Grenada
Moldova
El Salvador
Albania
Cape Verde
Malaysia
Puerto Rico
Brazil
Macedonia
Serbia
Jamaica
Montenegro
Bulgaria
Argentina

0.273
0.272
0.271
0.264
0.264
0.264
0.262
0.261
0.261
0.258
0.258
0.257
0.256
0.255
0.254
0.254
0.252
0.252
0.247
0.246
0.246
0.244
0.242
0.239
0.237

0.228
0.228
0.223
0.222
0.222
0.221
0.221
0.22
0.22
0.218
0.218
0.217
0.217
0.216
0.214
0.214
0.213
0.213
0.211
0.209
0.208
0.208
0.207
0.207
0.207

0.237
0.233
0.229

Moldova
Turkey
El Salvador
Bhutan
Mongolia
Bulgaria
South Africa
Mexico
Montenegro
Albania
Jamaica
Belize
Grenada
Puerto Rico
Cape Verde
Macedonia
Botswana
Brunei
Suriname
Hong Kong
Peru
Singapore
Brazil
Malaysia
Trinidad
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Romania
Israel
Dominican Republic

Israel

0.237

Panama
Singapore
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Romania
Croatia
Costa Rica
Hong Kong
Latvia
Mauritius
Lithuania

0.227

Costa Rica

0.196

0.225
0.223
0.221
0.218
0.215
0.214
0.207

Croatia
Panama
St. Lucia
Argentina
Greece
Lithuania
Mauritius

0.194
0.193
0.193
0.191
0.19
0.19
0.19
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0.206
0.205
0.204
0.203

Chile
Italy
Greece
Bahamas
Hungary
Uruguay
Malta
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Rep
Czech Republic
Korea South
Barbados
Estonia
Slovenia
Spain
Taiwan
Belgium
Cyprus
USA
France
Iceland
United Kingdom
Ireland
Japan
Norway
Australia
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Switzerland
Canada
Germany
New Zealand
Denmark
Finland
Sweden

0.205
0.204
0.203
0.197
0.196
0.196
0.194
0.193
0.193
0.193
0.192
0.188
0.185
0.185
0.183
0.183
0.183
0.181
0.181
0.179
0.177
0.177
0.174
0.171
0.169
0.169
0.167
0.167
0.167
0.166
0.165
0.164
0.162
0.159
0.157
0.155
0.153
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Latvia
Chile
Italy
Portugal
Hungary
Barbados
Spain
Uruguay
Bahamas
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Slovak Rep
Malta
Slovenia
Estonia
Taiwan
Belgium
Poland
France
Korea South
Australia
USA
New Zealand
Iceland
Japan
Netherlands
Ireland
Luxembourg
Austria
Germany
Norway
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Sweden

0.189
0.188
0.185
0.185
0.18
0.178
0.178
0.178
0.176
0.174
0.173
0.173
0.172
0.171
0.17
0.166
0.165
0.165
0.163
0.161
0.159
0.159
0.156
0.155
0.155
0.154
0.153
0.153
0.152
0.152
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.149
0.146
0.144
0.143

Appendix 8: Multivariate Regression Used To Forecast Political
Embeddedness in International Political Organizations
Dependent Variable

=

Independent Variable 1
Independent Variable 2
Independent Variable 3

=
=
=

Political Embeddedness in
International Political Organizations
GDP per capita at PPP
Gov Expense % GDP
Historic Material Power

Coef_of_X1:
Coef_of_X2:
Coef_of_X3:
Y Intercept
R-Square
Adj R-Square
F-Value
Probability of Zero

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

1.884102
1.438121
16.10293
58.8817
0.610311
0.593368
36.02139
4.00E-14

SE of Y-Intercept
SE_of_X1:
SE_of_X2:
SE_of_X3:
Beta_of_X1:
Beta_of_X2:
Beta_of_X3:
t-Value of Y-Intercept
t-Value_of_X1:
t-Value_of_X2:
t-Value_of_X3:
Prob of Y-Intercept
Prob_of_X1:
Prob_of_X2:
Prob_of_X3:
Multiple R
Std Error of Estimate
Dependent Variable
Ave
Dependent Variable

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

10.84787
0.423389
0.459673
3.391678
0.413867
0.284317
0.367212
5.427949
4.450054
3.128574
4.747779
7.98E-07
3.21E-05
2.57E-03
1.08E-05
0.781224
31.55091

=

99.76284

=

48.63065
311

Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable
Coefficient of
Variation
Ratio of SE to Mean

=

0.487463

=

0.316259
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